The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.
Question | Answer | Comments | |
A priori knowledge: yes or no? | Lean toward: yes | only if a proper definition of a priori is to be worked out such as to cover blue being opposite to yellow as invariant fact of perceptual knowledge | |
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? | Lean toward: nominalism | | |
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? | Lean toward: objective | | |
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? | Accept another alternative | analytic in Bolzano and Austrian School sense;
to be combined with the difference between formal and material ontology | |
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? | Accept an intermediate view | A justification process should be construed as grounded on the subject's refusal/acceptance of what it is not possible that appear to a her given some phenomenal conditions which on the objective side are constrained by which things gain access to the phenomenal world. Having a blu spot located in the visual field requires de re a surface and rules out it to become yellow in a smooth way. | |
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? | Lean toward: non-skeptical realism | It is not matter of having real or mental properties but of gaining access to invariances (object-side) through trasformations induced either merely by perceptual-motor activities or by methodically constrained procedures | |
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? | Lean toward: libertarianism | | |
God: theism or atheism? | Accept: atheism | | |
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? | Lean toward: empiricism | | |
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? | Lean toward: invariantism | | |
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? | Accept: non-Humean | | |
Logic: classical or non-classical? | Accept both | | |
Mental content: internalism or externalism? | The question is too unclear to answer | It depends upon what is meant by "content" and which sorts of conditions of truth/satisfaction it is identified with. | |
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? | Accept another alternative | phenomenologial realism as the way a Sachverhalt looks like to an agent suggesting way of action and constraints about what it is possible to be carried out (see Wertheimer on ethics axioms and structural contexts of experience) | |
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? | Lean toward: naturalism | | |
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? | Lean toward: physicalism | | |
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? | Accept another alternative | Non conceptual and phenomenally grounded judgement tuned with structural and interactive conditions of mutual cooperation (nozick + gestalt theory) | |
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? | Lean toward: consequentialism | | |
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? | Reject all | Phenomenological realism (as Epstein-Hatfield dubs the phenomenological explanation of perception in the Gestaltist tradition) | |
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? | Lean toward: biological view | | |
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? | Accept: libertarianism | | |
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? | Lean toward: scientific realism | | |
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? | The question is too unclear to answer | | |
Time: A-theory or B-theory? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? | Agnostic/undecided | | |
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? | Lean toward: correspondence | | |
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? | Lean toward: conceivable but not metaphysically possible | | |