In addition to conceiving of such imaginary scenarios as those involving philosophical zombies, we may conceive of such things being conceived. Call these higher order conceptions ‘meta-conceptions’. Sorensen (2006) holds that one can entertain a meta-conception without thereby conceiving of the embedded lower-order conception. So it seems that I can meta-conceive possibilities which I cannot conceive. If this is correct, then meta-conceptions provide a counter-example to the claim that possibility entails conceivability. Moreover, some of Sorensen’s discussion suggests the following argument: (...) if the conceivability of some proposition entails its possibility, then the meta-conceivability of some proposition entails its possibility; but we can meta-conceive impossibilities; so conceivability doesn’t entail possibility. In this paper, I’ll argue that one cannot entertain a meta-conception without thereby conceiving of the embedded lower-order conception. And so we can neither meta-conceive impossibilities nor meta-conceive possibilities of which we cannot thereby conceive. (shrink)

Logical truths are paradigmatically topic-neutral. I argue that topic-neutrality is ambiguous between two conceptions. Under one conception, a truth is topic-neutral if it is characterized by its abstraction from all semantic content whatsoever; according to another conception, a truth is topic-neutral if it is abstracted from the specific identities of things. I’ll discuss the significance of this distinction for Peacocke’s criterion for logical constancy drawn in terms of a priori knowability conditions. -/- Resumo As verdades lógicas são um tema paradigmaticamente (...) tópico-neutral. O autor defende que a tópico-neutralidade é ambígua entre duas concepções. Sob uma concepção, a verdade é um tópico-neutral se ela for caracterizada pela sua abstracção de todo o conteúdo semântico; de acordo com uma outra concepção, a verdade é um tópico-neutral se for abstraída das identidades específicas das coisas. O autor irá discutir o significado desta distinção no critério de Peacocke para a constância lógica pensada em termos de condições a priori de cognoscibilidade. Palavras-chave : conhecimento a priori, consequência lógica, constantes lógicas, tópiconeutralidade, verdade. (shrink)