Let DDQ be the thesis that definite descriptions are quantifiers. Philosophers often deny DDQ because they believe that quantifiers do not depend on context in certain ways, ways in which definite descriptions do depend on context. In this paper, we examine one such argument, which, if sound, would entail the negation of DDQ.We show that this argument fails, and draw some consequences from its failure.

An attractive principle about domains of quantification is the analogue of the Separation Axiom in set theory: restricting a domain by an arbitrary predicate yields a domain. In particular, restricting a domain by a predicate that applies to nothing yields a domain. Thus if there is a nonempty domain, there is an empty domain. But semantics for the empty domain involves some neglected subtleties. Untangling them requires us to revise the usual definition of truth in a model, avoiding the detour (...) through Tarski's notion of satisfaction. (shrink)