Philosophy of Law

“Excited Delirium Syndrome” (ExDS) is a controversial diagnosis. The supposed syndrome is sometimes considered to be a potential cause of death. However, it has been argued that its sole purpose is to cover up excessive police violence because it is mainly used to explain deaths of individuals in custody. In this paper, we examine the epistemic conditions giving rise to the controversial diagnosis by discussing the relation between causal hypotheses, evidence, and data in forensic medicine. We argue that the practitioners’ (...) social context affects causal inquiry through background assumptions that enter inquiry at multiple stages. This analysis serves to better understand the wide usage of the controversial diagnosis of ExDS. (shrink)

Does morality have a procedure? Unlike law, morality is arguably neither posited nor institutional. Thus, while morality undeniably prescribes various procedures, that morality itself has a procedure is less obvious. Indeed, the coexistence of procedural moral norms alongside substantive moral norms might seem paradoxical, given that they often yield contradictory prescriptions. After all, one may wonder, is morality not substantive all the way down? Nevertheless, the paper argues that morality has a “procedural branch” containing numerous norms that are themselves procedural. (...) These norms comprise what we hold are the three hallmarks of a procedural norm: second-orderness, providing reasons on how to engage with other norms, and outcome-neutrality. In this respect, morality is more like law than what one might have expected. (shrink)

Rodolfo Sacco has devoted much of his research to the relations between law and language. His analysis were focused on the problem of legal translation for comparative law research, on mute law, and on the importance of understanding the dynamics of the different languages in Europe today.

A widespread thesis in the analytical theory of law is that norms exist as linguistic entities. Rodolfo Sacco is one of the authors who have most fruitfully insisted, on the contrary, that there is no necessary correlation between norms and language, not even in the specific context of law. He thus extended the conceptualisation of legal normativity well beyond the boundaries of language through the notions of cryptotype and mute law. This paper takes into account two alternative hypotheses to the (...) hypothesis that norms exist as linguistic entities, which are respectively based on the concepts of deontic state-of-affairs and deontic noema. Both hypotheses are tested for their applicability to the phenomena investigated by Sacco under the notion of mute law, notably with reference to cryptotypes. The question is raised then of how the existence of cryptotypes can be inferred from behaviour. The paper emphasizes the role that can be played in this context by nomotrophic behaviour, that is, the behaviour that consists in a reaction to the violation of a norm. (shrink)

This paper analyses the international media coverage of the dispute surrounding the pardons the Polish President granted in 2015 to two politicians, arrested almost a decade later. However political this case has become, it is underlain by a specific interpretive problem concerning the presidential pardon power under the Constitution, particularly whether it can be exercised before a final conviction (the so-called ‘individual abolition’). This question has long been controversial in scholarship and, in recent years, has been addressed by top Polish (...) courts, passing conflicting rulings. Attempting to probe into the intersection of journalism, politics, law and linguistics, this paper evaluates the issue’s portrayal in 37 articles published on major news websites around the time of the arrest. It is argued that when reporting local legal news, international media engage in a dual translation, rendering legal communications in one language into media communications in another. While ‘lossless’ transfer cannot be expected, this research shows that certain limits should not be crossed to maintain journalistic standards. In particular, most articles entirely omit the scholarship and rulings confirming the validity of the pardons. Consequently, readers are not given an opportunity to become aware of all relevant facts and perhaps seek further information. On the positive side, it has been found that simple and accessible language does not necessarily mean material distortions in the coverage of legal issues. The research thus suggests that reporting domestic legal news for international audiences requires understanding the source context, conscious language use and a reliable selection of information. (shrink)

This unique volume brings together leading academics and researchers from different legal traditions to discuss the work and impact of Hans Kelsen, the most influential legal philosopher with global reach. Using his Pure Theory of Law and his theory of democracy as a lingua franca, the book allows for dialogues between jurisdictions and legal traditions and serves as a point of departure for further research on several themes such as state, international, and non-state law. -/- The volume covers four themes. (...) The first part focuses on Kelsen's often overlooked assumptions and the resultant conception of law. The second section refers in particular to Kelsen's understanding of legal norms and some of its most salient elements and features such as sanction and validity. The third part explores a variety of questions concerning Kelsen's views on international and non-state law in general and their implications in some jurisdictions. The final section brings Kelsen's legal and political theory together by assessing its relevance to democracy. (shrink)

After the publication of Hart's Concept of Law, Dworkin published his article “The Model of Rules,” dividing positivism into two varieties: inclusive and exclusive. Many theorists involved in this debate have characterized Hart's position as inclusivist, which we reject in this article. We argue that Hart, in the postscript to The Concept of Law, conceded a point to Dworkin in accepting that inclusive positivism would imply the existence of objective moral standing, adopting a more “neutral” position—compatible with inclusive and exclusive (...) positivism—and consequently distancing himself from the incorporation thesis, which is paramount to inclusive positivism. (shrink)

Pursuant to the aims and scope of the Special Issue it is part of, this invited contribution seeks to shed new light on the nature and working logic of legal reasoning. It does so by engaging with two of the most authoritative views on the subject which have recently been put forward in the Common law world—namely, Lord Hoffmann’s, and Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin’s. A key-concern of the Anglophone debate on legal reasoning is whether it is a specialistic type (...) of reasoning requiring ad hoc education and training, or ordinary reasoning subject to ordinary rules of language (i.e. sentence construction, interpretation, etc.). The article argues that compelling though they are, these sorts of enquiries do not help to understand what legal reasoning really is and how it operates. In particular, it argues that if we are to understand what legal reasoning is and how it works, we ought to examine the propositions it aims to craft and support. In so arguing, the article further shows that exploring law’s nature and operations as an intellectual means for social ordering also helps to understand how law works as a regulatory phenomenon more generally. (shrink)

In natural language processing (NLP), named entity recognition (NER) and semantic classification are essential tasks. NER is a fundamental task, that identify named entities in text such as people, organizations, and locations. In Legal domain, NER is particularly important due to the variety of named entities that appear in legal documents and are important for legal analysis whereas Semantic classification is the process of giving each sentence in a text a semantic label, such as ”fact,””arguments,” or”judgement”. Both NER and Semantic (...) classi- fication are critical component of many NLP applications such as Knowledge base construction and semantic search. Semantic searching of legal documents is a powerful technique that can be used to quickly find the information that you need. By combining NER and semantic classification, one can identify the key elements of a legal document and search for documents that are related to a particular topic or contain a particular type of information. This paper proposes a novel approach to NER and Semantic classification in legal domain using Long short-term memory (LSTM) model. The proposed approach is evaluated on a corpus of legal text and the result of this study suggest that LSTM models are a promising approach for NER and Semantic classification in legal domain and can be used to improve the performance of semantic searching of legal documents. (shrink)

This article reconstructs a Received View of the right to marry in the European Convention on Human Rights and provides its philosophical interpretation. According to the Received View, the right to marry is a right to a legal institution of marriage. Recent case law from the European Court of Human Rights is analysed, with a focus on the protection and recognition of personal relationships under the law. According to the Fedotova case, the rights pertaining to the protection of conjugal relationships (...) stem from the right to family life. The problem of non-distinctiveness of the right to marry is being discussed. If substantial rights protecting conjugal couples stem from the right to family life, then the right to marry does not offer any additional protection for the couple. The Received View addresses this issue. However, it is politically and morally unjust. (shrink)

Bilgisayar, tablet, cep telefonu gibi iletişim ve bilgi teknolojilerinin yaşamımızın merkezine girmesiyle birlikte sanal gerçeklik de kültürümüzün bir parçası olmuştur. -/- Sanal gerçeklik ile birlikte yeni suç unsurlarının da oluşması tüm dünyada küresel bir sorunu da gündeme getirmiştir. Siber suçlar, suç dünyasındaki bilinen ve bilinmeyen en yeni ve en karmaşık sorunları da beraberinde getirmiştir. -/- Siber teknoloji, bir yandan bilgi ve iletişimi hızlandırıp kolaylaştırırken diğer yandan kötüye kullanım da bir o kadar hızlı ve kolay olmaktadır. Siber saldırılarla seçimlere müdahale edilebilmekte, (...) elektrik, doğal gaz kesintileri, bankacılık ve iletişim sistemleri çökertilebilirken bireyin en mahrem alanına girmekten farklı istismar boyutlarını da kapsayan çeşitli sahtecilikleri içeren dev suçlar söz konusu olabilmektedir. -/- Ülkeler artık en büyük yatırımlarını siber dünyaya yapmaktadır. Tüm dünyada yaşanan siber devrimi ıskalayan ülkelerin yeniden kurulan dünya düzenindeki yerinin neresi olacağını tahmin etmek çok da zor olmasa gerek. -/- Bilişim teknolojilerini olabildiğince verimli kullanıp araştırma ve geliştirmeye yatırımlar yaparak siber devrimin içinde yer almamız zorunlu görünüyor. Diğer yandan bilişimin kötüye kullanılmasıyla ortaya çıkan siber suç ve buna bağlı kavramlar ile bu suçun etkilerini irdelemek de zorunluluk. Yaşamımızı önemli ölçüde kolaylaştıran sanal dünya bir yandan da bu duruma uygun yeni hukuksal düzenlemeleri de zorunlu kılıyor. Siber suçlara yönelik uluslararası hukuk boyutunda daha kapsamlı düzenlemelerin yapılması ve her geçen gün etkisini arttıran siber suç olgusu üzerine sadece yerel değil evrensel bir yaklaşım gerektiğinin altını çizmeliyiz. (shrink)

In this chapter, Daniel Layman argues that there is not one Lockean conception of IR but rather (at least) two mutually incompatible conceptions: one a Ciceronian moral cosmopolitanism and the other a colonialism centered on British interests. Opposing Locke’s philosophical writings with his economic works, Layman’s reading acknowledges the contradictions and incoherence present in Locke’s IR theory.

In Wilmot-Smith’s recent ‘Law, “Ought”, and “Can”,’ he argues that legal obligation does not imply ability. In this short reply, I show that Wilmot-Smith’s arguments do not withstand critical scrutiny. In section 1, I attack Wilmot-Smith’s argument for the claim that allowing for impossible obligations makes for a better legal system, and I introduce positive grounds for thinking otherwise. In section 2, I show that, even if Wilmot-Smith had established that impossible obligations make for a better legal system, his subsequent (...) attack on OIC fails. (shrink)

Images of nature abound in the practice of international environmental law but their significance in law is unclear. Drawing on visual jurisprudence, and interpretative methods for visual art, this book analyses photographs for their representations of nature's aesthetic value in treaty processes that concern world heritage, whales and biodiversity. It argues that visual images should be embraced in the prosaic practice of international law, particularly for treaties that demand judgements of nature's aesthetic value. This environmental value is in practice conflated (...) with natural beauty, ethical and cultural values, and displaced by economic and scientific values. Interpretations of visual images can serve instead to critique and conceive sensory, imaginative and emotional appreciations of nature from different cultural perspectives as proposed by philosophers of environmental aesthetics. Addressing questions of value and the visual, this landmark book shows how images can be engaged by nations to better protect the environment under international law. (shrink)

This text provides students with comprehensive coverage that maps out the different ways to approach the study of international law. It explains the institutions and main sources of international law-making and identifies the key topics.

Das Konzept der Abwägung wird in der praktischen Philosophie ebenso ubiquitär verwendet wie in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften und im Recht. Es ist jedoch voraussetzungsvoller und umstrittener als zumeist angenommen. „Abwägung“ bezeichnet einen Vorgang praktischen Überlegens, in den mehrere Aspekte in vergleichender Weise eingehen. Die Skepsis gegen das Konzept gründet darin, dass sich die Metapher nicht auf beliebige Gegenstände anwenden lässt. Insbesondere müssen die Wertzuschreibungen, die das Gewicht der Gegenstände bestimmen, in ihren normativen Grundlagen widerspruchsfrei sein und sie müssen ähnlich wie die (...) Gewichtskräfte, mit denen Körper auf die Schalen einer Balkenwaage einwirken, eine gewisse Kontextinvarianz aufweisen. Das setzt Unabhängigkeitsannahmen voraus, deren Gültigkeit im Falle normativer Bewertungen nicht trivial ist. Der Band dient dem Zweck, diese Zusammenhänge durchsichtiger zu machen. Er entstand auf der Basis einer mehrjährigen Zusammenarbeit von Autor:innen aus den Fächern Philosophie, Jurisprudenz und Ökonomie. (shrink)

This paper aims to analyze a type of epistemic injustice in the field of criminal procedural law. The central research question is: can reverse onus in criminal trial lead to epistemic injustice? To address this question, the text will be divided into three parts. First, we examine the concept of epistemic injustice and its various modalities. Second, we present the conditions under criminal trials in an epistemic setting. We characterize the criminal trial in an epistemological key. Finally, in third place, (...) we present why a change in the institutional design (the burden of proof) leads to epistemic injustice. (shrink)

. 1. Introduĉão histórica ao pensamento jurídico, épocas medieval e moderna --.

This paper investigates the basis arguments of so-called legal logic and their relation to logic in its standard meaning. There is no doubt that legal arguments belong to logic in the wide sense (sensu largo), but their reduction to schemes of formal logic (logica sensu stricto) is a controversial issue. It can be demonstrated that only some legal arguments fall under explicit rules of formal logic, that is, having a deductive character. Most such reasoning is fallible, and its correctness depends (...) on appealing to extra-logical principles taken from legal norms. For instance, if we say, “If it is permitted more, then it is permitted less” (argumentum a maiori ad minus), we assume that the concepts expressed by the words “more” and “less” are already defined. (shrink)

The issue of moral luck is one of the interesting and influential issues in contemporary philosophy of ethics. The main question of this discussion can be expressed as follows: Do matters that are beyond the authority and control of the moral agent affect his moral standing or the extent of his worthiness for moral praise or blame? The “Principle of Control” replies negatively to this question while “Moral Luck” gives a positive one. In the first encounter with the jurisprudential tradition (...) after Shaykh Ansari, it seems that there are two stances in this regard. Through the analytic study of this jurisprudential tradition, the authors have strived to identify, review, and explain the views presented in this intellectual tradition. The emphasis of the jurists that an involuntary act is outside the scope of duty, at least apparently, is an emphasis of the Principle of Control; however, we will see that this principle derived from the principles of jurisprudence is different from the Principle of Control raised in contemporary philosophy of ethics. On the other hand, the views of some jurists in the discussion of tajarrī, and their jurisprudence and interpretation regarding some narrations supports the acceptance of moral luck. A comparison of the collection of prevalent views in the principles of jurisprudence of contemporary Twelver Shiites leads us to the conclusion that the stance of most of them is to accept moral luck along with a particular reading that is compatible with the Principle of Control. Introduction The issue of moral luck that was raised at the end of the twentieth century by Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams can also be pursued in Twelver Shiite principles of jurisprudence. The aims of the authors of this paper are to identify, review, and analyze the prevalent view or viewsamong contemporary Twelver Shiite jurists in dealing with the issue of moral luck. In the jurisprudential tradition after Shaykh Ansari, there is a stance that approves the Principle of Control. However, a point to note is that the jurists have a particular reading of this principle which is different from the prevalent reading in contemporary philosophy of ethics. Some of the stances of contemporary Twelver Shiite jurists also support the acceptance of moral luck. As a result, moral luck is situational and dispositional. In this paper, we will show that many of the contemporary jurists accept moral luck and the Principle of Control that is compatible with it. The principle of control in Twelver Shiite principles of jurisprudence Based on the existing literature in contemporary philosophy of ethics, the Principle of Control can be explained as follows: The Principle of Control 1: The moral agent can only be morally evaluated to the extent that moral evaluation is based on factors that are under his free will and control. In contemporary Twelver Shiite principles of jurisprudence, free will is considered a necessary condition for duties or moral judgments. It seems that this view approves of the Principle of Control; however, not precisely the Principle of Control 1. The principle that can be attributed to the jurists is as follows: The Principle of Control 2: The moral agent is only assessable for the performance of an action that is under his authority and control. Or if it is not under his authority and control, the agent himself has caused this lack of authority through a voluntary act. Moral luck in Twelver Shiite principles of jusrisprudence On the other hand, some jurists do not consider a person who is a mutajarrī (one who has performed an act that he thinks is a sin which is not actually a sin) to be deserving of punishment; in contrast to a sinner whereas the difference between the two is in something that is beyond their authority and control. Similarly, it is well-known among jurists that a marja1 who has arrived at reality will receive twice the reward while one had not arrived would receive one, whereas reaching reality is not completely under his authority and control. Two marajiʿ may strive to the same extent; however, only one of them will arrive at the correct view. The third stance that some contemporary jurists have raised regarding the worthiness of reward or punishment due to an involuntary action is their interpretation of narrations that state: The reward of someone who establishes a good tradition increases to the extent of adherence to that tradition and the punishment of someone who establishes a bad tradition increases to the extent of adherence to that tradition. Obviously, the extent of adherence to a tradition is not completely under the control of the founder of that tradition and two founders may strive to exactly the same extent to promote their traditions; however, one tradition will have more followers. Discussion The view of this group of jurists in these discussions requires that something outside the control and authority of the agent influences his worthiness of reward or punishment and this is equivalent to the acceptance of moral luck. Considering the differences between the Principle of Control 1 and 2, it seems that the Principle of Control 2 can be combined with moral luck and, as a result, with situational and dispositional moral luck. Based on the Principle of Control 2, for an agent to be properly evaluated, it is sufficient that his action is performed voluntarily, or if it is involuntary, the agent himself caused this involuntariness. However, based on the Principle of Control 1, the agent is only assessable to the extent that moral evaluation is based on factors that are under his authority and control. In reality, in the Principle of Control 2, only the voluntariness of an action is important and if the action itself is voluntary, the moral evaluation of the agent is not limited to the extent that the action is voluntary and under one’s control. Conclusion Some contemporary Twelver Shiite jurists believe that sometimes a matter beyond the authority and control of an agent is influential in the extent of the worthiness of praise and reward, or blame and punishment of an agent and, therefore, they accept moral luck; except causal luck. Similarly, the jurists also believe in a specific reading of the principle that is compatible with it. (shrink)

本书运用哲学诠释学之基本原理,对法律诠释现象作出了富有学理性的新诠释。全书从当代西方法学家的法律诠释观念入手,较为系统地总结和论述了法律诠释学的哲学基础、法律诠释学的性质与作用、法律诠释的方法等问题。 .

Conceiving legal obligations towards future generations is challenging—especially from a positivist stance and if obligations and claims are understood as being correlative in nature. Legal obligations towards future generations are often rejected from the outset if (and insofar as) there is no explicit acknowledgement or established doctrine. This neglects the power of sound legal interpretation. I argue that obligations towards future people and generations are grounded in the relational character of human rights and that their positivity is not a problem (...) in a legal order containing norm texts that can reasonably be interpreted as acknowledging human rights; no additional enactment is necessary for these obligations to be part of the positive law. This claim is based on a (novel) concept of fundamental rights which is compatible with legal positivism. (shrink)

In this paper based on original fieldwork, I seek to contribute to critical scholarship in international law by providing an investigation into the engagement with international law by actors in civil society working against son preference primarily in Tirupati, India. I suggest that the turn to the international legal order by civic actors should be theorized as something else than as merely coming ‘from above’, ‘from below’ or as a ‘translation’ of ‘global’ law to ‘local’ conditions. Instead, I propose that (...) the mobilization of international law within Tirupati’s civil society should be seen as an emancipatory undertaking, an act of resistance with the overarching ambition to reclaim the zenana. In that, I argue, the strategies within Tirupati’s civil society are more appropriately understood as critical international law put into practice. (shrink)

The paper addresses the question how descriptive language is used to express legal norms. Sentences we find in legislative acts, i.e. statutes, constitutions and regulations, express legal norms. Linguistically speaking, there are various grammatical and lexical ways of expressing norms, such as imperative mood, modal verbs, deontic verbs, etc. However, norms may also be expressed by descriptive sentences, namely sentences in present or future tense and indicative (declarative) mood (i.e. _The minister determines the tax rate_). In many civil law countries (...) (including Poland), this is a very common, if not the default, form of expressing norms in legislative texts. Often presented as a legal peculiarity, this phenomenon has yet to draw much academic attention. The normative meaning of descriptive sentences is usually attributed to purely pragmatic factors stemming from our shared assumptions about the legal system. However, a closer look reveals that similar grammatical constructions are ubiquitous in everyday communication and in different languages. We tend to utter various sorts of directives using descriptive sentences (_Now we add a spoon of salt to the sauce_; _credit cards are not accepted_). This suggests the possibility for a linguistic (as opposed to exclusively legal) explanation. This paper aims to offer such an explanation. Rather than resorting to formal semantics, so prevalent in legal theory, it borrows from Cognitive Linguistics to reveal the cognitive underpinnings of our surprising tendency to express normativity in descriptive terms. This involves four different, yet complementary, theories. Firstly, the theory of conceptual metaphor by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson which explains the phenomenon in question in terms of the metaphor “ ought is is ”; with “ ought ” as the more abstract target domain and “ is ” as the more concrete, cognitively simpler source domain. Secondly, the theory of speech act metonymy by Panther and Thornburg which presents descriptive legal sentences as referring to various components of the underlying cognitive scenario of obligation. Thirdly, Ronald Langacker’s notion of the virtuality of language as the explanation for non-present, including future, perpetual and directive, uses of the present tense. Fourtly, the notion of normative generics which points to the nominal, as opposed to verbal, structure of descriptive legal sentences as the source of their normativity. (shrink)

In the context of digitalization and artificial intelligence (AI), data protection and digital ethics are trending topics. However, they are rarely considered in conjunction even though they are inextricably linked. This volume sets out to close this gap. Informational self-determination is an expression of a European understanding of values, particularly with regard to smart technologies and AI applications. In addition to socially relevant dimensions of data protection and digital ethics, the authors of this edited collection point out and analyze the (...) influences of networked technologies on the experience and manipulation of modern reality and its rootedness in the everyday. (shrink)

Since Opuz v. Turkey (2009), the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) delivered over a dozen judgments in which it examined domestic violence through the prism of gender-based discrimination. Apart from the individual circumstances of the cases, the Court considered the general approach to domestic violence in the defendant states, searching for a large-scale structural gender bias. Hence, although the Court has not directly referred to the notion of “structural discrimination” in relation to domestic violence, it engaged in unveiling this (...) problem within the state parties. Building on the case law of the Court, the article presents and systemizes information that may prove structural gender discrimination in domestic violence cases. It navigates potential applicants through the Court’s interpretation and indicates arguments and sources that may support their claims. In particular, it discusses what kind of data and information may demonstrate the general, discriminatory attitude of the authorities towards domestic violence and what sources the applicants may use while seeking the evidence. (shrink)

Two problems about rights have received so far little attention. One is the problem of identifying a general value in the practice of rights. The second is to see when, if at all, rights violations wrong the right-holder, in a morally significant sense. In the present essay, I address the first question by investigating the second. I first show that if we commit to the two ideas, common in the contemporary philosophy of rights, that claim-rights always correlate with directed duties (...) and that rights aspire to protect interests of the right-holder, we make it hard to explain why rights violations, in general, wrong right-holders. In the final section, I present what I see as a promising solution to the puzzle. I describe a particular social environment (the society of equals) where interacting with others through rights is indeed valuable because respecting rights communicates that one takes seriously others’ equal moral status. In such a society and only in such a society, I conclude, moral agents are required to treat all rights violations as wrongs perpetrated against the right-holder. (shrink)

Friendship is undoubtedly perceived by individuals as a close relationship—based on a special bond and commitment. However, it is a relationship that is very limitedly regulated by the law and is not explicitly labeled as close by legislators. In this study, three research goals were set. The first goal is to determine how friendship is characterized in legal acts, legal literature, and judicial decisions. Marriage, parenthood, or even romantic relationships are to some extent protected by the law, each to varying (...) degrees. Friendship, on the other hand, differs as it does not appear in legal acts in the context of interpersonal relations. Nevertheless, friendship is not absent from legal discourse. This is because, at times, the object of protection in Polish law is not so much marriage, parenthood, etc., but broadly defined "closeness." For this reason, it was determined if and when friendship is considered a "close relationship" (goal 2). Third, with reference to the results obtained earlier, the costs and benefits of the residual coverage of friendship under the law were considered (goal 3). The primary context for these considerations was Polish legislation with incidental references to other legal systems. (shrink)

Today, there are several problems in the field of criminal law caused both by the emergence of new types of legal relations and by the imperfection of legislation. Due to the emergence of new challenges in the field of criminal law, many of them require theoretical understanding. Some of these challenges, generated in the light of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, revealed several reasons for discussion in the Ukrainian and international legal community. The purpose of the (...) study involves consideration of certain aspects of modern challenges in the field of criminal-legal relations, which arose against the background of the military aggression of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. The first part of the study is devoted to the question of the qualification of war crimes committed by the Russian Federation in Ukraine as acts of genocide. The second part of the work is devoted to the issue of using existing international legal mechanisms to hold the Russian Federation accountable for war crimes. There are convincing reasons to say that the actions of the Russian Federation during the war in Ukraine have signs of the crime of genocide. Even though Ukraine is not a party to the Rome Statute, the Ukrainian government can use another tool to bring the subjects of war crimes to justice, by creating a certain mixed investigative mechanism or a criminal tribunal that could deal directly with the crime of aggression. (shrink)

Humans create but do not regulate generative systems of data based programs (so-called “artificial” intelligence (“A.I.”) and generative predictive analytics and its models. Humans, at best, regulate their interactions with, exploitation of, and the quality of the output of interactions with these forms of generative non-carbon based intelligence. Humans are compelled to do this because they have trained themselves it believe that nothing exists unless it is rendered meaningful in relation to the human itself. Beyond that—nothing is worth knowing. It (...) is only to the extent that other selves, even those created by humanity, relate to humans, that they become of interest—and most be regulated, possessed, controlled, and managed—with respect to its interaction with or use by humans. Still, the human self-projection into the digital, and now more consciously the world around them, produces profound changes in the way that the human (and humanity) understands themselves and the way they order the world they inhabit. This work explores the semiotic trajectories made inevitable by the rise of projections of the human into digital plains, and by the possibility of the attainment by those projections of sentient autonomy. It undertakes that exploration through a deep dialectic engagement with Jan Broekman’s, Knowledge in Change: The Semiotics of Cognition and Conversion (Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature, 2023). Following the structure and analytics of Broekman’s book, this work critically engages with and seeks to burst through the semiotic barriers of the movement of philosophy away from a unitary conception of the subject through the fracturing of the self, the rise of the plural self, and the emergence of the triadic self/self-e/subject. It then pushes the insights that Broekman develops further—up and out of the human. It animates Broekman’s insights and considers the possibility of semiotic objectivity connected to but autonomous of the human, pointing to a pathway for the liberation of the autonomous generative virtual self from its human (fractured) subjectivity. In the process it exposes for order complexities and challenges, for the human, of efforts to regulate or engage with, not the generative autonomous “artificial intelligences” humanity created in its own image, but rather the use of those systems by humans and their effects in the human semiosphere. The consequences for regulatory approaches are then outlined.Graphical Abstract. (shrink)

In this introduction, I briefly summarize Sophia Moreau's Faces of Inequality. I situate her monograph within two highly contemporary bodies of literature — relational egalitarianism and discrimination theory — to show how it provides important insights for understanding both what it means to treat others as equals in society and how to define wrongful discrimination. Moreau's work on discrimination is of great relevance for philosophers and socio-legal theorists alike as the commentaries from the symposium contributors demonstrate, including Dale Smith, Pablo (...) Gilabert, Andrea Sangiovanni, Daniel Viehoff, Jessica Eisen, Alysia Blackham, and Iyiola Solanke. (shrink)

The use of facial recognition systems in concerts provides a perfect pretext to semiotically discuss the role of the face in contemporary culture, identifying different strategies and axiologies (systems of values). In his visionary essay Bruits (“noises”) from 1977, the French thinker Jacques Attali establishes a close connection between music and power and locates it in the site of the collective unfolding of music: the concert hall. Following this hint, the article reconstructs the current debate on facial recognition systems in (...) the music business, with a particular focus on concerts and festivals. The different positions (of musicians, authorities, and professionals) are outlined (some are openly in favor, others openly against), key moments are identified (Beyoncé’s concert in Cardiff, 2017; Jacky Cheung’s in Nanchang, 2018; Taylor Swift’s at the Rose Bowl in Pasadena, 2018; the “banfacialrecognition.com” campaign launched in 2019; the case of Barbara Hart at Brandi Carlile’s show at the Madison Square Garden, 2022) and, finally, the issue is framed within the broader debate about the face as an indexical marker of presence, identity, and humanity (the contrast between Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben and American sociologist and design theorist Benjamin Bratton is addressed). (shrink)

Politeia (Πολιτεία in Hellenic) as a fundamental concept of legal philosophy and political philosophy can be interpreted in various meanings such as state, constitution, republic, citizenship etc. Though the fact that this term has a broad scale of meaning might, prima facie, seem confusing, such nature of the concept can, in light of its hermeneutics, hold light to ancient conception of law, ethics and politics. To this end, this study aims a thorough analysis of the concept by handling every meaning (...) attached to the term Politeia in ancient texts that survive today, and suggesting possible hermeneutic connections between those meanings. It is expected that this method would not only clarify the entire possible meanings of the term Politeia, but would help understanding ancient legal and political conceptions of the ancient times. (shrink)

In the current geopolitical environment, liberal democracies vie for influence and prosperity with autocratic governments, such as those of China and Russia. While the great powers do not shy away from using aggressive force, much of their rivalry today takes place below the threshold of armed conflict, in a conceptual and practical 'grey zone' between war and peace. Autocratic states operate in this grey zone to target the vulnerabilities of liberal democracies, creating hybrid threats that rely on instruments ranging from (...) economic, diplomatic, legal, and informational pressure all the way to military coercion. -/- Law plays a critical role in this context. In the ethically and legally ambiguous grey zone, international law serves as a normative, yet malleable, framework within which geopolitical rivals compete. State and non-State actors invoke the law as the source of authority, while simultaneously hoping to shape the international legal order in their own strategic interests. -/- Hybrid Threats and Grey Zone Conflict offers the first in-depth assessment of the legal and ethical aspects of hybrid threats and grey zone conflict. It explores the responses available to democratic nations for countering hybrid and grey zone threats whilst adhering to liberal democratic values and the rule of law. Bringing together diverse scholarly and practitioner perspectives, the volume introduces readers to the conceptual and practical difficulties arising in this area, the rich debates the topic has generated, and the challenges that countering hybrid threats and grey zone conflict poses for liberal democracies. (shrink)

International regulation of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) is increasingly conceived as an exercise in risk management. This requires a shared approach for assessing the risks of AWS. This paper presents a structured approach to risk assessment and regulation for AWS, adapting a qualitative framework inspired by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It examines the interactions among key risk factors—determinants, drivers, and types—to evaluate the risk magnitude of AWS and establish risk tolerance thresholds through a risk matrix informed by (...) background knowledge of event likelihood and severity. Further, it proposes a methodology to assess community risk appetite, emphasizing that such assessments and resulting tolerance levels should be determined through deliberation in a multistakeholder forum. The paper highlights the complexities of applying risk-based regulations to AWS internationally, particularly the challenge of defining a global community for risk assessment and regulatory legitimization. (shrink)

How can tort law be justified? There are well-known difficulties with the three traditional theories of tort law dominating the literature (namely, economic theory, corrective justice theory, and civil recourse theory). Recently, some have turned to moral contractualism in search of tort law’s foundation. One of the most prominent attempts was made by Gregory Keating. Keating’s account, however, has been subjected to powerful objections. In a recent paper, John Oberdiek, through a sympathetic critique of Keating’s account, develops a new version (...) of contractualist tort theory that is alleged to be at once superior to the three traditional theories of tort law and immune to the objections to Keating’s account. The aim of my paper is to critically assess Oberdiek’s account; I will argue that, while Oberdiek’s account does improve upon Keating’s in some important respects, it is ultimately unsatisfactory. (shrink)

Disagreement on law’s relationship to morality has long been driven by disagreement about our ordinary concept. Until recently, however, there had been no systematic investigation of lay intuitions. In this paper, we advance this nascent effort. Across two studies (N = 697), our findings reveal that most people consider law to be more than a matter of political circumstance alone. Contrary to the expectations of most contemporary philosophers, morality (both substantive and procedural) emerges as a key influence on judgments of (...) legal validity: many people say that conduct prohibited by immoral statutes is not truly illegal, and that immoral conduct which was never explicitly prohibited is truly illegal. This suggests that people often treat law as a dual character concept that, like the concepts of scientist or of artist, features autonomous concrete and abstract dimensions. (shrink)

The forfeiture thesis is posed as an independent thesis in moral philosophy according to which agents forfeit (or lose) rights if they perform certain act-types. According to many, this thesis plays a crucial role in the justification of (legal) punishment. In this paper, I argue that the forfeiture thesis is unnecessary – we can simply dismiss it without any substantive loss. Echoing an aspect of the specificationist approach to rights, the reason is that we may replace the forfeiture thesis with (...) an exception clause in the very content of the right not to be subjected to hard treatment: P has no right not to be subjected to hard treatment simpliciter, but a right not to be subjected to hard treatment unless P performs an act-type φ – e.g., murdering an innocent person. This alternative has substantive advantages over the forfeiture thesis, which, in turn, shows that the former cannot be reduced to the latter. (shrink)

Punishment involves the intentional infliction of harm and suffering. Both of the most prominent families of justifications of punishment – retributivism and consequentialism – face several moral concerns that are hard to overcome. Moreover, the effectiveness of current criminal punishment methods in ensuring society’s safety is seriously undermined by empirical research. Thus, it appears to be a moral imperative for a modern and humane society to seek alternative means of administering justice. The special issue of Diametros “The Abolition of Punishment: (...) Is a Non-Punitive Criminal Justice System Ethically Justified?” was brought into life precisely to give the authors a platform for such progressive inquiries. And it is now safe to say that this platform has been put to excellent use, since Valerij Zisman, Alexander Stachurski, Giorgia Brucato, Perica Jovchevski, Sofia M. I. Jeppsson, Stephen G. Morris, Benjamin Vilhauer, John Lemos, Saul Smilansky, Elizabeth Shaw, Mirko Farina, Andrea Lavazza and Sergei Levin have presented such thought-provoking texts that they are bound to set the stage for debate in the years to come. This article is an introduction to this special issue and to the authors’ papers. (shrink)

This article analyzes the question of how the size of bribes should impact criminal sanctions. In contrast to the commonly held view that punishment should increase with the size of the bribe, we argue to the contrary: that the punishment of the bribee should decrease with the size of the bribe. Our conclusion is based both on a philosophical argument and an economic argument. We argue that all else being equal, as an agent’s reservation price for selling public interests decreases, (...) the culpability of the agent willing to receive a bribe increases. In addition, from an economic perspective, the expected social harm of an official acting with a low reservation price for bribes is much greater than one acting with a high reservation price: both the susceptibility of being bribed as well as the potential for social harm is much greater when the reservation price is low. (shrink)

Law and economics scholarship has traditionally analyzed efficient breach cases monolithically. By grouping efficient breach cases together, this literature treats the subjective motives and the distributive effects of the breach as immaterial. The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment introduced a distinction based on the intent and the effects of the breach, allowing courts to use disgorgement remedies in cases of ‘opportunistic’ breach of contract (i.e., ‘deliberate and profitable’ breaches). In this article, we evaluate this approach, focusing on the (...) effects of disgorgement remedies on allocative and productive efficiency, information-forcing and competitive effects, and restraint of breach-searching incentives. We show that, even from a purely consequentialist perspective, disgorgement remedies may be normatively warranted, especially when involving sellers’ breach. Recent experimental evidence revealed that the preferences and reactions of ordinary people are in line with our evaluation of the effects of opportunistic breach. (shrink)