When individuals cannot make up their mind, they sometimes use a random decision-making aid such as a coin to make a decision. This aid may also elicit affective reactions: A person flipping a coin may (dis)like the outcome, and thus decide according to this feeling. We refer to this process as catalysing decisions and to the aid as catalyst. We investigate whether using a catalyst may not only elicit affect but also result in more affect-based decision making. We used different (...) online studies that examine affect-driven decisions by investigating scope insensitivity (indirect behavioural measure) and self-reported weight given to feelings versus reasons in hypothetical donation decisions. Study 1a showed that a catalyst (a lottery wheel) lead to more scope insensitive (i.e. affect-driven) donations. Study 1b included several changes and did not replicate these results. Study 2 (preregistered) examined scope insensitivity but did not replicate previous results; Study 3 (preregistered) looked at the weight given to feelings versus reason. Although catalyst (compared to control) participants descriptively reported relying more on feelings, this difference did not reach significance. In contrast to lay beliefs, results do not indicate support for the hypothesis that using a catalyst results in more affect-based hypothetical donation decisions. (shrink)

Information is more likely believed to be true when it feels easy rather than difficult to process. An ecological learning explanation for this fluency-truth effect implicitly or explicitly presumes that truth and fluency are positively associated. Specifically, true information may be easier to process than false information and individuals may reverse this link in their truth judgments. The current research investigates the important but so far untested precondition of the learning explanation for the fluency-truth effect. In particular, five experiments (total (...) N = 712) test whether participants experience information known to be true as easier to process than information known to be false. Participants in Experiment 1a judged true statements easier to read than false statements. Experiment 1b was a preregistered direct replication with a large sample and again found increased legibility for true statements—importantly, however, this was not the case for statements for which the truth status was unknown. Experiment 1b thereby shows that it is not the actual truth or falsehood of information but the believed truth or falsehood that is associated with processing fluency. In Experiment 2, true calculations were rated as easier to read than false calculations. Participants in Experiment 3 judged it easier to listen to calculations generally known to be true than to calculations generally known to be false. Experiment 4 shows an effect of truth on processing fluency independent of statement familiarity. Discussion centers on the current explanation for the fluency-truth effect and the validity of processing fluency as a cue in truth judgments. (shrink)

Das Buch beschAftigt sich mit psychologischen Theorien und mit empirischer Forschung in der Psychologie. Am Beispiel der Theorie der kognitiven Dissonanz von Festinger beschreibt und analysiert der Autor den Aufbau einer psychologischen Theorie, ihre Entwicklung im Zuge empirischer Forschungsprozesse und die wesentlichen Kennzeichen einer theorieorientierten experimentalpsychologischen Forschung. Diesen Betrachtungen liegt die strukturalistische Theorienkonzeption nach Sneed und StegmA1/4ller zugrunde - ein relativ neuer wissenschaftsphilosophischer Ansatz, der ursprA1/4nglich als non-statement view bezeichnet wurde. In diesem Rahmen werden insbesondere die Beziehungen zwischen Theorie und (...) Experiment sowie die Probleme der ValiditAt empirischer Untersuchungen neu analysiert. (shrink)

Je weiter die Verwissenschaftlichung unserer Lebenswelt fortschreitet, desto dringender stellt sich die Frage nach dem Status und dem sinnvollen Umgang mit Wissenschaft. Buchstaben-Folgen rekonstruiert das Projekt abendländischer Wissenschaft vor dem Hintergrund der Differenz von Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit. Die Reflexion auf das komplizierte Verhältnis zwischen gesprochener Sprache und Schrift sowie auf die entsprechenden - medial unterschiedlichen - Darstellungsformen von Wissen ermöglicht ein angemesseneres Verständnis der ambivalenten Rolle von Wissenschaft in unserer Kultur. Eine in ihrem Status und ihrer Reichweite mißverstandene Wissenschaft kann (...) leicht zur Ideologie werden. Das Buch führt zwei Debatten zusammen, die bisher noch kaum verknüpft worden sind: die interdisziplinäre Debatte der 80er und 90er Jahre um die kulturellen Auswirkungen von Schrift und Schriftlichkeit einerseits und die von Heidegger wesentlich angestoßene und bis heute anhaltende philosophische Diskussion um Status und Reichweite wissenschaftlicher Weltdarstellungen andererseits. In einer doppelten - medienhistorischen und medien-phänomenologischen - Perspektive erläutert der Autor, welche praktischen Entstehungsbedingungen und welchen Status wissenschaftliche Aussagen als >verdauerte sprachliche Handlungen haben, was bestimmte Mißverständnisse von Wissenschaft sind und wie diese Mißverständnisse gerade durch die schriftliche Form der Wissensdarstellung evoziert werden. Der erste Teil des Buches zeigt im Anschluß an Arbeiten von Jan Assmann, Christian Stetter und anderen, wie die Erfindung und Verbreitung der Alphabetschrift in Griechenland die Ausprägung eines formalen Sprachumgangs, die Entstehung von formaler Logik und logisch-enzyklopädischer Wissenschaft als episteme zugleich ermöglicht und herausgefordert hat. Im zweiten Teil des Buches werden zentrale Texte Heideggers im Kontext schriftphilosophischer Überlegungen neu gedeutet. Heideggers kritische Diagnose, daß die Geburtsstunde der okzidentalen Wissenschaft zugleich die Geburtsstunde der abendländischen Wissenschaftsmetaphysik ist, wird verständlich, wenn man sie mit der unreflektierten konstitutiven Schriftlichkeit des Wissenschaftsprojektes in Zusammenhang bringt. Seinsvergessenheit wird im Kern als Schriftvergessenheit verstehbar. Die Darstellung bewegt sich in einem spannungsreichen Verhältnis zu den schriftphilosophischen Thesen von Jacques Derrida und dessen Projekt einer Grammatologie. Die explizite Auseinandersetzung mit Derridas extrem erweitertem Schriftbegriff und mit dessen Kritik am vermeintlichen Präsentismus Heideggers bilden das abschließende Kapitel von Buchstaben-Folgen. Rainer Totzke, geb. 1966. 1988-1955 Studium der Journalistik und Kulturwissenschaften an der Universität Leipzig; 1995-2000 Promotionskolleg Ambivalenzen der Okzidentali-sierung. (shrink)

Si la " critique philosophique de l'art " peut constituer l'axe central d'une approche de la pensée de Walter Benjamin, c'est d'abord parce que l'art représente l'élément par lequel l'homme accède à sa propre temporalité. Le passé individuel, l'origine commune, le projet militant se cristallisent dans le geste artistique. La mémoire elle-même est une forme d'art, non moins que l'anticipation d'un avenir désirable. Investi du pouvoir de définir ainsi l'humanité de l'homme, l'art devient éminemment critiquable : Benjamin n'a jamais cru (...) que pratiquer la " critique " dispensât d'être philosophe. La critique, au contraire, n'a d'autre lieu que la philosophie, sous sa forme la plus épurée. On touche ici du doigt le fascinant pouvoir intégrateur de la pensée benjaminienne, capable de conjuguer l'autobiographique et le politique, la précision analytique et l'élan éthique, la déconstruction et la métaphysique. Quand Benjamin a été si souvent morcelé en personnalités contradictoires, sous la plume parfois d'un seul et même commentateur, c'est une image très cohérente, très homogène, qui nous semble ressortir des diverses contributions de ce recueil. (shrink)

Fifty years after his death, Walter Benjamin remains one of the great cultural critics of this century. Despite his renown, however, Benjamin's philosophical ideas remain elusive/m-/often considered a disaggregated set of thoughts not meant to cohere. This book provides a more systematic perspective on Benjamin, laying claim to his status as a philosopher and situating his work in the context of its time. Exploring Benjamin's theory of language, spoken and nonspoken, Rainer Rochlitz shows how Benjamin reconceptualized traditional ideas of (...) language, art, and history. Offering an expansive assessment of a unique twentieth-century thinker, this volume provides an indispensable guide for readers of Benjamin's recently released collected works. (shrink)

Interactive social cognition theory and approaches of developmental psychology widely agree that central aspects of emotional and social experience arise in the unfolding of processes of embodied social interaction. Bi-directional dynamical couplings of bodily displays such as facial expressions, gestures, and vocalizations have repeatedly been described in terms of coordination, synchrony, mimesis, or attunement. In this paper, I propose conceptualizing such dynamics rather as processes of affective resonance. Starting from the immediate phenomenal experience of being immersed in interaction, I develop (...) the philosophical notion of affective resonance to refer to a dynamic entanglement of moving and being-moved in relation. The concept of affective resonance makes visible that the interaction dynamic itself creates an affective experience rather than transmitting internal feeling states between pre-existent individuals. This leads to a philosophical framework in which relationality and ontogeny are primary over separate individuals, and in which the naturalistic distinction of a fundamental physical level versus an emerging level of social processes has to be given up. (shrink)

L'oeuvre d'Habermas témoigne de la façon dont le philosophe, dans son rôle d'intellectuel, peut agir de l'intérieur sur la cité, en se mêlant aux débats publics et en s'efforçant de les arracher aux abîmes de la déraison. Ces contributions, dont celle d'Habermas lui-même, reflètent le va-et-vient entre autoréflexion propre à la raison philosophique et sa projection théorique et pratique dans l'espace public politique.

Data analytics and data-driven approaches in Machine Learning are now among the most hailed computing technologies in many industrial domains. One major application is predictive analytics, which is used to predict sensitive attributes, future behavior, or cost, risk and utility functions associated with target groups or individuals based on large sets of behavioral and usage data. This paper stresses the severe ethical and data protection implications of predictive analytics if it is used to predict sensitive information about single individuals or (...) treat individuals differently based on the data many unrelated individuals provided. To tackle these concerns in an applied ethics, first, the paper introduces the concept of “predictive privacy” to formulate an ethical principle protecting individuals and groups against differential treatment based on Machine Learning and Big Data analytics. Secondly, it analyses the typical data processing cycle of predictive systems to provide a step-by-step discussion of ethical implications, locating occurrences of predictive privacy violations. Thirdly, the paper sheds light on what is qualitatively new in the way predictive analytics challenges ethical principles such as human dignity and the (liberal) notion of individual privacy. These new challenges arise when predictive systems transform statistical inferences, which provide knowledge about the cohort of training data donors, into individual predictions, thereby crossing what I call the “prediction gap”. Finally, the paper summarizes that data protection in the age of predictive analytics is a collective matter as we face situations where an individual’s (or group’s) privacy is violated using dataotherindividuals provide about themselves, possibly even anonymously. (shrink)

Entgegen der landlaufigen Meinung, unser Zeitalter sei durch einen irreversiblen Pluralismus philosophischer Diskurse gekennzeichnet, versucht diese Schrift zu zeigen, dass es Einheit in der Vielheit geben kann, wenn Denkzusammenhange auf ihre bildliche Expressivitat bezogen werden. Dabei lasst sich darstellen, dass heterogene Denkentwurfe wie Heideggers "Sein und Zeit," die Psychoanalyse, Wittgensteins "Traktat" oder Einsteins spezielle Relativitatstheorie trotz aller sachlicher Verschiedenheit einen einheitlichen Expressionszusammenhang bilden, welcher durch eine "Hohlweltmetapher" gekennzeichnet ist. Das Absolute wird in den Raum der Endlichkeit verlagert. Der christliche Gott (...) wird neu gedeutet.". (shrink)

Colour has long been a source of fascination to both scientists and philosophers. In one sense, colours are in the mind of the beholder, in another sense they belong to the external world. Colours appear to lie on the boundary where we have divided the world into 'objective' and 'subjective' events. They represent, more than any other attribute of our visual experience, a place where both physical and mental properties are interwoven in an intimate and enigmatic way. -/- The last (...) few decades have brought fascinating changes in the way that we think about 'colour' and the role 'colour' plays in our perceptual architecture. In Colour Perception: Mind and the physical world, leading scholars from cognitive psychology, philosophy, neurophysiology, and computational vision provide an overview of the contemporary developments in our understanding of colours and of the relationship between the 'mental' and the 'physical'. With each chapter followed by critical commentaries, the volume presents a lively and accessible picture of the intellectual traditions which have shaped research into colour perception. -/- Written in a non-technical style and accessible to an interdisciplinary audience, the book will provide an invaluable resource for researchers in colour perception and the cognitive sciences. (shrink)

It is surprising how far one can get by thinking things through. (Alec Fisher [2004], The logic of real arguments, p. 1)In the first part of the article, the central role of theory in emotion psych...

The chapter argues from an ethology-inspired internalist perspective that ‘colour’ is not a homogeneous and autonomous attribute, but rather plays different roles in different conceptual forms underlying perception. It discusses empirical and theoretical evidence that indicates that core assumptions underlying orthodox conceptions are grossly inadequate. The assumptions pertain to the idea that colour is a kind of autonomous and unitary attribute. It is regarded as unitary or homogeneous by assuming that its core properties do not depend on the type of (...) ‘perceptual object’ to which it pertains and that‘colour per se’ constitutes a natural attribute in the functional architecture of the perceptual system. It is regarded as autonomous by assuming that it can be studied in isolation of other perceptual attributes. More generally, the chapter argues on the bases of corresponding empirical and theoretical evidence that perception cannot be understood as the ‘recovery’ of physical world structure from sensory structure by input-based computational processes. Rather, the sensory input serves as a kind of sign for biologically relevant aspects of the external world that activates biologically given conceptual forms with their internal parameters. Although the sensory input is a causally necessary requirement for the activation of conceptual forms, the perceptual computations triggered are under the control of an internal programme based on a set of conceptual forms. (shrink)

Evidence on the coherence between emotion and facial expression in adults from laboratory experiments is reviewed. High coherence has been found in several studies between amusement and smiling; low to moderate coherence between other positive emotions and smiling. The available evidence for surprise and disgust suggests that these emotions are accompanied by their “traditional” facial expressions, and even components of these expressions, only in a minority of cases. Evidence concerning sadness, anger, and fear is very limited. For sadness, one study (...) suggests that high emotion–expression coherence may exist in specific situations, whereas for anger and fear, the evidence points to low coherence. Insufficient emotion intensity and inhibition of facial expressions seem unable to account for the observed dissociations between emotion and facial expression. (shrink)

The chapter deals with misconceptions in perception theory that are based on the idea of slicing the nature of perception along the joints of physics and on corresponding ill-conceived ʹpurposesʹ and ʹgoalsʹ of the perceptual system. It argues that the conceptual structure underlying the percept cannot be inferentially attained from the sensory input. The output of the perceptual system, namely meaningful categories, is evidently vastly underdetermined by the sensory input, namely physico-geometric energy patterns. Thus, the core task of perception theory (...) is to understand the internal conceptual structure with which our perceptual system is endowed. The conceptual structure underlying the semantic distinctions that characterise the output of the perceptual system can, by conceptual necessity, only be expressed by a logical language that is strictly more powerful than the logical language by which sensory notions can be expressed. Consequently, the internal structure underlying perceptual meaning – including core notions such as ‘Gestalt’ or ‘perceptual object’ – cannot be derived, by whatever kind of general inductive machinery, from the sensory input, or, more generally, from experience. (shrink)

Based on the belief that computational modeling (thinking in terms of representation and computations) can help to clarify controversial issues in emotion theory, this article examines emotional experience from the perspective of the Computational Belief–Desire Theory of Emotion (CBDTE), a computational explication of the belief–desire theory of emotion. It is argued that CBDTE provides plausible answers to central explanatory challenges posed by emotional experience, including: the phenomenal quality,intensity and object-directedness of emotional experience, the function of emotional experience and its relation (...) to cognition and motivation, and the relation between emotional experience and emotion. In addition, CBDTE avoids most objections that have been raised against cognitive theories of emotion. A remaining objection, that beliefs are not necessary for the emotions covered by CBDTE, is rejected as empirically unsupported. (shrink)

The chapter deals with the notion of phenomenal realness, which was first systematically explored by Albert Michotte. Phenomenal realness refers to the impression that a perceptual object is perceived to have an autonomous existence in our mind-independent world. Perceptual psychology provides an abundance of phenomena, ranging from amodal completion to picture perception, that indicate that phenomenal realness is an independent perceptual attribute that can be conferred to perceptual objects in different degrees. The chapter outlines a theoretical framework that appears particularly (...) well-suited for dealing with corresponding phenomena. According to this framework, perception can be understood as a triggering of conceptual forms by sensor inputs. It is argued that the attribute of phenomenal realness is based on specific types of internal evaluation functions which deal with the segregation of causes conceived as ‘external’ from those conceived as ‘internal’. These evaluation functions integrate different internal sources of ‘knowledge’ about the potential causes for the activation of conceptual forms and provide markers by which conceptual forms can be tagged as ‘external world objects’. (shrink)

Research on cognition and emotion during the past 30 years has made reasonable progress in theory, methods and empirical research. New theories of the cognition–emotion relation have been proposed, emotion research has become more interdisciplinary, and improved methods of emotion measurement have been developed. On the empirical side, the main achievement of the past 30 years is seen to consist in the reduction of the set of serious contenders for a theory of emotions. Still, several important issues are not fully (...) resolved, including the computational implementation of appraisal processes, the nature of emotions, and the link between emotions and actions. Also, quantitative theories of the cognition–emotion relation need to be refined and tested, and improved theories of the link between emotions and bodily and facial expressions need to be developed. To counter the dangers of theoretical fragmentation and knowledge loss, more efforts should be devoted to the analysis, reconstruction, comparison and integration of important theories and hypotheses in the field of emotion, as well as to the systematization of arguments in favor and against these theories and hypotheses. (shrink)

A new experimental paradigm involving a computerised quiz was used to examine, on an intra-individual level, the strength of association between four components of the surprise syndrome: cognitive (degree of prospectively estimated unexpectedness), experiential (the feeling of surprise), behavioural (degree of response delay on a parallel task), and expressive (the facial expression of surprise). It is argued that this paradigm, together with associated methods of data analysis, effectively controls for most method factors that could in previous studies have lowered the (...) correlations among the components of emotion syndromes. It was found that (a) the components of the surprise syndrome were all positively correlated; (b) strong association existed only between the cognitive and the experiential component of surprise; (c) the coherence between syndrome components did not increase with increasing intensity of surprise; and (d) there was also only moderate coherence between the components of the facial expression of surprise (eyebrow raising, eye widening, mouth opening), although in this case, coherence tended to increase with intensity. Taken together, the findings support only a weakly probabilistic version of a behavioural syndrome view of surprise. However, the component correlations seem strong enough to support the existence of strong associations among a subset of the mental or central neurophysiological processes engaged in surprise. (shrink)

Brian Leiter and Neil Sinhababu (eds), Nietzsche and Morality Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s10677-008-9134-6 Authors Rainer Kattel, Tallinn University of Technology Ehitajate tee 5 19086 Tallinn Estonia Journal Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Online ISSN 1572-8447 Print ISSN 1386-2820.

Three main versions of cognition-arousal theory are distinguished depending on how they interpret the theory’s basic postulate, that an emotion is a function of cognition and arousal: objectivist causal theories, attributional theories, and fusion theories. The objectivist causal and attributional theories each comprise a causal-functional and a part-whole version, and the fusion theory subsumes in particular a categorization and a perceptual integration version. In addition, the attributional version of cognition-arousal theory can be reinterpreted as a theory of emotion self-ascription. Although (...) arousal may in fact not be necessary for emotions, a modified cognition-feeling theory that replaces arousal with intrinsically affective feelings, seems still viable. Arguments are presented why the objectivist causal-functional version of this theory should be preferred. (shrink)

We first present a reconstruction of James’s theory of emotion (JATE) and then argue for four theses: (a) Despite constructivist elements, James’s views are overall in line with basic emotions theory. (b) JATE does not exclude an influence of emotion on intentional action even in its original formulation; nevertheless, this influence is quite limited. It seems possible, however, to repair this problem of the theory. (c) Cannon’s theory of emotion is a centralized version of JATE that inherits from the latter (...) theory a potentially fatal flaw, the insufficient physiological differentiation of emotions. (d) The core claim of JATE, that emotions are bodily feelings, is very likely false. (shrink)

This paper sets out the notion of a current “biopolitical turn of digital capitalism” resulting from the increasing deployment of AI and data analytics technologies in the public sector. With applications of AI-based automated decisions currently shifting from the domain of business to customer (B2C) relations to government to citizen (G2C) relations, a new form of governance arises that operates through “algorithmic social selection”. Moreover, the paper describes how the ethics of AI is at an impasse concerning these larger societal (...) and socioeconomic trends and calls for an ethics of AI that includes, and acts in close alliance with, social and political philosophy. As an example, the problem of Predictive Analytics is debated to make the point that data-driven AI (Machine Learning) is currently one of the main ethical challenges in the ethics of AI. (shrink)

Introduction: the foundation of justice -- Practical reason and justifying reasons: on the foundation of morality -- Moral autonomy and the autonomy of morality : toward a theory of normativity after Kant -- Ethics and morality -- The justification of justice: Rawls's political liberalism and Habermas's discourse theory in dialogue -- Political liberty: integrating five conceptions of autonomy -- A critical theory of multicultural toleration -- The rule of reasons: three models of deliberative democracy -- Social justice, justification, and power (...) -- The basic right to justification: toward a constructivist conception of human rights -- Constructions of transnational justice: comparing John Rawls's the law of peoples and Otfried Höffe's democracy in an age of globalisation -- Justice, morality, and power in the global context -- Toward a critical theory of transnational justice. (shrink)

The theory of emotions as affective position-takings (PT) is investigated from the perspective of a computational model of the belief-desire theory of emotions (CBDTE) proposed by the author. Both theories assume that a core subset of typical emotion episodes are the products of an evaluation process in which cognized states of affairs are evaluated for their congruence with the person's desires; and that emotions are, on the conscious level, feelings of pleasure and displeasure. However, according to PT the evaluation is (...) a concern-based construal and emotional feelings are intrinsically object-directed, whereas according to CBDTE, the evaluation is performed by a hardwired mechanism that produces nonintentional feelings. Furthermore, CBDTE suggests that hedonic feelings are simultaneously reactions to the detection of value, and representations of the detected value. (shrink)