ABSTRACT Studies on development and fairness judgments in resource allocations have mainly addressed the distribution of reward. However, the distribution of responsibility also requires exploration in the context of research on development and distributive justice. For an integrated understanding of reward and responsibility distributions, we briefly reviewed the studies on children’s fairness judgments in reward and responsibility distributions. We then discussed the theoretical basis and methodological framework to further our understanding. After reviewing a study which considered both reward and responsibility (...) distributions in the same experiment, we also discussed the questions to be solved to understand children’s fairness judgments in both types of distributions. Individual developmental process of fairness judgments, (in)consistency of judgments in reward and responsibility distributions, and generous judgments in allocations were discussed by referring to theoretical discussions of culture and reciprocity. (shrink)

In our previous paper [5], we have studied Kripke-type semantics for propositional logics without the contraction rule. In this paper, we will extend our argument to predicate logics without the structure rules. Similarly to the propositional case, we can not carry out Henkin's construction in the predicate case. Besides, there exists a difficulty that the rules of inference () and () are not always valid in our semantics. So, we have to introduce a notion of normal models.

The species problem is often described as the abundance of conflicting definitions of _species_, such as the biological species concept and phylogenetic species concepts. But biologists understand the notion of species in a non-definitional as well as a definitional way. In this article I argue that when they understand _species_ without a definition in their mind, their understanding is often mediated by the notion of _good species_, or prototypical species, as the idea of ``prototype'' is explicated in cognitive psychology. This (...) distinction helps us make sense of several puzzling phenomena regarding biologists' dealing with species, such as the fact that in everyday research biologists often behave as if the species problem is solved, while they should be fully aware that it is not. I also briefly discuss implications of this finding, including that some extant attempts to answer what the nature of species is have an inadequate assumption about how the notion of species is represented in biologists' minds. (shrink)

Takahashi translation * is a translation which means reducing all of the redexes in a λ-term simultaneously. In [4] and [5], Takahashi gave a simple proof of the Church–Rosser confluence theorem by using the notion of parallel reduction and Takahashi translation. Our aim of this paper is to give a simpler proof of Church–Rosser theorem using only the notion of Takahashi translation.

This book is a comprehensive investigation of the work of Joseph Alois Schumpeter, one of the great economists of the twentieth century. In this study, Yuichi Shionoya highlights Schumpeter's methodological views and emphasizes his ideal of a universal social science. Taking on board all aspects of his work, he reconstructs a system which encompasses theory and metatheory. The originality of Schumpeter's work - which the author calls the two-structure approach to the evolution of mind and society - is examined in (...) the light of the intellectual field in Germany and Austria in the early twentieth century. This book is a major contribution to the history of economic thought. (shrink)

Wegner’s method of flow equations offers a useful tool for diagonalizing a given Hamiltonian and is widely used in various branches of quantum physics. Here, generalizing this method, a condition is derived, under which the corresponding flow of a quantum state becomes geodesic in a submanifold of the projective Hilbert space, independently of specific initial conditions. This implies the geometric optimality of the present method as an algorithm of generating stationary states. The result is illustrated by analyzing some physical examples.

What is the purpose of the economy? To answer this intriguing and fundamental question, this book provides a systematic approach to economic ethics and constructs a relationship between the economy and morality; it expounds theoretical and practical issues of economic philosophy along two dimensions: values and institutions. On the dimension of values, Yuichi Shionoya explores the connections between the economy and morality by reconstructing a coherent system of ethics that coordinates the 'good, right, and virtue'. Based on this system of (...) ethics, the book goes on to discuss the dimension of institutions and presents the philosophy of the welfare state, consisting of a tripartite contemporary institution of 'capitalism, democracy, and social security'. Economy and Morality is a remarkable contribution to economic ethics exploring key philosophical issues including efficiency versus justice and liberty versus excellence. Its unique emphasis is the economics of virtue, which is concerned with the virtuous utilization of economic resources for human development, and applied to the reform of the welfare state. will all find this book of great interest - part of its appeal lying in its interdisciplinary approach to contemporary economic, political and social systems based on the synthesis of moral values. (shrink)

Recently several prominent biologists and philosophers, including Feinberg and Mallatt, and Godfrey-Smith, have proposed evolutionary accounts of consciousness. Despite disagreements regarding the specifics, they all focused on the “primitive” form of consciousness and argued that its origin is much more ancient than previously believed. In this study, we examine these accounts based on their methodological grounds. Specifically, we examine whether one methodological criticism leveled against evolutionary psychology on the completeness of its explanations can be applied to Feinberg and Mallatt’s adaptation (...) explanations. We conclude that their explanations fall short of being complete, but fare better than those advanced by evolutionary psychologists. (shrink)

In Book One of the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume seems to acknowledge the existence of both internal and external worlds, in which perceptions, objects, and bodies, exist. In particular, Hume seems directly to affirm the existence of extra-mental bodies, when he says at the beginning of the section "Of scepticism with regard to the senses," "We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in theexistence of body? but 'tis in vain to ask, whether there be body or (...) not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings" (T 1.4.2.1; SBN 187).1 Furthermore, he thinks that the existence of body must be taken for granted because it is "an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our .. (shrink)

Faced with the charge of value-ladenness in their theories, researchers in evolutionary psychology (EP) argue that their science is entirely free of values; their hypotheses only concern scientific facts, without any socio-cultural value judgments. Lynn Hankinson Nelson, a renowned feminist scholar of science, denies this. In her book and papers, Nelson finds that their hypotheses do contain evaluative components. One such example is the fear of snakes. While this fear was adaptive to the environment in the past, evolutionary psychologists argue (...) that this trait is now “maladaptive” because city-dwellers would rarely encounter snakes in their environment. However, Nelson argues that labeling this trait “maladaptive” implies that this fear is irrational since this claim cannot be understood otherwise. This paper argues that this and other arguments made by Nelson for demonstrating the value-ladenness in EP’s hypotheses have serious flaws. For instance, we argue that investigating the psychological mechanisms behind the fear and their developmental and energy costs would allow for proper interpretation of evolutionary psychologists’ claims for the maladaptive fear of snakes without any normative implication. We also maintain that some of her arguments fail to demonstrate their connection to the point at the center of the debates between EP and feminism. While Nelson may be right in stating that EP’s hypotheses have evaluative components, she does not prove their strong political or normative implications, which is central to the debate over EP. (shrink)

In the rationality debate, Gerd Gigerenzer and his colleagues have argued that human’s apparent inability to follow probabilistic principles does not mean our irrationality, because we can do probabilistic reasoning successfully if probability information is given in frequencies, not percentages (the natural frequency hypothesis). They also offered an evolutionary argument to this hypothesis, according to which using frequencies was evolutionarily more advantageous to our hominin ancestors than using percentages, and this is why we can reason correctly about probabilities in the (...) frequency format. This paper offers a critical review of this evolutionary argument. I show that there are reasons to believe using the frequency format was not more adaptive than using the standard (percentage) format. I also argue that there is a plausible alternative explanation (the nested-sets hypothesis) for the improved test performances of experimental subjects—one of Gigerenzer’s key explananda—which undermines the need to postulate mental mechanisms for probabilistic reasoning tuned to the frequency format. The explanatory thrust of the natural frequency hypothesis is much less significant than its advocates assume. (shrink)

William James criticizes Hume for failing to adhere to the strictly empiricist method when he postulates discrete constituents of experience—which Hume calls perceptions—thereby making our experience a train of disconnected pieces. James argues that the discontinuity of experience in Hume results in part from his failure to recognize the immediate presence of relations in experience.1 Emphasizing a continuity and unity of experience, James thus differentiates his empiricism from Hume's as being radical in the sense that it recognizes relations as 'real' (...) parts of experience just as are things that are experienced to be so related.2 This raises a question concerning the experiential status of relations in Hume: is .. (shrink)

In this note, we will study four implicational logicsB, BI, BB and BBI. In [5], Martin and Meyer proved that a formula is provable inBB if and only if is provable inBBI and is not of the form of » . Though it gave a positive solution to theP - W problem, their method was semantical and not easy to grasp. We shall give a syntactical proof of the syntactical relation betweenBB andBBI logics. It also includes a syntactical proof of (...) Powers and Dwyer's theorem that is proved semantically in [5]. Moreover, we shall establish the same relation betweenB andBI logics asBB andBBI logics. This relation seems to say thatB logic is meaningful, and so we think thatB logic is the weakest among meaningful logics. Therefore, by Theorem 1.1, our Gentzentype system forBI logic may be regarded as the most basic among all meaningful logics. It should be mentioned here that the first syntactical proof ofP - W problem is given by Misao Nagayama [6]. (shrink)

In A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume seems to use the term "object" to refer to different things in different contexts, including impressions, ideas, perceptions, and bodies. Does he ever use the term "external bodies" to refer to things in the extra-mental world? I argue that what Hume means by external bodies when he affirms their existence is not externally existing, material objects that are somehow presented to the mind or presented in impressions. Rather, the bodies that Hume affirms are, (...) at bottom, no different from perceptions, but they can be distinguished from merely internal perceptions like pain or pleasure in terms of their "different relations, connexions, and durations" (T 1.2.6.9; SBN 68). I conclude that in order to be consistent, given the various statements he makes throughout Book One of the Treatise, Hume must reject the philosopher's doctrine of double existence of perceptions and objects and affirm only the existence of perceptions, sometimes conceived as internally existing and mind-dependent and sometimes conceived as existing outside and independent of the mind. (shrink)

The dual process theory is a view that there are two information-processing systems in our mind. It has been popular in cognitive and social psychology for the last few decades, but this simplified formulation of the theory has problems. In this paper I shall review the recent developments made by the dual process theorists to meet those challenges and indicate the directions the theory could take. In particular I shall discuss possible defining properties or mechanisms of the two systems. I (...) argue that working memory and its neural correlates, but not cognitive decoupling, are the underlying mechanisms of the "reflective" system while the "intuitive" system may have rather external underlying mechanisms, i.e., natural selection. This renders both systems homeostatic property cluster kinds but they are based on different kinds of mechanisms. (shrink)

In _Realism and Naturalizing Knowledge_ (Keisho Shobo, 2013), Ryo Uehara carefully formulates the homeostatic property cluster theory of natural kinds and expands it by applying this framework to artifacts and knowledge and thereby drawing them in the naturalistic picture of the world. This is a substantial addition to the development of naturalistic philosophy in Japan. In this essay I shall make general comments on his account of natural kinds in the following respects: Uehara's distinction between real and nominal kinds, his (...) objection to the species-as-individual thesis, the relative lack of attention to the distinction between the realism of natural kinds and the scientific realism, and finally, races as possible natural kinds. (shrink)

The species problem is the longstanding puzzle regarding the nature of species. This paper aims to describe how biologists experience little communication breakdown when they have different conceptions of species. For this purpose, I analyze two debates on species and speciation between Guy Bush and Jerry Coyne & H. Allen Orr. Although they have radically different ideas on species, they experience little communication difficulty. I will argue that this is because they implicitly agreed on the referent of the group of (...) organisms being addressed and possible causal factors of the speciation process. This analysis confirms a leading account in the general philosophy of science on the way in which scientists avoid the incommensurability threat. (shrink)

Gerd Gigerenzer's views on probabilistic reasoning in humans have come under close scrutiny. Very little attention, however, has been paid to his evolutionary component of his argument. According to Gigerenzer, reasoning about probabilities as frequencies is so common today because it was favored by natural selection in the past. This paper presents a critical examination of this argument. It will show first, that, _pace_ Gigerenzer, there are some reasons to believe that using the frequency format was not more adaptive than (...) using the standard (percentage) format and, second, that Gigerenzer's evolutionary argument and his other arguments such as his historical description of the notion of probability are in tension with each other. (shrink)

Platforms for sharing genomic and phenotype data have been developed to promote genomic research, while maximizing the utility of existing datasets and minimizing the burden on participants. The value of genomic analysis of trios or family members has increased, especially in rare diseases and cancers. This article aims to argue the necessity of protection when sharing data from both patients and family members. Sharing patients’ and family members’ data collectively raises an ethical tension between the value of datasets and the (...) rights of participants, and increases the risk of re-identification. However, current data-sharing policies have no specific safeguards or provisions for familial data sharing. A quantitative survey conducted on 10,881 general adults in Japan indicated that they expected stronger protection mechanisms when their family members’ clinical and/or genomic data were shared together, as compared to when only their data were shared. A framework that respects decision-making and the right of withdrawal of participants, including family members, along with ensuring usefulness and security of data is needed. To enable this, we propose recommendations on ancillary safeguards for familial data sharing according to the stakeholders, namely, initial researchers, genomic researchers, data submitters, database operators, institutional review boards, and the public and participants. Families have played significant roles in genetic research, and its value is re-illuminated in the era of genomic medicine. It is important to make progress in data sharing while simultaneously protecting the privacy and interests of patients and families, and return its benefits to them. (shrink)

The main part of the proof of Kripke's completeness theorem for intuitionistic logic is Henkin's construction. We introduce a new Kripke-type semantics with semilattice structures for intuitionistic logic. The completeness theorem for this semantics can he proved without Henkin's construction.

Literature expects that an attitude toward nuclear power is in direct proportion to the perceived risk of accidents at an operational nuclear power plant; that is, the oppositional attitude is based on the view that nuclear technology is risky and support for nuclear power is related to a perceived low risk and/or potential benefit. However, it is misleading to assume that individuals’ risk perception alone can linearly explain their position after such an accident. The association between risk perception and attitude (...) toward nuclear power varies significantly according to country but, until now, has been largely unexamined. This article takes into consideration the effects of structural factors on that relationship by examining public attitudes toward nuclear energy after the Fukushima nuclear accident in March 2011 and reveals that the need for the efficient production of electricity (i.e., nuclear energy) outweighs concern for the potential danger of a nuclear incident. Although a country's dependence on nuclear power for the production of electricity engenders anti-nuclear attitudes, it is evident that a level of economic development largely alleviates any negativity relative to that energy source. (shrink)

William James criticizes Hume for failing to adhere to the strictly empiricist method when he postulates discrete constituents of experience — which Hume calls perceptions — thereby making our experience a train of disconnected pieces. James argues that the discontinuity of experience in Hume results in part from his failure to recognize the immediate presence of relations in experience. Emphasizing a continuity and unity of experience, James thus differentiates his empiricism from Hume's as being radical in the sense that it (...) recognizes relations as ‘real’ parts of experience just as are things that are experienced to be so related. This raises a question concerning the experiential status of relations in Hume: is James correct in accusing Hume of failing to notice the experiential reality of relations? Does Hume deny the experiential reality of relations entirely? Or does Hume downplay the experiential reality of relations and come to take them merely as products of the imagination, hence not ‘real,’ for certain theoretical reasons? (shrink)

For public health professionals, traumatic brain injury and its possible protracted repercussions are a significant source of worry. In opposed to patient neurorehabilitation with developed brain abnormalities of different etiologies, neurorehabilitation of affected persons has several distinct features. The clinical repercussions of the various types of TBI injuries will be discussed in detail in this paper. During severe TBI, the medical course frequently follows a familiar first sequence of coma, accompanied by disordered awareness, followed by agitation and forgetfulness, followed by (...) return of function. Clinicians must be aware of common medical issues that might occur throughout the various stages of neurorehabilitation, for example, posttraumatic hydrocephalus, paroxysmal sympathetic hyperactivity and posttraumatic neuroendocrine disorders, at each step of the process. Furthermore, we address problems about the scheduling of various rehabilitation programs as well as the availability of current data for comprehensive rehabilitative neuropsychology techniques. (shrink)

In the Appendix to A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume famously retracts his account of personal identity by confessing that it involves a profound problem he cannot solve, which I have elsewhere identified and called the Bundling Problem. Neither of the two possible solutions that Hume himself considers in the Appendix is a viable option for him by his own lights, which might suggest that any successful account of a unified self must go beyond the empirical framework. In this paper, (...) I argue that we can find a strictly empiricist solution to Hume's problem in William James. I attempt to show that James's descriptions of our experience are phenomenologically more detailed and faithful to how experience is undergone from the first-person perspective, which allows him to explain our belief in an identical, unified self solely on empirical grounds. James finds unity and continuity right in the content of the stream of experience itself. A detailed investigation of James's accounts reveals that Hume's fundamental problem does not stem merely from his lack of empirical resources but, more importantly, from his tacit abandonment of the professed empiricist methodology. (shrink)

There are remarkable parallels between Hume and Nagarjuna in their denial of substantiality and independence in objects and their subsequent attitude toward our ordinary world. Acknowledging a deep-rooted human tendency to take objects as independent entities, they both argue that there is nothing intrinsic in those objects that make them unitary and independent, and that those characters are, strictly speaking, merely fictitious, mental constructs. They nonetheless affirm the existence of our ordinary world as real. Although their main purposes of the (...) philosophical inquiry are different (epistemological for Hume, and soteriological for Nagarjuna), their accounts of the nature of our world allow us to accept it in the way we ordinarily believe with the deeper understanding of it. It is only in this world where we think, act, and interact with others that an epistemology grounded in human sentiment and experience (for Hume) or humans liberation (for Nagarjuna) is possible. (shrink)