In my dissertation, I have examined the relations between students? personal epistemologies and self-regulated learning. I have conducted three independent studies for my three-article dissertation. The first study is a meta?analytic research of the relations between personal epistemology and self-regulated learning. I analyzed 40 published articles in the literature and computed an overall effect size for the reported relations between personal epistemology and self-regulated learning. I also examined the roles of the moderator factors on those relations. The meta-analysis revealed a (...) small but statistically significant mean effect size . The moderator analyses revealed that although students? grade level did not statistically significantly predict the relations under fixed- and random-effects models, the effects of culture, sex, and subject area on the relations were statistically significant. For my second study, I collected quantitative data at a high school in Turkey to explore the relations between the students? personal epistemologies and self-regulated learning. Two-hundred-nine high school students at the school in Turkey participated in the study. Results from the structural equation modeling showed that students? personal epistemologies predict both their motivation and meta-cognitive strategies to learn physics. For my third study, I employed a case study in order to explore high school students? personal epistemologies in school science practice in a STEM charter school located in South Central United States. For this study, I observed nine students in a physics class and conducted individual and group interviews with them over six weeks. I audio recorded students? conversations in class. Results showed that the students hold na?ve beliefs about the nature of scientific knowledge and knowing. The students viewed scientific theories as ideas or thoughts that needed to be tested. In their view, a school science experiment had either a correct or an incorrect answer. The three studies I conducted and report in this document help us better comprehend how personal epistemology is related to self-regulated learning and to design instruction to help students? understand the nature of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

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The appearance, use, and philosophy of the disabled detective are latent even in early detective texts, such as in Arthur Conan Doyle’s canonical Sherlock Holmes series. By philosophy, I am referring to both why the detective feels compelled to detect as well as the system of detection the detective uses and on which the text relies. Because the detective feels incompatible with the world around him (all of the detectives I analyze in this dissertation are men), he is driven to (...) either fix himself, the world, or both. His systematic approach includes diagnosing problems through symptomatology and removing the deficient aspect. While the detective narrative’s original framework assimilates bodies to medical and scientific discourses and norms in order to represent a stable social order, I argue that contemporary detective subgenres, including classical disability detective texts, hardboiled disability detective texts and postmodern disability detective texts, respond to this framework by making the portrayal of disability explicit by allocating it to the detective. The texts present disability as both a literary mechanism that uses disability to represent abstract metaphors (of hardship, of pity, of heroism) and a cultural construct in and of itself. I contend that the texts use disability to investigate what it means to be an individual and a member of society. Thus, I trace disability in detective fiction as it parallels the cultural move away from the autonomous individual and his participation in a stable social order and move towards the socially located agent and shifting situational values. (shrink)

The provocation for this dissertation is a brief contention: aging is not synonymous with disease. This contention is a corrective reaction to the pervasive sensibility that aging is a disease, and which therefore casts the character of time’s passing as a process of destruction. The upshot of this corrosive sensibility is that we are not aging well. Guided both by the belief that we can reconstruct the meaning of time’s passing and an ameliorative sensibility to heal human suffering, the dissertation (...) offers an alternative, more fruitful understanding of aging in which the character of time changes from a process of destruction into one of creative individual genesis. This is how we should experience time as time passes. Living in this way is an achievement: It is the activity of ferreting out the best possible ways in which to live so that life is deep and robust with concatenated meaning. This philosophical diagnosis of aging is situated within two philosophical traditions—first, existentialism and, second and primarily, the pragmatism of classical American philosophers. The deceptively simple insights from existentialism at work in the dissertation are this: that we are ontologically free to choose our own persons and that our freedom resides in the ever-present possible. The next philosophical move that is made is the pragmatic turn: that, with a sense that there is always something better, we attend to how it is that we press into our possibilities by listening to and heeding experience so that we adapt and grow as individuals. (shrink)

In order to improve design methodology and better utilize human-centered design (HCD) approaches, there is a need for an intellectual foundation to reconcile HCD with traditional design approaches. A method from Aristotle, called Poiesis, provides a useful basis for this while helping to relate engineering design to a general discipline of design. In this paper, we explain what Poiesis is in an engineering design context, and examine the similarities between current methods and this ancient approach. Current methodology is similar to (...) different parts of Poiesis, but we propose that it can be improved by combining different existing methods using Poiesis as a framework for a more comprehensive, holistic approach. (shrink)

Due to vast changes in religious thinking, an attempt to rethink, and ultimately explode and recreate, religious typology in architecture as it exists becomes necessary. An intense review on existential and pragmatic religious literature leads to the conclusion that the subject of sacred architecture has changed, creating a need to develop a new typology. After arguing the justification of this rethinking, the paper examines literature regarding religious typology as it currently exists and its relationship to the city, the idea of (...) monument and its appropriateness for religious architecture, and the relationship between shared memory and sacred spaces. Finally, the ideas gleaned are applied to three distinct urban fabrics in an attempt to further analyze the theoretical space and produce prototypical models for the fabrics addressed. From these studies an archetypal model of an ideal sacred architecture is created for all three urban conditions. (shrink)

The primary objective of this thesis is to advocate for Black Nationalism's full inclusion in the academic field of political philosophy. By bringing the thinkers in the Black Nationalist tradition into this discourse, the field of philosophy stands to gain important insight into the prejudices and unexamined assumptions that plague academia. I will flesh out the nature of these assumptions using the works of Black Nationalists like Angela Davis, George Jackson and Joy James. This will show that reading Black Nationalists (...) as social theorists enables philosophers to unveil sources of knowledge about political economies by looking at the history of imperialism in a comprehensive manner. The second section is devoted to an examination of how the Black Panther Party's relationship to the state reveals the role of white violence in maintaining racial hierarchies. That the Black Panthers were targeted so systematically by the state indicates that they were perceived to be a threat to the white power structure, which gives us insight into how challenging state terror is a revolutionary act in intellectual and concrete ways. I show that the mainstream academic discourse on racism in American society assigns higher credibility to white philosophers even when Black thinkers have been producing relevant scholarship for centuries on the subject in question. The third section examines the philosophy of the Enlightenment in terms of how it relates to the domestic colonization of African Americans and to the abuse of people of color around the globe by European and American imperialists. The purpose of this section is to show how scholars' confidence in white canonized philosophers predisposes them to overlook Enlightenment philosophy's structurally racist approach to political societies. The fourth section provides a detailed overview of the key principles in Anti-Colonial and Critical Race Theory as they intersect with Black Nationalism. Important issues addressed in this section include the role of prisons in keeping African Americans in a state of neo-slavery. In order to situate Black Nationalist thought within a broader intellectual history, I will discuss how Black Nationalism represents the culmination of radical American and Anti-Colonial political theory. (shrink)

This dissertation develops and explores how a particular variety of virtue epistemology (VE) applies to the theory and practice of education. To this end, several key issues are addressed: knowledge and epistemology, knowledge in education, virtue and culture, and the application of a particular variety of VE to education. Furthermore, this dissertation employs a philosophical methodology based in theoretical work from two disciplines—philosophy and education. In Chapter I, I explicate the purpose of this dissertation and provide a rationale for pursuing (...) this project. I also clarify some key terminology, discuss some delimiting factors, and offer chapter previews. In Chapter II, I discuss how Edmond Gettier challenged the standard definition of knowledge as justified true belief. This resulted in the development of virtue-based epistemologies. Having distinguished between several forms of VE, I conclude this chapter by advancing regulative virtue epistemology (RVE). In Chapter III, I provide a conceptual and historical overview of the concept of knowledge in the specific context of educational theory. This discussion provides important context for the application of RVE to educational matters. In Chapter IV, I consider how the concept of virtue is understood in several diverse cultural contexts. Here I ameliorate a potential worry—that virtue is a distinctly Western concept. Finally, in Chapter V, I apply RVE to the theory and practice of education. It is shown that RVE has important implications for the epistemic aims of education—that is, the ultimate knowledge-related purposes of education. Specifically, I find that understanding offers a more holistic account of educational theorizing, and places greater responsibility on teachers and students in their educational activities. I also conclude that RVE widens the aims of education to include other epistemic goods. I then demonstrate that communication—an important feature of education—is also regulated by intellectual virtue. Finally, I present two proposals for teaching from an RVE perspective, and find that each has particular strengths and weaknesses. I conclude with some areas for future research. (shrink)

This thesis aims to provide the appropriate historical context for interpreting John Stuart Mill's Utilitarianism. The central question considered here concerns two views of Mill's intentions for Utilitarianism, and whether the work should be read as Mill arguing for his own version of utilitarianism, or as an ecumenical document expressing and defending the views of many utilitarians. The first view, labeled the orthodox view, as defended by Roger Crisp, is probably the most commonly held view as to how to interpret (...) the document. The second view, labeled the revisionist view, is defended by Daniel Jacobson in a recent article. By examining Mill's place in the history of utilitarianism, his journals, correspondence, and other writings leading up to and after the publication of Utilitarianism, this thesis argues in support of the revisionist position. Furthermore, it is argued that certain portions of the book deserve special consideration apart from other chapters, and this is taken to have implications for the future of research in Mill?s thought. This thesis has four chapters including the first introductory chapter, which outlines the motivations guiding the orthodox and revisionist views. The second chapter provides a general exposition of Utilitarianism, as well as an outline of the primary evidence supporting the orthodox and revisionist positions. The third chapter is a defense of the revisionist position, and it highlights the specific biographical context in which Utilitarianism was composed, as well as evidence from Mill's writings, correspondence, and journals suggesting that he saw the need to write a general defense of the principle of utility and elaborate his theory of justice. This chapter also includes a historiographical analysis of Mill's biographers, which suggests that Utilitarianism is not viewed by Mill's biographers as being especially central to his considered views on utilitarianism. Finally, the chapter includes a section on the early reception and criticisms offered against Utilitarianism, which partly explains why the book has come to be interpreted as it has. The final chapter reviews the evidence for the revisionist position and explains the implications for Mill scholarship in light of the findings of this study. (shrink)

This dissertation is centered on problems within the history and philosophy of biology. The project identifies the philosophical roots of the current ecological movement and shows how a version of philosophical naturalism might be put to use within contemporary ethical issues in biology, and aid in the development of research programs. The approach is historically informed, but has application for current dilemmas. The traditions from which I primarily draw include classical American philosophy, particularly C.S. Peirce and John Dewey, as well (...) as thinkers associated with the German Naturphilosophie movement, such as Goethe and Schopenhauer. There are deep, but often overlooked, resonances between these seemingly disparate traditions and contemporary biology that are located in the conflict between the developing organism and the ever-fluctuating environment. The dissertation makes the case for a shared description of nature among these traditions and proposes applications to burgeoning contemporary ecological interpretations of issues such as hybridization and epigenetics. (shrink)

Frank N. McMillan Jr., a country boy steeped in the traditional culture of rural Texas, was summoned to a life-long quest for meaning by a dream lion he met in the night. On his journey, he followed the lead of the founder of analytical psychology, Carl Jung, and eventually established the world’s first professorship to advance the study of that field. McMillan, born and raised on a ranch near Calvert, was an Aggie through and through, with degrees in geology and (...) petroleum engineering. As an adult working near Bay City, Texas, he was lunching in a country café when by chance he met abstract expressionist painter Forrest Bess, who was ecstatically waving a letter he had received from Jung himself. The artist’s enthusiastic description of Jung as a master psychologist, soul doctor, and healer led McMillan to the Jung Center in Houston, where he began reading Jung’s Collected Works. McMillan frequently said, “Jung saved my life.” Finding Jung: Frank N. McMillan Jr., a Life in Quest of the Lion captures McMillan’s journey through the words of his own journals and through reflections by his son, Frank III. David Rosen, the holder of the first endowed McMillan professorship at Texas A&M University, adds insights to the book, and the late Sir Laurens van der Post, whom the elder McMillan met at the Houston Jung Center in 1979, authored a foreword to the book before his death. This is a story that sheds light on the inner workings of the self as well as the Jungian understanding of the Self. In often lyrical language, it gives the human background to a major undertaking in the dissemination of Jungian scholarship and provides a personal account of a life lived in near-mythic dimensions. FRANK N. MCMILLAN III, an author, educator, and speaker, has been active in worldwide Jungian circles for the past twenty-five years. A former board member of the C. G. Jung Educational Center of Houston and a member of the International Association of Jungian Studies, he lives in Corpus Christi. (shrink)

In this thesis I consider the problem of the distinctiveness of knowledge of our own mental states and attitudes. I consider four influential approaches to this problem: the epistemic approach, the "no reasons view," the neo-expressivist approach and the rational agency approach. I argue that all of them face serious problems. I further argue that many of these problems are connected with the lack of fine-grained enough classification of the entities with respect to which we have self-knowledge. I suggest such (...) a classification, distinguishing passive occurrent mental states, mental actions and standing attitudes, and argue that we should treat each of these categories separately for the purpose of explaining self-knowledge of them. I discuss in detail self-knowledge we have with respect to two of these categories: standing attitudes and mental actions. On my account self-knowledge of standing attitudes stands in a derivative relation to self-knowledge of other kinds. In my discussion of self-knowledge of mental actions I establish that we have a distinctive non-observational kind of self-knowledge and show some specific characteristics of this kind of self-knowledge. In the end I attempt to relate self-knowledge of mental actions to practical knowledge in the ordinary sense of skill. (shrink)

American jurisprudence currently applies two incompatible validity standards to determine which laws are enforceable. The natural law tradition evaluates validity by an uncertain standard of divine law, and its methodology relies on contradictory views of human reason. Legal positivism, on the other hand, relies on a methodology that commits the analytic fallacy, separates law from its application, and produces an incomplete model of law. These incompatible standards have created a schism in American jurisprudence that impairs the delivery of justice. This (...) dissertation therefore formulates a new standard for legal validity. This new standard rejects the uncertainties and inconsistencies inherent in natural law theory. It also rejects the narrow linguistic methodology of legal positivism. In their stead, this dissertation adopts a pragmatic methodology that develops a standard for legal validity based on actual legal experience. This approach focuses on the operations of law and its effects upon ongoing human activities, and it evaluates legal principles by applying the experimental method to the social consequences they produce. Because legal history provides a long record of past experimentation with legal principles, legal history is an essential feature of this method. This new validity standard contains three principles. The principle of reason requires legal systems to respect every subject as a rational creature with a free will. The principle of reason also requires procedural due process to protect against the punishment of the innocent and the tyranny of the majority. Legal systems that respect their subjects' status as rational creatures with free wills permit their subjects to orient their own behavior. The principle of reason therefore requires substantive due process to ensure that laws provide dependable guideposts to individuals in orienting their behavior. The principle of consent recognizes that the legitimacy of law derives from the consent of those subject to its power. Common law custom, the doctrine of stare decisis, and legislation sanctioned by the subjects' legitimate representatives all evidence consent. The principle of autonomy establishes the authority of law. Laws must wield supremacy over political rulers, and political rulers must be subject to the same laws as other citizens. Political rulers may not arbitrarily alter the law to accord to their will. Legal history demonstrates that, in the absence of a validity standard based on these principles, legal systems will not treat their subjects as ends in themselves. They will inevitably treat their subjects as mere means to other ends. Once laws do this, men have no rest from evil. (shrink)

When considering the nature of the human being, Descartes holds two main claims: he believes that the human being is a genuine unity and he also holds that it is comprised of two distinct substances, mind and body. These claims appear to be at odds with one another; it is not clear how the human being can be simultaneously two things and one thing. The details of Descartes' metaphysics of substance exacerbates this problem. Because of various theological and epistemological commitments, (...) Descartes frames his metaphysics of substance in a way that ensures mind and body's real distinction from one another. Articulated from this perspective, the problem becomes one wherein it is not clear that two completely separate substances can come together to form one entity. The aim of this thesis is to show how Descartes can hold real distinction and true union without contradiction. To this end, I will first detail the problem and outline a variety of solutions that have already been presented. Then I will outline important concepts relating to Descartes' metaphysics of substance and attributes. This not only reveals the depth of the problem but also lays the groundwork for my proposed solution. I argue that the key to understanding how these two claims are consistent and in accord with Descartes' philosophy is through a comment Descartes makes to his contemporary Henricus Regius where he urges that the union of mind and body is achieved through a "mode of union." I substantiate this claim by arguing for the intelligibility of understanding union as a modal attribute within Descartes' framework. Finally, I show how Descartes can hold real distinction and true union with consistency. When union is understood as a mode, mind and body are able to exist apart from one another, ensuring real distinction. Moreover, union construed as a mode does not allow the complete separability of mind and body. Thus, when united, mind and body achieve the kind of unity Descartes desires for the human being. (shrink)

The purpose of the present study aimed to develop a comprehensive model that measures the autoethnographic/biographic relevance of dreams, memories, and reflections as they relate to understanding the self and others. A dream, memory, and reflection (DMR) ten item questionnaire was constructed using aspects of Freudian, Jungian, and Lacanian Theory of Dream Interpretation. Fifteen dreams, five memories, and five reflections were collected from the participant at the waking episode or during a moment of deep thought. The DMR analysis was used (...) as the prime matter for creating a narrative document that uses autoethnography and autobiography to deliver a philosophical story about the unconscious reality of the participant. The results of the dissertation study produced a ten section narrative document titled The Shadow of Joaquin that portrayed the benchmarks of the life of the participant that led him to the completion of a doctoral degree in curriculum and instruction. At the final section of the narrative document the postmodern philosophical theory of Labor Percolation is proposed by the researcher as a direct result of the DMR analysis. (shrink)

William James's "The Dilemma of Determinism" essay, delivered and published in 1884, concerns the competing doctrines of determinism and free will. In the essay, James suggests compelling reasons why it is more rational to believe in free will than it is to believe in determinism. In this thesis, I contend that not only does "The Dilemma of Determinism" offer a coherent and forceful argument for the rationality of belief in free will, but it also contains rich insights into James's moral (...) and religious philosophies. Consideration of 1891's "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life," for instance, finds James's sentiment that the moral life is only pertinent if the future of the universe is thought to be in the hands of the moral agent. Similarly, consideration of 1896's "The Will to Believe" shows that adoption of religious belief in the absence of scientifically coercive evidence stems naturally from the position taken by James with regard to belief in free will in "The Dilemma of Determinism." Offering several other similar instances, I conclude that James's moral and religious thought is viewed more clearly through the revealing lenses of "The Dilemma of Determinism.". (shrink)

If we take seriously the analogy bestowed by our heritage that nature is to be conceived as our mother and that God the Father is our source for Reason, Truth, and Justice then given Nietzsche's claim that we are a generation of fatherless children we should be a generation of naturalists. But the latter has yet to develop a strong following or even a consciousness about this cosmic divorce. The existentialists, for instance, ruminated almost exclusively on their bereavement from God (...) venturing little to strengthen and engage what could be fruitfully gained from Mother Nature. Albert Camus, amongst the European scene, was an exception. He was someone who literally and figuratively lost his father and developed a bond between his natural mother and nature herself. Camus was apt to saying that following the desertion of the gods his idols all had feet of clay. This prolonged love affair with the earthly was both a source for spirituality and understanding that funded a keen sensibility toward a horizon of naturalistic humanism. Naturalistic humanism is an intelligence that consents to relativity consecrated by tears and shadow, body and sunlight. It reflects an earth-bound odyssey where silence, pain, suffering, and struggle mingle with love, life, value, meaning, and beauty. If human existence goes best when described as a drama then as naturalists we are but paying homage to our setting where players transact on pavement, bodies come to be confined or spread as particles amidst ocean and land, and tragedies are preserved in the sands of time. John Dewey's prominent instrument when describing the human setting was the use of humans as "organisms." As a naturalist, the application was flawless because the image enabled him to describe an individual's environment in an intimate way. Dewey, because of his naturalism, had a remarkable ability to frame humans as creatures reacting, adapting, and interacting to the constant rhythmic tensions inherent in everyday experience. It is this thesis's aspirations to mold both Camus and Dewey's naturalistic humanism into an alike metaphysical starting point. The assumption to be propounded is that, for both, humans inherit a limited disposition from their natural setting and this relativity, imposed by Mother Nature, is the root of all meaning. (shrink)

In this thesis, I argue that current attempts to ground intentionality face one of two challenges. Either the grounding feature of intentionality will be itself intentional or the grounding feature is disparate in nature from the representational capacity of an intentional mental state and therefore no connection between the two can be taken to exist. I examine two current accounts of intentionality and the features they utilize to ground it. I maintain that both views fall prey to one or both (...) of the objections I raise. I conclude that any account of intentionality will need to meet both of these challenges in order to be counted successful. (shrink)

This thesis presents a case for theological compatibilism, the view that divine foreknowledge and human freedom are compatible. My attempt to support theological compatibilism is based chiefly upon two arguments, which appear in the second and third chapters of this thesis. While these arguments differ, they are united in one respect: each argument relies heavily upon the doctrine of divine sustenance, which is the doctrine that God is causally responsible for the continual existence of the universe. In chapter II, I (...) employ the doctrine of divine sustenance as an assumption that, when conjoined with a modified characterization of the necessity of the past, forces a common argument against theological compatibilism to generate an absurd conclusion. This approach constitutes a negative argument for theological compatibilism: if the modifications to accidental necessity and the assumptions regarding sustenance are appropriate, then some principle underlying a traditional argument against theological compatibilism must be rejected in order to avoid absurdity. In chapter III, I use the notion of divine sustenance in a positive argument for the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. In that chapter, I contend that theological models that deny foreknowledge or divine sustenance lack the resources to explain the existence of human persons making free decisions. However, I argue that at least one theological model that includes foreknowledge, when conjoined with the doctrine of divine sustenance, provides adequate explanatory grounds for the existence of persons in their free decision-making. This implies that if human persons are free, their freedom is compatible with divine foreknowledge and divine sustenance, which also supports the theological compatibilist's position. Although my discussion results in some unresolved difficulties regarding divine freedom, which I discuss in the final chapter, the arguments in the second and third chapters nevertheless yield the conclusion that proper consideration of divine sustenance corroborates theological compatibilism. The theological compatibilist, then, may cogently employ the doctrine of divine sustenance to defend the coherency of his or her own position and to criticize the plausibility of opposing views. (shrink)

Kantian internalism was developed in part as a response to objections to Kantian ethical theory leveled by philosophers such as Bernard Williams and Michael Stocker. Their arguments are evaluated in light of Kantian internalism and shown to be effectively countered. Aristotelian alternatives to Kantian internalism are considered in the context of the debate between the Kantian internalists and Williams and Stocker. Aristotelian approaches do not preclude or effectively undermine Kantian internalism, though Kantian internalism itself demands a change in focus for (...) subsequent Kantian ethical theorizing. (shrink)

My purpose for this thesis is to understand and interpret the meaning and intent of Kierkegaard's authorship. Kierkegaard is emphatically concerned with making his reader aware of essential Christianity and what it means to be a Christian. Accordingly, I will begin by examining the context from which Kierkegaard writes. He felt that Christendom greatly misunderstood essential Christianity. Believing that those in Christendom erroneously focused too intently on the doctrines of Christianity to the neglect of the "how" of Christianity, he examines (...) how it is possible that a person could learn eternal truth. For Kierkegaard, Christianity cannot be objectively discerned because it is not a teaching, but a way of life. As a result, Christianity is not primarily a historical matter of philosophy. As long as one seeks Christianity's truth objectively, he or she will constantly delay to make a decision about becoming a Christian, doubting the truth of Christianity. Having shown how Kierkegaard objects to Christendom's version of Christianity, I explain what he considers to be the prerequisite for genuine Christian faith-subjectivity. He believes that one must exercise the utmost personal concern if one is to be enabled to accept Christianity. Kierkegaard, therefore, conceives of Christianity as a way of existing. Furthermore, I make clear important points in Kierkegaard's thought. Since there are many competing ideas about what Christianity is, I suggest that, while Kierkegaard rejects Christianity as a system of doctrines, he is neither indifferent nor hostile to doctrines. For him, doctrines are descriptive of the normative Christian life. He adds that to truly believe, as a Christian, is to personally trust Christ. He says that this change of mind corresponds with a change of life such that one becomes a responsible individual before God. Finally, I conclude that Kierkegaard is best characterized as a Christian apologist, defending Christianity from Christendom, and that his contributions as an existential philosopher and literary writer simply complement his primary purpose as an author. (shrink)

In this thesis I argue that Heidegger avoids a problem regarding totalitarianism that is found in political thought within the Western tradition, most specifically seen in Plato and Hegel. In order to fully understand what Heidegger's political sphere would look like, to see whether or not he avoid the troubles of totalitarianism, one first needs to understand the crucial relationship that Heidegger proposes between art and the political sphere, more specifically between art and being. For Heidegger, to understand the role (...) of the political in one's life, one must first understand the nature of being. And for Heidegger, a work of art is that which reveals the truth about being. But before one can understand what Heidegger sees as the relationship between art and being and the further relationship between art and the political sphere, one needs to understand what the role of art is in fact for Heidegger. But before one can fully understand Heidegger's conception of art and how it reveals the truth, one needs to recognize that for Heidegger we live in an age of aesthetic alienation. According to Heidegger, in our day and age the study and treatment of art have become problematic. We are misguided in the way that we approach, discuss, use and treat art; we must first try to understand why Heidegger thinks that is. And so in this thesis, this is where I begin. I argue that if one can understand this connection between art and truth, art and being, and art and the political sphere, one can begin to see how Heidegger's view of the political overturns the traditional Western schema and avoids the ramifications that tend to gravitate uncontrollably toward totalitarianism. (shrink)

The goal of this thesis is two-fold. First, while the model concept frequently is mentioned in the philosophical literature on scientific knowledge, it rarely is addressed as a focus for methodology. My aim is to support the view that models are central to scientific practice, and that for this reason, the model concept deserves further attention in general philosophy of science. Second, I hold that since models are an important part of scientific inquiry, various philosophical puzzles arise as a consequence (...) of an analysis of the model concept. In particular, I investigate the problem of constructivism about scientific models for a realist view of science, and I urge that although it may be tempting to adopt an anti-realist position, methodological considerations demand that one must be a realist about the model concept. (shrink)

There is a tension between traditional theism and contemporary Platonism. Traditional theism maintains that God is the creator of all things distinct from Him; whereas contemporary Platonism contends that there are innumerably many abstract objects that are uncreated as well as immutable and necessarily existent. These abstract objects include, but are not limited to, numbers, properties, propositions, and relations. In "Absolute Creation" Christopher Menzel and Thomas Morris seek to reconcile traditional theism and contemporary Platonism: they argue that abstract objects are (...) immutable and necessarily existent, but that they are dependent on God for their existence. They have named the view "theistic activism." Brian Leftow argues against the viability of theistic activism. He offers the following three claims: (i) activism entails that God creates Himself; (ii) activism relies on a causal incoherence; and (iii) activism entails an explanatory circle. Hugh J. McCann has also offered an objection to activism. He argues that activism entails a reductio ad absurdum. In this thesis I give an exposition of theistic activism and the objections that Menzel and Morris anticipate in "Absolute Creation." Following that, I argue against Leftow's claims and the objection offered by McCann. In conclusion, I summarize the objections to theistic activism and speculate that activism is not immediately intuitively appealing due to the model of creation activism presupposes. (shrink)

The indispensability argument, which claims that science requires beliefs in mathematical entities, gives a strong motivation for mathematical realism. However, mathematical realism bears Benacerrafian ontological and epistemological problems. Although recent accounts of mathematical realism have attempted to cope with these problems, it seems that, at least, a satisfactory account of epistemology of mathematics has not been presented. For instance, Maddy's realism with perceivable sets and Resnik's and Shapiro's structuralism have their own epistemological problems. This fact has been a reason to (...) rebut the indispensability argument and adopt mathematical nominalism. Since mathematical nominalism purports to be committed only to concretia, it seems that mathematical nominalism is epistemically friendlier than mathematical realism. However, when it comes to modal mathematical nominalism, this claim is not trivial. There is a reason for doubting the modal primitives that it invokes. In this thesis, this doubt is investigated through Chihara's Constructibility Theory. Chihara's Constructibility Theory purports not to be committed to abstracta by replacing existential assertions of the standard mathematics with ones of constructibility. However, the epistemological status of the primitives in Chihara's system can be doubted. Chihara might try to argue that the problem would dissolve by using possible world semantics as a didactic device to capture the primitive notions. Nonetheless, his analysis of possible world semantic is not plausible, when considered as a part of the project of nominalizing mathematics in terms of the Constructibility Theory. (shrink)

In this project, a Kierkegaardian concept of community is developed despite Kierkegaard's emphasis on the individual over and against the collective. It will require a new reading of Kierkegaard that moves beyond Kierkegaard as the champion of the individual. This new reading suggests that the retrieval of the individual is necessary for important concepts like religion, relations, faith, and community to be enriched and developed. This reading, first and foremost, provides a consistent account of Kierkegaard's authorship from his earliest works (...) in the University to his attack at the end of his life. This reading provides a framework to discuss the role of the individual in the formation of community within Kierkegaard's thought. This framework is a new and unique contribution to discourses concerning community and the relation between unity and difference. Under this reading, no single doctrine, set of dogmas, or tradition is sufficient to bring unity and solidarity. It is only through the individual that there becomes a possibility of community. These themes are manifested throughout this project. The individual in Kierkegaard's thought is characterized as a corrective. The individual remedies the establishment's emphasis on the collective. This blocks the temptation to diminish the individual for the sake of relations between people. Finally, the relation of the individual to others is examined through Kierkegaard's development of Church. This discussion provides a means to discuss in concrete the role of the individual in relation to other individuals of a community. (shrink)

Pornography appears to give rise to a conflict between two fundamental rights: the right to free speech and expression and the right to equal respect and concern. Pornography is inseparably tied with the right to freedom of expression. To ban pornography is to violate the right to freedom of expression. But pornography is a type of expression that subordinates women. To allow pornography to exist undermines women's right to equal respect. Liberals want to uphold both the right to freedom of (...) expression and the right to equal respect. But it appears that pornography will not allow them to do this. I attempt to solve the problem of pornography for the liberal. My central argument will be that a ban on pornography will not insure that the right to equal respect is upheld because a ban on pornography will result in the subordination of men. This claim will be defended with a Marxist argument that uses premises from evolutionary psychology. I will conclude that the liberal state can uphold both the right to freedom of expression and the right to equal respect. (shrink)

In this thesis, I argue that in order to coherently hold a belief about what happens to people when they die, one's theory of personal identity must be carefully chosen. I examine belief in immortality of the soul, annihilation of the person, and resurrection of the body. I maintain that for each view, at least one theory of personal identity conflicts with that view and, therefore, cannot be consistently held with that view. I argue that a psychological-continuity theory of personal (...) identity is consistent with each of these beliefs about death. Some, but not all, physical-continuity theories of personal identity are consistent with annihilation of the person. I further argue that even on a psychological-continuity theory of personal identity, the soul's immortality is questionable. In light of the conditions that are necessary for a soul to be a person, we should not expect such a soul to be immortal (even if it outlives the body for some time). I also argue that resurrection of the body on a materialist's model is more parsimonious than resurrection on a dualist's model. (shrink)

This project is an exploration and development of several key concepts in Kierkegaard's writings. The primary focus is on the concept of freedom, which, in Kierkegaard's writings, is problematic for at least two reasons. First, there is the "metaphysical" problem of freedom in Kierkegaard's works, which is the problem of understanding what, exactly, Kierkegaard's view of human freedom is and how (and whether) this view of freedom is reconcilable with Kierkegaard's view of God as absolutely sovereign. Second, there is the (...) "existential" problem of freedom. For Kierkegaard, the highest form of human freedom is existentially expressed as faith, and thus, the existential problem centers on the difficulties of living out, on a day-to-day basis, the kind of genuine faith that Kierkegaard perceives as essential to Christian existence. Both aspects of the problem are crucial for understanding Kierkegaard's overall theological and philosophical position. In fact, the two are interconnected: his solution to the logical problem has important existential implications, but his existential views are only tenable if they rest on some sort of plausible metaphysical foundation. With regard to the logical problem, I will argue that Kierkegaard holds a view of freedom in which the human subject is truly free in every significant sense of "free," but that the subject's will does not act independently of God's will. The individual's will has its very being in God's will, and God's sovereignty is actually required to make the individual free. With regard to the existential problem, I will argue that, for Kierkegaard, genuine faith is essentially characterized by suffering, and this suffering is manifested in a variety of forms. By renouncing all things to God, by declaring His goodness in the midst of suffering, and by embracing the essential characteristics of what it is to be human (namely, that one is finite, temporal, and limited in both knowledge and power ), one is finally able to "rest transparently" in God. This act of resting transparently, which includes as an essential component a recognition of one's absolute need for God, is, for Kierkegaard, both the true act of faith and "man's highest perfection.". (shrink)

Wittgenstein's On Certainty is a collection of notes whose general focus is on epistemological issues found in two papers by his friend and Cambridge colleague, G.E. Moore. Though the original catalyst for his reflections is the work of Moore, Wittgenstein's thoughts become strikingly broad and sweep across most major issues in epistemology. However, the remarks constituting On Certainty are discursive, enigmatic and often inconsistent, leaving a great burden on Wittgenstein scholarship to try to piece together coherent arguments he may be (...) giving, and positions he may be taking, in epistemology. This thesis takes on part of that burden. In particular, it gives an affirmative answer to the question "Is there a response to skepticism in On Certainty"? Wittgenstein's response to skepticism has its roots, of course, in the philosophy of language. I will argue that the very view of language which Wittgenstein attacks in the rule-following considerations of Philosophical Investigations is presupposed by the skeptical problem. Hence, if Wittgenstein's repudiation of that view of language was successful in the former work, then we already have the materials sufficient for a defeat of skepticism. But this swift semantic maneuver is not all the criticism that Wittgenstein has to give of skepticism-or so I will argue. He offers us in On Certainty a rich diagnosis of the skeptical problem: the skeptic misunderstands the function of the sentences on which his arguments tend to fixate. To approach this diagnosis, I argue, Wittgenstein implicitly employs his notion of "meaning as use" together with a key epistemological principle found in On Certainty to force on us an acceptance of his view of how those sentences function, and to show us how they couldn't function in the way that the skeptical arguments assume. One of the obligations that this thesis must discharge, of course, is to corroborate these claims with remarks from On Certainty and the Investigations. One upshot of discharging such an obligation is to glean some of the continuity between those two works, which, I think, is essential for a solid understanding of last century's greatest philosopher. (shrink)

William James' "The Will to Believe" essay has been the subject of much philosophical and religious discourse in the over one hundred years since its publication. Interpretations of the essay have been varied and numerous. In this thesis, I critique several of the prominent interpretations of "The Will to Believe." I find that each interpretation is lacking in some important way. Most of the interpretations fail to read James' text carefully and faithfully. The interpretations that succeed in reading the text (...) carefully and faithfully fail because they do not provide a useful or helpful strategy to persons who find themselves with questions of belief like those James intended to address. I offer an interpretation of "The Will to Believe" that fails in neither of these ways. I do this by drawing on James' larger philosophical and psychological corpus, using the major struts of his mature thought to develop and clarify several important passages of "The Will to Believe." I conclude that "The Will to Believe," properly interpreted, offers a coherent and powerful strategy to persons confronted with certain types of questions of belief. (shrink)

John Rawls is famous, among other things, for defending two principles in his theory of justice. The first seeks to secure many of the traditional rights and liberties familiar in modern liberal democracies, while the second stipulates Rawls's preferred model for arranging economic institutions. However, the placement of a right to hold personal property among the first principle rights and liberties raises an immediate and fundamental question: what are we to do when the property rights of the first principle conflict (...) with the preferred economic model of the second principle? I will suggest that this question reveals a fundamental problem of indeterminacy arising from two sources within Rawls's theory of justice. The first source lies in Rawls's commitment to multiple and potentially conflicting principles of justice, while the second involves Rawls's undeveloped account of personal property rights. Rawls has offered a powerful means for ameliorating the first source of indeterminacy with his rule of lexical priority, whereby the first principle of justice takes categorical priority over the second principle. However, Rawls has not offered a similar means for relieving the second source of indeterminacy. While this is often considered a superficial omission owing to textual constraints, I argue that Rawls's undeveloped account of property rights is a major factor in the problematic network of indeterminacy I seek to reveal. In order to ascertain the severity of this problem, I attempt to furnish Rawls's property right with determinate content in two distinctive ways: first by importing content from the second principle and then by purchasing content on independent normative grounds. I conclude that if Rawls specifies this right by borrowing content from the second principle, then he defects on his commitment to lexical priority and reintroduces the first source of indeterminacy into his theory. However, if Rawls specifies the content of his right independently of the second principle, then the derived property right will severely circumscribe its lexically posterior function of arranging economic institutions, thereby leaving indeterminate the status of the second principle within the theory of justice. This dilemma bespeaks an intractable problem of indeterminacy, where regardless of how Rawls proceeds, something important will be left unacceptably indeterminate. (shrink)

Science provides us with important information about how we experience color-it explains how objects reflect light at certain wavelengths, it describes how our perceptual faculties work regarding color vision, etc. But science doesn't provide us with a concept of color. It doesn't explain what it's like to experience color or how we come to know color. These conceptual issues arise in philosophical discussion. In order to have an adequate color theory, then, one needs to combine insight gained from color science (...) with an explanation of the phenomenology of color (what it's like to experience the colors), an epistemology of color (how we come to know what things, if any, are colored), and the metaphysics of color (what, if anything, are the colors). The primary focus of this thesis is to examine some of the philosophical positions one can take concerning the nature and existence of the colors. One such position is physicalism, which states that color is some physical property of the object. Another color theory is dispositionalism, which states that color is the power an object is disposed to look like to certain perceivers in standard conditions. Both of these color theories are compatible with the intuition that our color experiences are veridical. Yet, there are others, illusion theorists, who claim that the external world is not colored. Some illusion theorists state that color can only exist within our experience and that we wrongly project these colors onto the world. Others claim that color is an illusion because there are too many scientific facts pointing to the conclusion that nothing specifically can be denoted as being a certain color. In this thesis, I will explore each of these positions and conclude that dispositionalism is the most adequate color theory. (shrink)

Reflective equilibrium is widely accepted as a method of justifying ethical beliefs. Narrow reflective equilibrium justifies moral beliefs by achieving coherence between moral principles and moral judgments. However, this theory has been accused of moral conservatism objection; that is, moral beliefs may appear to be coherent but wrong. What are the normative grounds for criticizing implausible beliefs that seem to be in equilibrium? Wide reflective equilibrium has been the traditional attempt to respond to the conservatism objection. It adds non-moral beliefs (...) into the coherence. All our moral principles, moral judgments, and non-moral beliefs must be in balance. If there is incoherence in our system of beliefs, adjustments must be made to one or more of our beliefs to return our beliefs into equilibrium. However, wide reflective equilibrium is also susceptible to the moral conservatism objection. All our beliefs may seem to be coherent but lead to implausible results. In this thesis, I argue that a modified wide reflective equilibrium theory is a better response to the moral conservatism objection. My theory of modified wide reflective equilibrium adds two other elements into the equilibrium: background social and economic conditions, and formative experiences. By background social and economic conditions I mean to include social, economic, technological, political, institutional, and legal conditions that influence our beliefs. They give rise to new moral issues and color old moral issues in a new light. They highlight moral issues not previously noticed and uncover hidden inconsistencies. Formative experiences are actual or vicarious experiences of situations that generate moral issues. By formative experiences we become more competent in judging the salient facts, the interrelationships of data, the motivations of actions, and the consequences of our decisions. Adding conditions and experiences to the equation helps challenge implausible ideas and better responds to the moral conservatism objection. (shrink)

The problems posed by gender essentialisms are important for both feminist theorists and environmental ethicists. Ecofeminist philosophers, as both feminist theorists and environmental ethicists, should therefore find this issue relevant to their discipline. In this thesis, I will explore the topic of gender essentialisms and its relevance for ecofeminist philosophers. Specifically, I will provide a definition of "ecofeminist philosophy" and delineate the connections that ecofeminists find between the oppression of women and environmental degradation. I will also provide a logical analysis (...) of arguments for gender essentialisms and arguments against these theories. And, lastly, I will consider why gender essentialisms ought to matter for ecofeminist philosophers. My hope is that this thesis will fruitfully engage with the issues posed by gender essentialisms, including clarifying arguments made in favor of and in opposition to these theories as well as their relevance to ecofeminist philosophies. (shrink)

Contextualism in epistemology is the thesis that the truth conditions of knowledge attributions are context-sensitive, where facts about both the subject's context and the attributor's context are relevant. This view allows for two persons, say, Jones and Wilson, both to be speaking truly when Jones says of Smith at time t 'Smith knows p', for some proposition p, and Wilson says of Smith at time t 'Smith doesn't know p', for the same proposition p. The explanation offered is that Jones (...) and Wilson do not share the same context, and hence different standards are appropriate for evaluating the truth of their claims. In this case, the epistemic facts concerning Smith satisfy the conditions determined by Jones's standards but do not satisfy those determined by Wilson's. As such, increasing attention is being directed to the potential contributions this view makes to the theory of knowledge---particularly its strategies in tackling some of the thornier issues of skepticism. Contextualists concede that skeptical claims are true in contexts where the standards for knowledge have been raised (often through the mentioning of a skeptical hypothesis); however, they also maintain that in ordinary contexts where the standards for knowledge are lower, the truth of our knowledge attributions is preserved. In other words, skeptics cannot, on this view, claim that our ordinary knowledge attributions are false. Furthermore, contextualists explain the persuasive pull of skeptical arguments by appealing to our failure to recognize that a shift in context has occurred. The primary aim of my thesis, then, is to examine the specific contextualist positions advanced by David Lewis, Keith DeRose, and Stewart Cohen---the three most prominent endorsers of the view---as well as to address some of the more worrisome critiques of contextualism. My investigation focuses on assessing the plausibility of conceiving knowledge attributions as context-sensitive and on assessing the promise of this account for solving the problem of skepticism. Since the literature surrounding this issue is relatively new, my thesis not only advances the debate, but offers a guide to it as well. (shrink)

The theory of evolution, as articulated by Charles Darwin, is one of the most successful paradigms at work within the natural sciences. The importance of this theory is not, however, restricted to the scientific realm alone. For philosophy, the most important ramification of scientific evolutionary theory is that the world is no longer best understood as being static - a position that has been held historically due to the influence of Plato and Aristotle - but is rather best understood as (...) being changing and in process. The Classical American philosophers William James and John Dewey recognized the importance of Darwin's work for philosophy; therefore, their work is examined in an effort to achieve clarity regarding the interactions between evolutionary theory and philosophy. What is found is that for both James and Dewey, philosophy begins with 'radical empiricism', the uniqueness present in any individual's particular experiences. Further, the experiences had by an individual constitute what is real. A philosophy thus grounded finds the universe to be pluralistic, without recourse to a priori monisms or dualisms. What is seen, then, is that both James and Dewey agree with Darwin that the world is best understood as being in process in addition to more carefully delineating the philosophical ramifications of such a position. The final question that is to be asked is this: How is one to form warranted beliefs within such a pluralistic universe? On Dewey's account, beliefs may be formed through a process of inquiry modeled after scientific methods of inquiry. Nevertheless, we humans often find ourselves in situations which do not logically direct our choice of beliefs. James is used to assist in this dilemma, specifically his argument that this type of decision must be made according to the 'passional nature' of the individual. Ultimately, what will be shown is that warranted beliefs must be chosen according to how they impact the continued experiences of the individual. But here one must proceed with caution, for just as beliefs might open up beneficial possibilities that were not available before, they might also eradicate possibilities, restricting the individual's ability to live well. (shrink)

Theories of hermeneutics -- the study of interpretation -- have been used both to support and to reject the division of the natural and human sciences. Wilhelm Dilthey and Charles Taylor defend that divide, while Richard Rorty and Clifford Geertz have contested its validity. The arguments of Dilthey and Taylor stem from the classical hermeneutical tradition founded by Friedrich Schleiermacher. On the other hand, Rorty and Geertz have claimed support for their position from the philosophical hermeneutics of Martin Heidegger and (...) Hans-Georg Gadamer. In this thesis, however, I argue that the confrontation between Dilthey and Heidegger has been misconceived. Geertz and Rorty are actually committed to the same hermeneutical principles as Dilthey and Taylor, which makes their rejection of a divide between the sciences an "extraordinary reversal." Once the history of hermeneutics has been clarified and its central figures properly characterized, I argue that Dilthey and Heidegger probably would have agreed about the former' s divorce of the sciences. I also argue that Geertz and Rorty are more committed to that division than they themselves may readily admit. (shrink)

This thesis compares the descriptions of God that come from religion and from the Cosmological Argument. The Cosmological Argument has long been held to support the traditional concept of God held by religious adherents. However, one finds that upon closer examination these two descriptions of God may not be as compatible as previously thought. So, I examine if there is reason for concern, and if so, how one is to reconcile these differences. Chapter I will quickly introduce the Cosmological Argument. (...) Chapter II will look at the Cosmological Argument's viability. This look at viability is in order because if the argument does not withstand criticism, then this discrepancy between the descriptions of God is not an issue. This problem is only significant if the Cosmological Argument is viable. So, the second chapter will examine the viability. This chapter answers some of the most common attacks on the argument (issues about the Principle of Sufficient Reason committing the fallacy of composition, and issues about infinite and circular regresses). After showing the argument is viable, the third chapter will consider the attributes of the being that result from the Cosmological Argument. By fleshing out the being's attributes, one is then able to compare this being to the God of Religion. In the fourth chapter, I examine the God of Religion, and compare the two descriptions. In doing this, I will find that they contradict over the notion of God as Personal in religion and a being, which has aseity in the Cosmological Argument. With this contradiction in mind, I will then offer six possible solutions to this conflict. In the conclusion (Chapter V), I accept the sixth solution, which suggests a synthesis for reconciling the two descriptions. With this solution, I will discuss how the reconciliation works, and I will offer a conception of God that comes from that solution. (shrink)

People often engage in simultaneous activities. For example, a person might be driving to the workplace, while conversing with a passenger in the vehicle. Such persons often report feeling as if the driving is being done on "automatic pilot" and have difficulty remembering features specific to the drive. How exactly to classify this case, which will be referred to as the "inattentive driver", is a source of some controversy. Some may be tempted not to count it as an experience at (...) all. Others claim that the driving is properly identified as an experience, but disagree as to what kind of experience it is (e.g., conscious or unconscious). In this thesis, these competing views will be assessed and it will be argued that the case of the inattentive driver should, in fact, be classified as an experience. Ultimately, it will be shown that those who view inattentive driving as a conscious or unconscious experience, have more in common than it might seem. (shrink)

The philosophical approach known as existentialism is commonly recognized for its view that all of the experiences and interactions of life are meaningless. Many existentialist thinkers are led to conclude that life is therefore only something to be tolerated, and that close or intimate relationships with others should be avoided. The individual self consequentially becomes a type of island, which neither interpersonal nor intellectual pursuits can affect. Among the despair and dread offered by the hands of the existentialists came a (...) distinctly original philosophy from Gabriel Marcel. Marcel, a World War I veteran and concert pianist, was a late bloomer in philosophy. Although he was never professionally trained in philosophy, his early works came as a result of his interest in the idealists. As Marcel developed philosophically, however, many of his writings developed as reactions against the atheistic existentialists, and primarily that of Jean-Paul Sartre. Sartre's characterizations of the isolated self, of the death of God, and of lived experience as having "no exit" especially disgusted Marcel. In order to offer a response to the reality painted by Sartre, Marcel proposed his concept of a being-by-degrees. Marcel agrees with the existentialists that fundamental being is, in itself, meaningless. He posits, however, that experiences and relationships need not be meaningless, but that through experiences in relationships, individuals can impute significant meaning into their lives. Marcel's being-by-degrees is certainly an ideal to be achieved, as well as a process. In order to determine whether his theory is an obtainable goal, however, Marcel must explain how his whole, "existential" person can sustain meaningful relationships when so often those relationships cause the person pain, suffering, and feelings of disconnectedness. Indeed, for Marcel to succeed against the type of existentialism he abhors, he must offer an alternative that speaks to the difficulty of interpersonal conflict while maintaining that the individual self cannot be whole without vulnerability in relationships. (shrink)

The purpose of this project is to advance the thesis that the notion of an appropriative self, reconstructed from the philosophy of William James, answers, in part, the concerns outlined in the Critical Theory of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer. Initially I focus on explicating Adorno and Horkheimer's diagnosis, that ideological consciousness is the product of the dialectic of enlightenment. According to their view, culture is a reconciliation of the ego's impulse to persist and regress. Only after such an expansive (...) diagnosis can Adorno and Horkheimer suggest the possibility for social transformation. Next I concern myself with the straightforward task of carefully expositing the philosophical landscape of William James' radical empiricism. Finally I address the dialectic of enlightenment in terms of James' philosophy. Building on the foundations of radical empiricism, my thesis seeks to show how radical empiricism can accommodate Adorno and Horkheimer's metaphysical sensibilities, accelerating and expanding the diagnostic sweep of critical theory. This, I conclude, will involve James' notion of an appropriative self that actively counters the metaphysical forces at work in the dialectic of enlightenment. (shrink)

This paper examines development aid institutions and programs in two ways: from their institutional genesis and from post-Cold War critical viewpoints. Beginning with the Lend Lease Act of 1941, it traces the development of national and international bodies and agencies that are dedicated to the business of spurring development. Many of these were created in the unique atmosphere found at the close of World War II, a time of both great hopes and realistic expectations. During the Cold War much of (...) the North's foreign and development aid policies served to protect and further their ends in the developing world, specifically to fight the spread of communism. As a result of this, criticism of this type of aid was somewhat muted during this period. The end of the Cold War allowed a more open and vociferous debate about foreign aid. These recent debates will be examined including viewpoints as diverse as security issues, neo-liberal themes, progressive and environmental stances. In conclusion the criticisms and institutional directives, as embodied in their own statements of purpose, will be examined together to determine the validity of the criticisms. Following this a suggestion will be made for debt relief for the poorest countries based on these findings. In contrast to most debt relief programs, this paper will suggest that debt relief be predicated on increased social spending on education and basic health care needs instead of on meeting further fiscal austerity demands. (shrink)

This work was inspired by a simple question with a very complex answer; where does our knowledge come from? Although this question can be addressed from many different perspectives, I approach this question from an evolutionary perspective by surveying philosophical interpretations of evolutionary theory. Contemporary treatments of evolution by philosophy fall under the title of evolutionary epistemology, which is considered in the naturalized epistemology camp. Within evolutionary epistemology, two very different branches emerge: the evolutionary epistemology of theories (EET) and the (...) evolutionary epistemology of mechanisms (EEM). The EET approach attempts to provide an evolutionary framework for scientific progress, or culture in general, by modeling Darwinian evolution. The EEM approach looks directly at the evolution of humans in order to determine the effects of natural selection on intelligence. One result of the EEM approach is natural skepticism, which holds that human intelligence is inherently limited in its reasoning abilities. (shrink)

The philosophy of Gilles Deleuze is a critical philosophy that aims at examining and articulating the irrationality that underpins all rational thought. In that regard, this thesis aims to outline and clarify the Deleuzean critique of the representational thinking introduced by Platonism and perfected by Hegelianism, insofar as Deleuze recognizes the play of difference at the heart of their representational philosophies. Therefore, the Deleuzean critique of western thought takes as its aim the nav̐e assumption that Identity rather than Difference is (...) at the heart of Being. In Plato and Hegel "philosophy" is characterized as the comprehension of reality. These thinkers promote epistemological concerns, such as knowing "properly" and "correctly," over and above the creative aspect of thought that Deleuze argues gives rise to such philosophies of knowledge. Against such representational thinking that posits Identity as the means to comprehending reality, Deleuze argues that when studied carefully one recognizes that prior to all comprehension, in the instant, thought "makes a difference." Thus, for Deleuze, the differential nature of thought provides that which makes possible the sort of conceptual thinking that Plato and Hegel proffer. What he clarifies is that representational thought is itself not grounded by an identity, but rather by a difference through which an identity can be produced. (shrink)

Chihara seeks to avoid commitment to mathematical objects by replacing traditional assertions of the existence of mathematical objects with assertions about possibilities of constructing certain open-sentence tokens. I argue that Chihara's project can be defended against several important objections, but that it is no less epistemologically problematic than its platonistic competitors.

The project of this thesis is a moral evaluation of OPERATION JUST CAUSE, the United States' use of military force in Panama in 1989. I begin by arguing that just war theory, both in its classic and contemporary forms, needs to be revised. Present just war positions do not adequately take into account the complex, nontraditional missions that military forces are increasingly called to perform in today's ever-changing international arena. From humanitarian relief efforts in Somalia to peacekeeping missions in Kosovo, (...) militaries today and those of the United States in particular, are serving in roles that are a sharp tactical departure from those they prepared for in the Cold War era. OPERATION JUST CAUSE is one such example of these types of nonstandard missions. I survey classic and contemporary just war theories, select and modify appropriate criteria, and restate a modified composite theory that I argue for as optimal for evaluating these new types of military actions. I then put my composite theory to the test by examining in detail U.S. motives and actions in Panama in 1989, and subsequently evaluating them against my revised criteria. Finally, given the judgment methodology that I state, I conclude that OPERATION JUST CAUSE was a justified use of military force by the United States. (shrink)

In this thesis, I have explored, explicated and argued for some specific areas of commonalities between the philosophy of John Dewey and the teaching of Confucius. Both theories start with the same fundamental assumption that there is no such thing as immutable human nature, and their shared emphasis on education is based on this supposition. John Dewey and Confucius agree that the self mainly consists of habits and that the transformation of the self implies growth, i.e., the acquisition of new (...) and intelligent habits. The Deweyan conception of growth overlaps the Confucian doctrine of self-cultivation in that both concepts focus on the obtainment of inner moral qualities that are of great communal import. Dewey's construal of freedom seems to parallel jen, the Confucian ideal, because both thinkers maintain that human perfection is the ultimate goal for which we should strive unceasingly. (shrink)

This thesis is concerned with God's relationship to time. In the first chapter of this thesis I first provide a historical account, in the next two chapters I critique two contemporary accounts and, in the last chapter I provide my own account. I have two main theses that I attempt to support: (1) God fails to be related to creation on the accounts that I critique and (2) God is related to creation if He is in time. In my introductory (...) chapter I consider the history of the progression of thought about God and His relationship to time. There are four tasks that I want to complete in the introductory chapter: (1) to show that some of the Church Fathers depended upon Greek philosophers such as Plato, Plutarch, and Plotinus for their beliefs about God and time, (2) to show the Church Fathers' academic interdependence on each other, (3) to show that Thomas Aquinas summarizes and synthesizes many of the best arguments from his predecessors and, (4) to show that Aquinas states that since God is simple, He does not have real relations with His temporal creation. Contrary to Aquinas, it seems like God is really related to creation and there are some contemporary scholars who want to show that God can be both really relational with creation and also simple. I focus on the persons who utilize the Special Theory of Relativity (STR) to show that God can really be related to creation-namely Stump and Kretzmann's account and Brian Leftow's account. I demonstrate that these atemporal theories that depend on STR (either forthrightly or heuristically) fail. Instead, I propose that God is in immeasurable ontological time both prior to creation and after creation. In this way He can be really related to His creation. (shrink)

My purpose in this thesis is to understand the meaning and implications of William James's contention that thought is inherently selective. To this end, I shall focus first on James's relevant writings. Thought, for James, is guided primarily through interests that are dominantly aesthetic, that is, tied to the body. These interests condition the content of our thought by focusing our attention on some aspects of experience rather than others. The immediate implication of this theory is that thought does not (...) represent experience; rather, it orders experience. John Dewey elaborates and expands James's ideas and I turn to his work next. Noting that philosophy cannot achieve an accurate representation of experience simply because thought is by its nature selective, Dewey offers a way to increase the quality of our everyday experiences by suggesting techniques to render selection more significant and meaningful. Finally, I shall argue that Albert Camus's conception of rebellion is analogous to James's and Dewey's notions of creative thought, thereby casting a final light on the content of James's idea of the selectivity of thought. In a similar vein as Dewey, Camus attempts to provide guidelines for effective and meaningful rebellion. Both Dewey and Camus, then, move philosophy toward a progressive cultural critique. This move away from representation toward cultural criticism l take to be the most significant implication of James's notion of the inherent selectivity of thought. (shrink)

Somatic cell nuclear transfer is the process of cloning that produced Dolly. In order to clone an animal using somatic cell nuclear transfer, a donor cell is collected from an animal that one wants to clone and placed in a culture with a very low concentration of nutrients. This starves the cell and causes it to stop dividing and causes it to switch off its active genes. Next an egg cell is collected [from a member of the same or compatible (...) species] and the nucleus containing the DNA is removed. The two cells are then placed next to each other in a culture and an electric pulse fuses them together. A second electric pulse-which simulates the spark of fertilization-activates the cell and starts division. After about six days the resulting embryo is placed into a surrogate mother. When the gestation period is completed the clone is born. In this thesis I consider the permissibility of using this techniques to clone non-human animals. (shrink)

A commonly-cited problem in eighteenth-century aesthetics is a supposed discrepancy between theory and practice: the period's aesthetic literature devalued instrumental music, providing no basis for the evaluation and aesthetic appreciation of the Classic-era instrumental masterworks of Mozart and Haydn. In this paper, I argue both that the problem is overstated, and that a solution is in the offing if we look at the period's writings on the aesthetic experience. These writings provide criteria for value judgments of musical works with the (...) intrinsic aesthetic qualities characteristic of Classic-era instrumental music. I then sketch a formalist view of the musical aesthetic experience, from the writings of philosopher David Hume and theorist/composer Johann Mattheson, positing formal and stylistic characteristics that elicit a positive aesthetic judgment upon their apprehension by a listener. This eighteenth-century empiricist aesthetic is an aesthetic for instrumental music, not an aesthetic of, or exclusive to, instrumental music. There is, on my account, no compelling reason for holding that an adequate aesthetic for instrumental music must provide evaluative criteria exclusive to that art form, as critics have maintained; this notion is a vestige of the romantic ideal of musical autonomy. Lastly, I illustrate the theory's relationship with practice by examining the first movement of Haydn's Symphony Number 95 in C Minor. (shrink)

This thesis will explore the various views on the nature of language found in the works of Michel Foucault and Ludwig Wittgenstein. It will show that both writers move from a highly theoretical account of language toward a view in which background practices assume a large role. It will also show that these later views have a number of parallels, both in the picture of language they present and in the conceptual tools used to approach the subject. Finally, it will (...) indicate directions for future research that will employ concepts developed by both writers. (shrink)

This thesis pursues an understanding of the meaning of democracy when democracy is taken as a meaningful term by virtue of being a proper word in our language, the notion of meaning involves both ''what does x mean'' and ''what do we mean by x", and (3) we must include and account for the tension between "x is a democracy'' and ''x is being democratic''. The thesis treats as an assumption that the meaning of democracy cannot be satisfied without satisfying (...) and above. It is the task of the thesis to show that these conditions require the introduction of a general notion of affecting or affective relations, and that a path to these kinds of relations is available through (a) the understanding and rejection of atomism, (b) the notion of separate things as things in fields, and (c) a rejection of physicalist reductionism that permits real meanings for each field. (shrink)

In 1929 - 1930, John Dewey wrote a series of essays which became the work "Individualism Old and New.'' In this work, he describes a type of individual which he terms "lost.'' The lost individual is disconnected, disoriented, and disassociated. It can find no sense of identity, place, or purchase in a culture which is rapidly changing from an agrarian, frontier culture into an industrial, corporate one. Dewey discusses the plight of the lost individual, the cultural forces that create it, (...) and some possible methods of recovery of the lost individual in "Individualism Old and New.'' In this paper, I will demonstrate that Dewey's diagnosis of the lost individual holds as true for our turn-of-the-millenium culture as it did for Dewey's 1930 America. This will be accomplished by situating the problem of the lost individual within a larger context of Dewey's philosophy. What it means to be an individual will be examined in order to determine how such individuals come to be lost. For Dewey, individuality is derived from experience within a social context. To this end, when an individual's social context is disrupted or not conducive to forming integral relationships and transactions with experience, the individual is lost. For recovery to occur, integral associations must be formed. Such associations are not the ones offered by the corporate associations that dominate our society today. Rather, assured individuality is the result of an individual participating in a community. The recovery of the lost individual is only possible through its integration into a community. (shrink)

Current investigations in epistemology tend to follow either the continental or the analytic school of thought. These schools of thought have different goals for epistemology and different procedures for achieving these goals. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the feasibility and profitability of communication between analytic and continental philosophy in epistemology. Wittgenstein's concept of language games will be used to frame the issue', continental and analytic philosophers play different language games. One can successfully interpret a particular language game (...) from the perspective of another language game using the principle of charity. Specifically, the principle of charity allows analytic and continental epistemological to communicate profitably. (shrink)

In this thesis I argue that there is no complete notion of epistemic justification that can be defined in terms of intellectual virtues. A complete notion of justification would have to capture both the idea that there are internally accessible grounds for holding a belief justified, and at the some time provide a reliable connection between our beliefs and the features of the external world. Some virtue theorists claim that a complete notion of justification can be derived from the exercise (...) of intellectual virtues. I single out two strands of virtue-theories involved in this project. On the one hand, virtue-responsibilism construes intellectual virtues as ingrained habits necessarily connected with the desire for truth. On the other hand, virtue-reliabilism understands the intellectual virtues as faculties or cognitive mechanisms that are reliable in providing us with true beliefs. First, I argue that virtue-responsibilism cannot capture a sufficient measure of reliability, that increases the likelihood of a beliefs being true. Furthermore, I argue that virtue-reliabilism does not connect well with the notion of epistemic responsibility necessary of a complete notion of justification. Finally, I suggest that underlying the inability of virtue-responsibilism to capture reliability and virtue-reliabilism to accommodate responsibility is the old problem of specifying the connection between justification and truth. (shrink)

Texas festivals are given credit for providing benefits for both the festival's community and for the people who visit the community. As a result of these perceived benefits, communities across Texas stage a broad range of festivals and events. These events require substantial planning and skilled management to be successful. Those involved in the planning are often volunteers and have little or no background in event planning and management. Regardless of their experience level however, most event coordinators have ongoing needs (...) for information that will help them produce successful events. To produce a successful event, coordinators seek information from a variety of sources. These sources may include their personal network of friends and colleagues to professional consultants or formal workshops, conferences, and seminars. The primary purpose of this project is to provide information that will help the Texas Agricultural Extension Service Recreation, Park & Tourism Program evaluate its future role in responding to the needs of Texas festival coordinators. To accomplish this end, this study seeks to identify information needs of Texas festival coordinators and to describe how current sources of information are utilized by festival coordinators. This paper outlines the development and implementation of an information needs assessment of Texas festival coordinators and a description of current information sources being used by them. The project seeks to identify gaps in the provision of information and the access Texas festival coordinators perceive they have to information. The "importance"/"access" scale of this survey clearly identifies a range of important information topics which organizations could address. The following are the top 10 information needs of Texas festival coordinators as indicated by mail survey respondents: 1. Writing press releases 2. How to measure advertising success 3. Regulations for food, fire, safety, etc. 4. How to find regional talent 5. Insurance issues 6. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 7. How to find and contract for professional entertainment 8. How to determine space requirements for event activities 9. How to create a layout for people/vehicle flow and activities 10. Estimating amount and type of security need It is indicated that most coordinators are aware of the six organizations and agencies that serve the needs of the festival industry. 1. International Festivals & Events Association (IFEA) 2. Texas Agricultural Extension Service (TAEX) - Department of Recreation, Park & Tourism at Texas A&M University 3. Texas Travel Industry Association (TTIA) 4. Texas Festivals & Events Association (TFEA) 5. Texas Department of Economic Development (TDED) 6. Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) Of respondents to the needs assessment mail survey, 82.8% to 72.6% of Texas festival coordinators are aware of the programs and services of these organizations and agencies. While coordinators show a high level of awareness of conferences, seminars, and workshops, only 13% to 24.7% have attended. Coordinator networks and the internet are viable sources of information. The majority (88%) of festival coordinators (n=216) indicated they have access to the internet and 81.9% of respondents (n=215) said they use the internet. Organizations can use this study and its results to focus on information needs that coordinators indicate are important and have low accessibility. January and February followed by June and July would be the best months for conferences, seminars, and workshops. Seminars may be held during the "off peak" months of January and February while brochures about how to better market an event can be distributed during the peak festival times of September and April. Coordinators' responses as to the best months they would be able to attend Certified Festival Manager (CFM) training also corresponded with event seasonality patterns. Using multiple distribution methods can improve access to festival planning information. Workshops, internet sites, brochures, and publications are just a few of the ways organizations may vary their distribution of information resources. Coordinators indicted their main source of information comes from coordinator networks (48.9%). This finding should be used to note the importance of networking at coordinator informational events. The internet is a viable source of information. Of the respondent coordinators, 98% indicted they have access to the internet. It is reasonable to suggest that more information can be provided via the internet. There are clearly overlapping functions among these organizations', however, many programs are carried out as partners in serving the festival industry. While this study did not examine these overlapping roles, it would be appropriate that areas of overlap should be examined more closely. (shrink)

David Lewis [1973] offers a possible worlds approach to a theory of counterfactuals. He attempts to specify necessary and sufficient conditions according to which a given counterfactual is true or false. This MA Thesis surveys Lewis's theory of counterfactuals in detail. Although for the most part I defend Lewis's account from several objections, in the final chapter I reason that his theory is susceptible to skepticism, which threatens any philosophical theory that relies on Lewis's theory to distinguish between non-paradigmatically true (...) and false counterfactuals. As for the more sympathetic portion of my project, while I show how Lewis's canonical account cannot handle some paradigmatically false counterfactuals--viz., those containing true components--I try to repair his analysis in the spirit of Alan Penczek [1997]. I then discuss Lewis's extension or enhancement to his original theory, which he gives in order to foil an objection advanced by Kit Fine [1975] and Jonathan Bennett [1984]. Finally, I outline and raise several worries inherent in Bennett's rival theory. As for the less then sympathetic section of this paper, I exploit arguments put forward by G. Lee Bowie [1979] as well as by Daniel Krasner and Mark Heller [1994], which are designed to undermine any systematic procedure to circumscribe Lewis's crucial three-place comparative similarity relation between possible worlds. (shrink)

The doctrine of agent-causation has been suggested by many interested in defending libertarian theories of free action to provide the conceptual apparatus necessary to make the notion of incompatibility freedom intelligible. In the present essay the conceptual viability of the doctrine of agent-causation will be assessed. It will be argued that agent-causation is, insofar as it is irreducible to event-causation, mysterious at best, totally unintelligible at worst. First, the arguments for agent-causation made by such eighteenth-century luminaries as Samuel Clarke and (...) Thomas Reid will be considered alongside the defenses of agent-causation proffered in this century by C.A. Campbell, Roderick Chisholm, and Richard Taylor. It will be shown that the case for agent-causation made by these figures is ultimately unconvincing. Two defenses of agent-causation made within the past ten years will then be taken up for examination and critique. First, Timothy O'Connor's attempt at advancing an unrefined and unrepentant doctrine of agent-causation will be shown to suffer from the same maladies as its predecessors. Next, Randolph Clarke's causal agent-causal theory of free action, which seeks a via media between agent-causal theories of free action and causal theories of action, is examined. Clarke's theory is an attempt at providing an account of how both events and agents qua substances can be the codeterminants of free actions. Despite the improvement of Clarke's theory over more conventional agent-causal theories of free action, it will be shown that agent-causation makes his theory more cumbersome than it needs to be. Clarke is able to get as much mileage out of a causal indeterminacy theory of action that does not require him to posit obscure agent-causes. Finally, a sketch of an alternative theory of free action will be offered. While it may suffer from its own conceptual deficiencies, it may not suffer from the same conceptual problems as agent-causal theories of free action. (shrink)

It is widely recognized that in order for one's belief to be justified (in the sense of justification thought to be necessary for knowledge, i.e., doxastic justification) one's belief must be based on that which justifies it. Epistemologists, however, differ about the exact relation that the evidence must bear to one's belief in order for that belief to be doxastically justified. The various analyses of the basing relation that have been proposed can be divided into two main categories: causal accounts (...) and non-causal accounts. In the second chapter I will explicate the central issues involved in providing an adequate causal account of the basing relation. I will consider various attempts to salvage causal accounts in light of Keith Lehrer's counterexample to such formulations of the basing relation, and I will argue that no satisfactory defense of causal theories has so far been given. Consequently, the correct explication of the basing relation must be noncausal. Through the consideration of various non-causal formulations of the basing relation in chapter three, I argue that the correct non-causal account must be reflective in nature. As a result, I argue that Lehrer's account is inadequate, and I conclude that the reflective account provided by Richard Foley is correct. (shrink)

The use of functional language in biology creates a philosophical difficulty for anyone who, for whatever reason, maintains that biological entities were not consciously designed. Since a majority of biologists presently holds this view, many philosophers have attempted to provide a "naturalized" account of what it means for a given biological trait to possess a function. Naturalized accounts seek to capture all that biologists mean functional language is used, yet without making reference to teleological terms such as "goal," "purpose," "design," (...) intention," etc. The difficulty arises once it is realized that our everyday use of functional language seems to be inseparable from such teleological concepts. This thesis has three objectives. The first is to show that the attempt to naturalize the concept of function is a task more suited to a particular community of biologists or philosophers who share certain metaphysical presuppositions than to a broad community seeking the widest possible consensus about the properties of living things. The second is to demonstrate that the attempts to naturalize the concept of function have failed due to insurmountable obstacles of both a conceptual and a practical nature. And the third is to offer and defend an account of function which retains the intuitive link to teleological concepts, but which also preserves the logical consistency of making functional ascriptions in a neo-Darwinian biological context (i.e., of ascribing functions to things which one believes were not in fact designed). Such an account would also remove the need to interpret functional language metaphorically, as some have done. The account offered here disjunctively combines actual design with very strong appearance of design to achieve this desired result. (shrink)

In this thesis I argue that understanding ought to be a central concept investigated by epistemologists. Contemporary epistemologists have largely ignored the concept of understanding, preferring instead to study propositional knowledge. Unlike propositional knowledge, understanding is a cognitive excellence which involves "chunks of information" rather than single propositions. Furthermore, I argue that understanding is distinct even from more complex forms of knowledge; understanding is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. I defend the distinction between knowledge and understanding against possible objections (...) from some recent analyses of knowledge. Finally, I turn to axiological questions and discuss the value of knowledge and the value of understanding over and above true belief. I conclude that any attempt to investigate cognitive excellence in all its forms is incomplete without an inquiry into the nature of understanding. (shrink)

My task here will be to trace the development of the phics. American philosopher John Dewey's esthetics. Central in Dewey's work is the attempt to break down the rigidity of culturally imposed structures which divide esthetic experience from more general sorts of experience; in Dewey's work, esthetic and more general experience are organically continuous. I focus the early portion of this work tracing the roots of Dewey's more mature account of experience. In Dewey's work we discern a strong interest in (...) the immediate, concrete content of our direct experience of the world: a character of experience which I follow Dewey in calling 'thatness'. It is this 'thatness' which most characterizes our esthetic experience, and it is pivotal in Dewey's account of the transactional nature of our interaction with our environment. I shall examine the role of 'thatness' in Dewey's transactional account of experience and then consider the relation between fine art and craft in an attempt to elucidate Dewey's claim as to the presence of the esthetic, with its accompanying 'thatness', in both pursuits. (shrink)

In this thesis I argue that the existence of evil does not provide sufficient evidence that an omnipotent, omniscient and all-loving God does not exist. Specifically, my argument is a contribution to an ongoing debate between William Rowe and Stephen Wykstra. This thesis briefly outlines the history of the development of the evidential version of the problem of evil with its roots in David Hume's writings. It also details the published literature of the debate between Rowe and Wykstra, finally concluding (...) in an argument against Rowe's defeater of Wykstra's CORNEA requirement. I argue that it is not probabilistically surprising that the actual world is a morally deep world, and that this fact precludes Rowe from making his inductive inference. (shrink)

genetic engineering, there are few arguments made for a positive moral obligation to genetic intervention. This is especially so with respect to human germ-line gene therapy. Burke. K. Zimmerman makes one of the few arguments that society and the medical profession have a moral obligation to develop and use human germ-line gene therapy. However, Zimmerman's arguments are vague, and he misses some important points. It is the point of this thesis to criticize and buttress Zimmerman's arguments, and to show that (...) philosophers have an important role to play, in conjunction with scientists, in the ethical debate surrounding genetic engineering. In addition to making suggestions for improvement of Zimmerman's argument, I will argue that the argument succeeds. (shrink)

Since the publication of Jurgen Habermas'essay "Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification," Habermas'form of cognitive moral proceduralism has been met with a host of criticisms originating from within both the Analytic and Continental philosophical traditions. Most of these criticisms, I contend, fail philosophically because they either do not consider critical elements of Habermas' extensive philosophical corpus or else force one to maintain a philosophically problematic position concerning the resolution of moral problems. In this thesis, I will first (...) elucidate in chapter II the salient features of Habermas' notes for the construction of his cognitive proceduralism, what he calls Moralitdt. Then, in chapter III, I will show how this form of moral discourse can meet objections to the particular philosophical tradition from within which Habermas is working (communicative rationality) and against attempts to derive a workable moral theory from within it. In chapter IV, I will provide a further analytic explication of the moral theory Habermas envisages, drawing in part from his other philosophical works on ethics. Having defended philosophically this further explication of his moral theory, in chapter V I will then provide a defense of Habermas' theoretical bifurcation of Moralitdt from Sittlichkeit, or an ethical/existential form of discourse, against general neoHegelian/neo-Aristotelian/conu-nunitarian objections and provide an argument for Moralitdt's philosophical and meta-philosophical independence from Sittlichkeit. Finally, in chapter VI, I will demonstrate how Moralitiit, when applied to practical problems, is a tenable moral theory suitable for use by normal, reflective individuals. I hope, therefore, to have defended the plausibility of Habermas' particular moral theory and its theoretical independence from theories of the "good life," thereby also his bifurcation of Moralitdt and Sittlichkeit. (shrink)

In three chapters this thesis seeks to demonstrate that (i) there historically has been no consensus in the use of the term 'mental privacy' and that several problematic doctrines are based on confused accounts of this term; (ii) there are contemporary debates which are maintained, in large order, by the opposing sides subscribing to different notions of mental privacy; and (iii) a preliminary investigation makes clear that both mental states with propositional content and mental states with non-propositional content are private (...) in that both require the agent to have the state. (shrink)

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In this thesis I argue that the best justification for an environmental ethic for the US Army is one which is based on an anthropocentric or humanistic approach, and I evaluate the Armys Environmental Ethic in light of this. I then consider the Army's Environmental Ethic as a normative operational environmental ethic: an ethic which should help to guide commanders in the field, particularly in times of war. I conclude that the Army's stated operational-level Environmental Ethic is both appropriate and (...) adequate. (shrink)

Human rights enforcement is an important issue within international law. Unfortunately, the status quo of human rights within international law is unsatisfactory. Men, women and children suffer daily violations of their most fundamental human rights. The international community and sovereign states stand by idly, and human rights violations continue unabated. The main impediment to human rights enforcement is state sovereignty. If sovereignty can be abridged to the extent necessary for human rights enforcement, there may be hope for human rights within (...) the international arena. (shrink)

This first chapter locates crucial elements of James's notion of truth within James's 'The Will to Believe." James recognizes evidential criteria in the formation of belief, in contrast to a common claim that for him beliefs are generated in an evidential vacuum. Jamess view of evidence in "The Will to Believe" also stands as a pragmatic reappraisal of traditional epistemology, and such criteria are individualistic. But his treatment should not be taken as subjectivist, in the sense that personal whim or (...) desire always override evidential criteria in the formation of belief. Rather, James's view allows him to avoid both subjectivism and traditional evidentialism. The second chapter suggests that "The Will to Believe" also contains a notion of pluralism, which is intimately related to radical empiricism. James develops two levels of pluralism, individualistic and social. Whereas the first chapter concerns inquiry on an individual level, the second locates the individual within society. James's position on pluralism is also discussed briefly in relation to contemporary ethical theory. Perhaps James's most important notion is that of an "intellectual republic." Such a republic would emerge from a productive mediation between the two levels of pluralism outlined in the essay. In closing, it is suggested that the relationship between James and Josiah Royce illustrates James's ideal of such mediation. The third chapter develops notions of social inquiry hinted at by James within the more radically social philosophy of John Dewey. Following a brief discussion of Platonic assumptions regnant in contemporary discussions, Dewey's views are offered as an alternative to some unpalatable consequences of Platonism. A brief discussion of Dewey's metaphysics and epistemology follows; Dewey manages to avoid both Platonism and relativism, while maintaining the stable and precarious elements traditionally associated with either approach. In conclusion, it is suggested that Dewey's use of the stable and precarious constitute a basis for his notion of criticism, where inquiry is viewed not as a bid for ultimate clarity, but rather as a pattern of interrelationships between elements imbedded within context. Since escape from context is impossible, clarity is also contextual. (shrink)

The task of this project is to explore and explicate the notion of growth as expressed in the philosophical works of American philosopher and educator John Dewey. Specifically, I shall address the importance of our everyday aesthetic experience as it is embodied in our struggles to come to understand our world and each other. These sorts of moments can be pivotal, in that they are opportunities for us not only 'to learn,' as that phrase is traditionally understood, but to be (...) transformed by the continual play between our environing conditions and ourselves. Educative experiences are many and varied, but are not ever-present and are not always fully undergone even when they do avail themselves to us. They exist at least as often in failures and sufferings as in moments of understanding and satisfaction. Furthermore, not all experiences are educative. I shall explore and evaluate the criteria for educative experience which Dewey presents, paying special attention to the continuities which exist within and among our moments of development and transformation. (shrink)

The problem of personal identity has vexed philosophers since its initial formulation by John Locke. He argued that "person" is a distinct ontological entity' y from "man." In so doing, he initiated a separation of the physical and psychological which nearly all later philosophers follow. Some, unsatisfied by Locke's preference for the psychological, argue that physicality is the essential feature of personhood. Others, more inclined to support Locke, argue that psychology is the essential feature. A large portion of the discussion (...) concerning the problem of personal identity is the dispute between these two opposing branches. Yet, despite their differences, both branches share a common goal: the search for necessary and sufficient conditions for personal identity, the search for a suitable "criterion." Derek Parfit, however, questions the primary motivation behind this quest. His arguments attempt to demonstrate not only that no such necessary and sufficient conditions exist, but that this conclusion is untroubling because identity is not even what matters in survival. This last suggestion-that identity is not what matters-is Parfit's novel contribution, and it is the suggestion with which this thesis is mostly concerned. My first task is a description of Parfit's arguments that lead to his radical conclusion. This includes an explication of his Spectra and Fission Arguments, each of which are then assessed. The second task is a description and evaluation of Parfit's replacement for identity, relation R. I examine the critical notion of "quasi" psychology and attack it on two grounds. First, I argue that it is not entirely clear that Parfit's description eliminates the necessity of personal identity: quasi-memory itself presupposes identity. Second, I argue that even if quasi-memory avoids circularity, it cannot matter in the way in which Parfit hopes it can. This is so, I suggest, because memories matter only because of their essential uniqueness. When this element is erased-as it is in quasi-memory memory" ceases to matter altogether. By way of concluding, I offer a hypothesis that illuminates not only Parfit's possible motivations, but his reasons for going awry. (shrink)

Examining literal meaning and the role it plays in the explanation of metaphor shows that the concept of meaning by itself is not powerful enough to answer questions about using and comprehending metaphorical utterances. A full theory of communication is required to give a positive account of metaphorical utterances. In "What Metaphors Mean," Donald Davidson uses his theory of meaning to clear up important confusions about metaphor and its accomplishments, but his account of metaphor is largely negative and leaves much (...) to be explained. Davidson claims that a metaphor means only what the sentence used in the metaphor literally means. Anything else that a metaphor may prompt an interpreter to think is neither a meaning nor a cognitive content encoded in the metaphor and is not subject to linguistic conventions. He claims that the literal meaning of a sentence does play a role in a metaphorical utterance of the sentence, but he does not give a precise account of that role. An important insight in Davidson's account is that literal meaning does not tell the entire story of all important linguistic phenomena. In their book Relevance: Communication and Cognition, Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson give an account of metaphor that avoids Davidson's criticisms and goes beyond the vague positive comments he makes in his essay on metaphor. They propose a theory of communication that not only accommodates Davidson's theory of meaning but explains the role it plays in metaphorical utterances. Sperber and Wilson do not contradict Davidson, but they go beyond his claims and show how a metaphor does what it does. They claim that metaphorical utterances are not different in kind from literal utterances-both require the same interpretive abilities and procedures used in verbal communication. This claim is based on a view that limits the role of literal meaning not only in metaphor but in verbal communication generally. (shrink)

The hegemony of the Inference to the Best Explanation as the rule which scientists follow in theorizing has been challenged in recent debates in philosophy of science by the concept of Symmetry. Inference to the Best Explanation as part of the Realist view of science has been most ably defended by David Armstrong. The concept of Symmetry, as part of the Constructive Empiricist view of science, is championed by Bas van Fraassen. If van Fraassen's Symmetry Principles are to become the (...) rules which all scientists follow, one would need to provide a rationally compelling reason to persuade us to abandon Scientific Realism in favor of Constructive Empiricism. Conversely, if Armstrong wanted all scientists to be Scientific Realists in their use of IBE, then he would have to provide a rationally compelling reason to do so. Part of such a project must include showing that to hold the opposing view would comn-dt one to an irrational position. But it is clear that both Scientific Realism and Constructive Empiricism are within the bounds of what is rational. Since neither view can be shown to be rationally compelling, we must ask whether one is rationally preferable to the other. There are two types of competition in deciding whether one theory is rationally preferable to another. These are the philosophical theory competition and the scientific theory competition. Relying on the former seems to result in the victory of Scientific Realism, while relying on the latter results in the victory of Constructive Empiricism. I argue that this particular conflict belongs in the philosophical theory competition, with the result that Scientific Realism, and with it IBE, should be the dominant account of science. (shrink)

Publication of Gilles Deleuze's interpretative text Nietzsche and Philosophy was accompanied by a resurgence of interest in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, and its themes were taken up by "New Nietzscheans" such as Foucault and Lyotard. The intricate particulars of Deleuze's interpretation were largely ignored, however, until recent criticisms of his account by Keith Ansell-Pearson and Vincent Descombes. By clarifying the meaning and implications of Deleuze's understanding of Nietzsche's Will to Power and Eternal Return, and its ramifications for the relationships (...) between forces and between Master and Slave types, though, I argue that his position is shielded from these attacks. Specifically, I show how Deleuze's notion of difference deflects traditional dialectical criticisms of both Nietzsche and Deleuze's interpretation of Nietzsche. (shrink)

In his book, Anarchy , State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick argues that the only state that can be justified is the minimal state, a state limited to providing protection for all its citizens. Nozick explains how a minimal state could naturally develop from a state of nature without violating any person's rights, allowing for its justification. Whereas, any more extensive state would violate people's rights in performing its various roles, causing such a state to be unjustified. In this thesis, I (...) demonstrate that Nozick's claims about the justification of states may be false. I argue that in order for Nozick's claims to be sustained one must accept some critical assumptions he has made concerning the minimal and more extensive states. Yet, I argue, even if one accepts such assumptions, Nozick's claims may still be false. For, depending upon how one chooses to identify a state, the state that Nozick believes he has justified may actually be considered a more extensive state. In his book, Nozick does not examine how a state, limited to protection, will try to fulfill its single function of protection. I argue that how a state fulfills that single function may cause it to be considered a more extensive state. Therefore, Nozick's claim that no more extensive state than the minimal state is justified would be false. (shrink)

The objective of this thesis is to determine under what circumstances a military officer should disobey or refuse to follow a superior order and also what additional actions the officer should take if he does not follow the order. Within a profession in which loyalty and obedience are valued so highly, there is often a reluctance to discuss the problem of superior orders. The problem is discussed from the perspective of the junior officer. Immanuel Kant's ethics are used as the (...) basis for determining whether or not the order should be followed. Case studies from engineering ethics are examined to determine what avenues of dissent are available in that field. Military examples are then used to determine which of these avenues may be useful and appropriate for military officers. (shrink)

A recent resurgence in interest in the philosophy of Georg Simmel, especially by postmodernists, warrants a closer examination of his life and thought, particularly in light of the fact that he is poorly understood and generally misperceived. Simmel's philosophy is relevant not only because, unlike most postmodernists, he does not slide into the realm of nihilism, although he did maintain an ambivalent pessimism regarding the future. Simmel was a member of a generation who, like postmodernists, rebelled against the grand narratives (...) of the Enlightenment and lived in an era stereotyped by rootlessness and a decline in meaning for life. Simmel's era was given articulation by the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, to whom Simmel is greatly indebted intellectually, although this debt is generally not recognized. I argue that to understand Simmel properly, particularly in light of his being embraced by postmodernists, he must be perceived from the perspective of the times in which he lived, which entails examining the Schopenhauerian roots of his philosophy. In this manner, generally negative stereotypes of Simmel can be shown to be false, and the relevance of his thought for our postmodern world becomes clear in that the world in which he lived was extremely similar to ours. (shrink)

The problem of evil has been raised as a problem for any monotheist who has traditional beliefs about God. The belief that God exists and is omniscient) omnipotent, and omnibenevolent has been claimed to be inconsistent with the existence of evil. Though philosophical theists have provided successful defenses against the problem of evil, few if any, have given an adequate explanation of the existence of evil that is considered plausible on a specific belief system. In this thesis I explore the (...) contributions that Christian theism makes toward resolving the problem of evil. I divide the problem into four areas and argue that the origin of evil must be addressed if an adequate response to the problem of evil is to be identified. I also argue that since the existence of evil is to be expected on a traditional Christian belief system, inductive arguments that claim the existence of evil makes it improbable that the Christian God exists fail. (shrink)

Two ideals, those of community and cosmopolitanism, have wound their ways through the history of philosophy and humanity. In recent times, we again find them the subject of debate in academia while parallel conflicts have arisen throughout the world which appear to instantiate the intellectual debate. The dichotomy has historically resisted resolution. The present thesis presents two views that I believe attempt to resolve the contradictions of community, individual, and world. The two views are those of Josiah Royce and Charles (...) Taylor. I wish to show the similarities and dissimilarities between their respective social philosophies, their social ontologies, and the ameliorative practices they advocate. Although I find Taylor's account to be inadequate, I argue that Royce's notion of community places us on the right footing towards an attempt to escape the dualism of individual and community. This alternative route represents a bequest of a greater comprehension of what it means to be both socially engaged and free. (shrink)

This thesis explores the paradoxical nature of Albert Camus's ideas of Western consciousness, absurdity, and rebellion. Camus believes that as members of the Occident, we are the products of both the Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian cultures. We attempt to make sense of the world through these two sensibilities. The problem with this approach is that these world-views generate very different conceptions of the world. Camus believes that there is no way to logically integrate these two positions and that they exists together (...) as the structure of our consciousness in a paradoxical relationship. The understanding of the world that they generate for us is a unique truth that is dependent upon both sensibilities, but at the same time is much greater than the truths of each individual world-view. Camus argues that every meaningful explanation of the world attempts to overcome any inconsistencies that may threaten this explanation. Naturally, in our attempt to make sense of the world, we try to reconcile the differences between these two divergent world-views. But according to Camus, these two sensibilities exist in a paradoxical relationship that cannot be overcome without sacrificing one of the worldviews and the truth of who we are. Any attempt to reconcile this paradox will undermine the source of our conscious reflection and destroy our ability to give life meaning. It is this crisis that comes with trying to alter the paradox that brings to light what Camus calls absurdity and rebellion. Camus argues that if we try to establish a world based only on the Greco-Roman sensibility, we face absurdity and suicide. Likewise, if we attempt to establish a world based entirely on the Judeo-Christian sensibility, we justify revolution and murder. Either way, we undermine the very thing for which we are striving--a meaningful existence. Absurdity and rebellion are very beneficial, though, in that they make us aware of the paradoxical structure of our consciousness. Camus believes that it is only when we recognize the paradox implicit in our nature that we will avoid the horrors of suicide and murder and construct positive values. (shrink)

Risk analysis is an extraordinarily diverse field of study. This thesis attempts to determine what are the philosophical underpinnings of some of the major writers on the subject of risk. It breaks these writings down into two major groups: those whose writings are positivist in nature and those whose writings are contextualist. Positivistic writings define the subject matter of risk analysis in unambiguous terms that are verifiable by experience. The contextualist adopts a broader approach. For a contextualist the meaning of (...) an explanation for uncertainty is to be found in that explanations particular social context. The second task of this thesis is to consider more fully the concept of contextualism. This section will focus on writers such as John Law, Bruno Latour and Michel Callon who have expanded the term social to include such heterogenous intermediaries as money, texts, human beings and machines. The consequences of their expansion of the social for risk studies will be examined. The final task of this thesis is to apply this expanded contextualist notion of risk to a case study. The explanations provided by two investigatory teams involved in an outbreak of anencephalic births in Cameron County, Texas will be examined. These two groups possess differing conception of risk. It will be shown that these two epistemological positions are the result of differing social organizations. The social commitments of these two groups are responsible for their conceptions of risk. (shrink)

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In the decade of the eighties two blueprints for development, the Brandt and Brundtland RePc)rts, were published with the intention of providing states with a development program. These reports propose remarkably similar solutions to the world's development problems. However, the underlying ethic which could be used to guide the proposals is dissimilar. The Brandt RePOrt is Predicated upon an ethic of rights and obligations to others, while the Brundtiand Report ethic is based upon C n interests. In neither report is (...) the underlying ethic developed. Beginning with these two reports can we construct an ethic which could guide state sponsored development policy? A number of contemporary writers on development construct theories which could be used to support the ethic of Brandt, and be applied to state sponsored development. The neo-Kantian ethics of Gewirth, Shue and O'Neill provide examples of such an ethic. However, a deontic ethic- designed for governing interpersonal relations- is not easily extendable to governmental bodies constrained by rather strict mandates. Attempting to formulate an ethic to govern state sponsored development through theories of justice, such as those proposed by Beitz and Pogge, is also problematic. The constraints of iv a deontic ethic- designed for governing interpersonal relations- is not easily extendable to governmental bodies constrained by rather strict mandates. Attempting to formulate an ethic to govern state sponsored developmentt [sic] through theories of justice, such as those proposed by Beitz and Pogge, is also problematic. The constraints of a governments' mandate can conflict with the demands of contemporary theories of justice. An alternative approach- suggested by the ethic of Brundtlandwhich would base state sponsored development upon an interest based ethic requires examination. Many of the problems of development evince structures similar to those described by game theorists as assurance games and prisoner's dilemms. If this is the case, and a legitimate ethic can be constructed which guides agents behavior toward attaining optimal results, such an ethic may be appropriate for guiding state sponsored development. It is suggested that an ethic such as Gauthier proposes in Morals by Agreement may be best suited to guide development policy. Such an interest based ethic is consonant with the mandate which legitimates government authority. (shrink)

The concept of a sustainable agriculture varies much with writers: some see it as the preservation of agricultural resources or as the reduction of agricultural contamination of the environment or both. Other authors focus on economic viability or the political dimensions of a sustainable agriculture. This thesis argues for a concept of sustainable agriculture as a normative, socio-political concept. Such concepts can avoid some of the theoretical problems in purely ecological, neoclassical economic, and other accounts. Sustainability as a normative, socio-political (...) concept allows for the possibility of a sustainable agriculture in any system in history, regardless of the system's economic or political structure. The proposed concept also provides a basis for evaluating ethical issues relevant to agricultural systems, present or hypothetical. (shrink)

Traditionally, much of the research surrounding Franz Kafka's works has focused on the more serious issues such as the existential aspects --- alienation, angst, or anxiety and anticipation of death. This does not preclude that some others have written on the "lighter" aspects of Kafka's writing, that is, comedy and humor. Because the comedic in Kafka's work is so apparent, I felt it to be a plausible intent to explore the relationship between the more serious aspects and the comedic. It (...) seems that humor and comedy are not the opposite of seriousness, but ways of checking and challenging values and beliefs. Comedy is yet another way to learn; it is a new perspective that often is an aesthetic experience. Kafka's three major works, "The Metamorphosis," The Trial, and The Castle, provide many instances of the comedic. Central to each work is the idea of the "comedic hero" on a journey. With these three works and with the earlier mentioned ideas, my endeavor is to inquire and explore the comedic moments with a special emphasis on revealing how the heroes are entirely unable to eradicate their own misfortune. (shrink)

This is my (Douglas Kutach's) M.A. thesis. It is an embarrassment. My apologies to Wendell Berry.

Due to the character of the original source materials and the nature of batch digitization, quality control issues may be present in this document. Please report any quality issues you encounter to [email protected], referencing the URI of the item.

Due to the character of the original source materials and the nature of batch digitization, quality control issues may be present in this document. Please report any quality issues you encounter to [email protected], referencing the URI of the item.

Due to the character of the original source materials and the nature of batch digitization, quality control issues may be present in this document. Please report any quality issues you encounter to [email protected], referencing the URI of the item.

Due to the character of the original source materials and the nature of batch digitization, quality control issues may be present in this document. Please report any quality issues you encounter to [email protected], referencing the URI of the item.

Due to the character of the original source materials and the nature of batch digitization, quality control issues may be present in this document. Please report any quality issues you encounter to [email protected], referencing the URI of the item.

Due to the character of the original source materials and the nature of batch digitization, quality control issues may be present in this document. Please report any quality issues you encounter to [email protected], referencing the URI of the item.

Due to the character of the original source materials and the nature of batch digitization, quality control issues may be present in this document. Please report any quality issues you encounter to [email protected], referencing the URI of the item.

If grains of sand are added, one by one, to a growing collection of sand on an otherwise empty table, there will eventually be a "heap" of sand on the table. It seems impossible, however, to specify the precise point at which the collection becomes a heap. One grain of sand is certainly not a heap of sand. Does two grains comprise a heap? Can the collection be called a heap at three grains, at 10 grains, or at 500 grains? (...) The commonly used term "heap" is vague -- there is no clear line, which demarcates the heaps from the non-heaps. The difficulty presented by this vagueness becomes clear when we examine the sorites paradox, a very old philosophical problem, which is centered around the premise that the term "heap" has no precise definition. If it is impossible to specify exactly which objects are heaps and which objects are not heaps, how do we continue to use the term with such impunity? Is it possible for a system of logic to model the use of vague terms, if their application is often "neither true nor false," or, "only a matter of interpretation?" How are we to understand the role of vagueness within language? (shrink)

The history of cartography has since the 1970s significantly expanded its disciplinary reach, its theoretical directions and approaches, and its scholarship. This annotated bibliography is intended as a guide to the extended field. It seeks to remind newcomers and established map scholars alike of the field’s traditional concerns (and literatures) and to inform them of its new directions and scholarship.

The presence of parasites in a population has an impact on mate choice and has substantial evolutionary significance. A relatively unexplored aspect of this dynamic is whether or not the presence of parasites increases the likelihood of hybridization events, which also have a significant role in ecological adaptation. One explanation of increased hybridization in some areas and not others is that stress from parasites results in selection for an increase of novel genotypes. Two swordtail species Xiphophorus birchmanni and Xiphophorus malinche (...) maintain an active hybrid zone. The patterns of hybridization are unique in that they do not match up directly with expectations. We set out to test whether or not individuals can sense, using chemical cues, whether conspecifics in their immediate vicinity have high parasite loads and also whether this has an effect on mating and association behavior toward both conspecific and hybrid mates. Our hypothesis being that females will have greater association times with hybrid/heterospecific mates if conscpecifics are heavily parasitized. We found that females exposed to parasitized males had a weaker preference for conspecific odor than those exposed to unparasitized males, both relative to a water control and relative to hybrids. The empirical investigation described above is coupled with a historical and philosophical discussion of some of the issues surrounding the acceptance and understanding of the concept of hybridization. This discussion takes as its major themes: an analysis of the role that social views have on the formation of scientific hypothesis; the lag between epochal change in the scientific community and the assimilation of the consequences into social beliefs; the survival of hierarchical and teleological thinking in our concept of species and purity; and the failures of contemporary evolutionary theory to provide satisfactory explanations about the meaning and upshot of hybridization. Two specific misconceptions about hybridization are addressed. First, that hybridization clashes with the belief in kinds/types/species having separate and pure identities. Secondly, the teleological view that reads purpose into nature and places all instances of variation on a hierarchical scale; the top and bottom of which are determined by estimated closeness to the predetermined perfection of a type. < <. (shrink)