1. Two Approaches to the EarthIn several postwar texts, the earth increasingly receives attention from Carl Schmitt.1 In The Nomos of the Earth, the most important of these texts, he refers to Friedrich Hölderlin, a much earlier, very different author, who also considers the subject of the earth. Even though the positions of both are, ultimately, quite similar, they maintain significant terminological differences. Schmitt and Hölderlin both employ the word “nomos,” but in very different ways. Hölderlin regards “nomos” as “law” (...) in the sense of “positive” norm or “Gesez.”2 This use of “nomos” as “Gesez” differs from a second notion of law as the meaning operating at the basis of what Hölderlin calls the “sphere.” The sphere is a meaningful whole in which man originally exists. Law is here the very relations of the sphere as a meaningful whole. Hölderlin calls it the law in a “negative” sense.3 This second notion of law by Hölderlin (negative law or law as the meaning at the basis of the sphere) coincides precisely with the Schmittian idea of “nomos” as an “order of meaning [Sinnreich],”4 what he also calls the law in an “ontonomous and existential” sense.5 The first use of law as “nomos” or “Gesez” by Hölderlin coincides with Schmitt’s use of “Gesetz”: of law as “positive” law. (shrink)

ExcerptCarl Schmitt (1888–1985) is known as the most consequential German legal and political mind of the twentieth century.1 Many crimes of the Nazi regime found support in his conceptual justifications, and Schmitt is called the “Crown Jurist” of the Third Reich with good reason. Historians, political scientists, and sociologists must grapple with the author in order to understand the course of totalitarianism in modernity. Whether literary historians should do so is far less settled, though he was fascinated by their object (...) of study. His writings on literary topics are said to reveal much about Schmitt’s person, politics, and period, but little about literature itself.2 This explains why his “Don Quijote und das Publikum” (“Don Quixote and the Public”), published in the arts and cultural journal Die Rheinlande in 1912, was almost unknown in literary studies for a century.3 Schmitt’s text on the novel by Miguel de Cervantes has not been reprinted, and until recently it had not been translated from the original German. Size has a role too. At under two thousand words, the text has probably escaped notice due to its small scale.4 Recent English and Italian translations in major humanistic journals may signal the end of its obscurity though.5 “Don Quixote and the Public” is at the door of literary studies. The question now is not whether to respond, but how. (shrink)

ExcerptOver the past decade, class divisions have grown across the globe. This class structure is not exactly like that described in Marx’s time; it is more complex, shaped by both new technology and the legacy of globalization.

ExcerptAlain de Benoist, Ernst Jünger: Between the Gods & the Titans. Edited by Greg Johnson. Translated by Greg Johnson and F. Roger Devlin. Budapest: Middle Europe Books, 2022. Pp. 180. The central figure in Alain de Benoist’s introductory volume on the life and work of Ernst Jünger is the Worker. He is an intelligent anchor for the volume, for he, of all of Jünger’s metaphorical symbols, most extensively occupies his thoughts throughout his long career. He also most fully characterizes modernity: (...) first its glorious promise, later its potential horror. Introduced in Jünger’s book of the same name in 1932, the Worker is the dominant figure of our time. Benoist writes that the Worker subsumes “all creation aimed at giving form to the world, all affirmation of power, all expenditure of energy.” In this sense, the Worker dominates modernity because the productive spirit—the belief that one can will into existence that which one conceives—dominates modernity. Titanic factories, new political systems, an interconnected world state: these ambitious projects of the time are the realization of this figure. (shrink)

ExcerptWeak government is a negation of liberty.Francis LieberAfter the experiences of the past generation, it should be apparent that all too much of liberal internationalist thinking in America is not “internationalist” in any real sense at all. Internationalism, if it is to have any meaning as a word, must mean peace and cooperation between different nations, which by nature will have not merely different interests that must be reconciled but different political systems that must coexist.

ExcerptWe often have the experience of intuiting something without being able to precisely define what that intuition is. Sometimes this intuition leads to a more well-defined insight, and sometimes it might lead to some kind of action, even in the absence of clear conceptual definitions. Yet it is difficult to ascertain what kind of knowledge or awareness such intuitions consist of. What is an intuition as opposed to a defined concept of something? How seriously should we take such intuitions? Are (...) they something separate and qualitatively different than concepts? Are they just fuzzy concepts? Do they really exist at all? These are crucial questions because they lead to conclusions about the status of concepts themselves. If the alternative to clear concepts is nothing at all, then the sociopolitical corollary would be that the alternative to conceptual knowledge and the holders of such knowledge would also be nothing at all. By contrast, if intuitions are separate from concepts and real, then expert knowledge might possibly have some deficiencies in comparison with intuitions. The essays in this issue of Telos explore in one way or another this question of the status of conceptual knowledge as opposed to intuitive awareness. (shrink)

I. The Paradox of “Judgment” and Pre-reflective Self-AwarenessIn “Fichte’s Original Insight” (1982), Dieter Henrich, the founder of the Heidelberg School, delivered a diagnosis of why three hundred years of Western explication of the internal structure of subjectivity proved to be fruitless. As Manfred Frank noted, “Seldom has so much food for thought been put in a nutshell.”1 Fichte had the “insight” that his predecessors, in their totality (and “nearly all his successors”2), including Kant, misconceived the reality of our self-consciousness as (...) reflection, and thus fell prey to circular reasoning. A subject’s reflection on its own identity is impossible, since it can gain awareness of this identity only if it previously possessed some immediate knowledge of itself. Therefore, (self-)consciousness should not be conceived within the framework of the “reflection model,” which possesses an inherent contradiction, but rather as pre-reflective in nature, and as such it must be postulated by our thought. This is not to say that reflective consciousness—“egological” consciousness, the “reflection model of consciousness,” the “higher-order” theory of consciousness—i.e., the cogito, is impossible, but merely to highlight that its logical foundation cannot be justified by itself and that it essentially depends on the pre-reflective sphere of our psychic lives.3. (shrink)

ExcerptDrawing on the quasi-legal human experimentation programs designed and implemented by the CIA between the 1950s and 1970s, the television series Severance envisions the possible corporate uses of brainwashing and mind control. The narrative centers on employees of a technology company, Lumon Industries, who agree to undergo a medical procedure (“severance”) that separates non-work memories from work memories by implanting a microchip into the brain. Unfolding like a science fiction psychological thriller, the narration falls somewhere between omniscient and restricted. Viewers (...) at the outset know only slightly more about the non-work lives and histories of the characters than the characters’ work-day versions, while the gradual increase of viewer knowledge parallels that of the characters’ paths toward self-discovery. (shrink)

ExcerptNarrative today is a commanding term for individual and group definition. Within literature and literary discussions, narrative structure has been treated in increasingly complex and multifaceted ways. However, as narrative has moved from literature into wider cultural circulation, such multiplicity and complexity can be lost. Narrative is embraced as the form in which experience takes meaningful shape. Each individual or each group has a story as their version of who they are, interpreted in each one’s terms and affirming each one’s (...) right to such interpretation. On the one hand, this promises the airing and sharing of viewpoints and versions on the part of each self or group. On the other hand, certain tendencies and implications of narrative structure close off each version from the others. Narrative can then become a claim to one’s own story in ways that refuse the stories of others. Instead of interchange among many voices in an open forum, what emerge are competitive accounts that deny the validity of the accounts of others. (shrink)

1. IntroductionFirst and foremost, the public sphere is the sphere of our social life. Social media’s naturally low barrier to entry and strong participatory attributes have made it more deeply rooted in human social life than any other media before it. Consequently, many scholars have put forward views and theories arguing that the web is essentially a public sphere.