Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ARTs) have been practiced in Islamic societies within married couples since their introduction. However, there are divergent views over the issue of third-party donation among Sunni and Shia scholars. This paper illustrates the different perspectives of Shia Muslims surrounding, sperm, egg, and embryo donation and ethical aspects thereof. The study reveals that there are different views regarding sperm, egg, and embryo donation among the Shia religious leaders around the world. Many Shia religious scholars, including the Iranian supreme (...) religious leader Ali Hussein Khamenei allow sperm, egg, and embryo donation with certain conditions. However, the conditions stipulated by Shia religious scholars contradict the ethical and legal practices of sperm, egg, and embryo donation. Regarding sperm and egg donation, they declared that the donor child would inherit from a third-party donor and the commissioning parents would be adoptive parents. Thus, according to them, donor anonymity is impossible. Moreover, the Iranian act on embryo donation did not stipulate the right and responsibilities of the donor child and recipient couples and did not clarify the nature and number of embryos that can be donated and implanted. The paper argues that the lack of laws and guidelines on sperm, egg, and embryo donation raises many ethical problems. Based only on religious rulings, third-party donation has been practiced without foreseeing the well-being and safety of donor children, donors, and recipient couples. (shrink)

John Davis (_New Methuselahs_: _The Ethics of Life_ _Extension_, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2018) advances a novel ethical analysis of longevity science that employs a three-fold methodology of examining the impact of life extension technologies on three distinct groups: the “Haves”, the “Have-nots” and the “Will-nots”. In this essay, I critically examine the egalitarian analysis Davis deploys with respect to its ability to help us theorize about the moral significance of an applied gerontological intervention. Rather than focusing on futuristic scenarios (...) of radical life extension, I offer a rival egalitarian analysis that takes seriously (1) the health vulnerabilities of today’s aging populations, (2) the health inequalities of the “aging status quo” and, (3) the prospects for the fair diffusion of an aging intervention over the not-so-distant future. Despite my reservations about Davis’s focus on “life-extension” vs. increasing the human “healthspan”, I agree with his central conclusion that an aging intervention would be, on balance, a good thing and that we should fund such research aggressively. But, I make an even stronger case and conjecture that an intervention that slows down the rate of molecular and cellular decline from the inborn aging process will likely be one of the most important public health advancements of the twenty-first century. This is so because aging is the most prevalent risk factor for chronic disease, frailty and disability, and it is estimated that there will be over 2 billion persons age > 60 by the year 2050. (shrink)

Clinical ethics consultants (CECs) work in complex environments ripe with multiple types of expectations. Significantly, some are due to the perspectives of professional colleagues and the patients and families with whom CECs consult and concern how CECs can, do, or should function, thus adding to the moral complexity faced by CECs in those particular circumstances. We outline six such common expectations: Ethics Police, Ethics Equalizer, Ethics Superhero, Ethics Expediter, Ethics Healer or Ameliorator, and, finally, Ethics Expert. Framed by examples of (...) requests for ethics consultation that illustrate each kind, along with brief descriptions, we argue that while these expectations ought to be resisted for clear and practical reasons, they also create opportunities for CECs to articulate, educate, and ultimately be responsible to the professional demands of clinical ethics work. Recognizing, acknowledging, and at times resisting those expectations thus become key activities and responsibilities in the performance of ethics consultation. (shrink)

Civility is an essential feature of health care, as it is in so many other areas of human interaction. The article examines the meaning of civility, reviews its origins, and provides reasons for its moral significance in health care. It describes common types of uncivil behavior by health care professionals, patients, and visitors in hospitals and other health care settings, and it suggests strategies to prevent and respond to uncivil behavior, including institutional codes of conduct and disciplinary procedures. The article (...) concludes that uncivil behavior toward health care professionals, patients, and others subverts the moral goals of health care and is therefore unacceptable. Civility is a basic professional duty that health care professionals should embrace, model, and teach. (shrink)

Although medical confidentiality is widely recognized as an essential principle in the therapeutic relationship, its systematic and coherent practice has been an ethically challenging duty upon healthcare providers due to various concerns of clinical, moral, religious, social, ethical and legal natures. Medical confidentiality can be breached to protect the patient and/or others if maintaining confidentiality causes serious harm. Healthcare professionals may encounter complicated situations whereby the divulgence of a patient’s confidential information may pose a threat to one party whereas the (...) concealment of such information may cause harm to another. After deliberating on the Islamic concept of harm (ḍarar), this paper focuses on the dual duty and conflicts of interests faced by healthcare professionals in the practice of medical confidentiality. Referring to serious infectious diseases with a special mention of AIDS, this study also provides discourse on how healthcare professionals deal with difficult scenarios of conflicts of interests and ethical dilemmas. (shrink)

Settling the debate over conscientious refusal (CR) in liberal democracies requires us to develop a conception of the healthcare provider’s moral role. Because CR claims and resulting policy changes take place in specific sociopolitical contexts with unique histories and diverse polities, the _method_ we use for deriving the healthcare norms should itself be a democratic, context-dependent inquiry. To this end, I begin by describing some prerequisites—which I call _publicity conditions_—for any democratic account of healthcare norms that conflict or jibe with (...) CR. Next, drawing on Ronald Dworkin’s jurisprudence and Tom Beauchamp & James Childress’s approach to bioethical reasoning, I briefly introduce one method for generating healthcare norms that is faithful to the publicity conditions and has potential to constructively, and democratically, derive important boundaries for CR. Finally, I argue that many critics of CR fail to similarly ground their accounts of healthcare norms in healthcare professionals’ sociopolitical contexts, often relying instead on their own interpretation of a generally stateable healthcare norm. This leads to their misconstruing both the value judgments on which their own approaches rest and the public, political values that are often invoked in favor of CR. (shrink)

The stipulation of living organ transplantation policy and practice in Bangladesh is family-oriented, with relatives being the only people legally eligible to donate organs. There have been very few transplantations of bone marrows, liver lobes, and kidneys from related-living donors in Bangladesh. The major question addressed in this study is why Bangladesh is not getting adequate organs for transplantation. In this study, I examin the stipulations of the policy and practice of living organ donation through the lens of 32 key (...) stakeholders including physicians and nurses, a health administrator, organ donors and recipients, and their family members, as they can shed light on the realities and problems of organ donation for transplantation in Bangladesh. My ethnography reveals that the family members are always encouraged to donate organs for transplantation, and saving the lives of relatives through organ donation is seen as a moral obligation. Many view saving the life of a relative by donating one’s organs as equivalent to saving one’s own life. An assessment of the dynamics of biomedicine, religion, and culture leads to the conclusion that the family-oriented organ donation policy and practice have been widely endorsed and accepted in Bangladesh, and Islamic ethical principles and collective family ethos undergird that policy and practice. However, the unavailability of medical resources, lack of post-operative coverage for organ donors, religious misconceptions and unawareness of the general public, and the absence of posthumously donated vital organs for transplantation are perceived to be the most common barriers to a successful living donor-recipient pair organ transplantation. By overcoming these obstacles, Bangladesh can develop a successful living donor-recipient pair organ transplantation program that will ensure improved healthcare outcomes, promote altruism and solidarity among Bangladeshi families, and protect the poor from having their organs sold to wealthy patients. (shrink)

Leading paradigms of clinical ethics consultation closely follow a biomedical model of care. In this paper, we present a theoretical reflection on the underlying biomedical model of disease, how it shaped clinical practices and patterns of ethical deliberation within these practices, and the repercussions it has on clinical ethics consultations for patients with chronic illness. We contend that this model, despite its important contribution to capturing the ethical issues of day-to-day clinical ethics deliberation, might not be sufficient for patients presenting (...) with chronic illnesses and navigating as “lay experts” of their medical condition(s) through the health care system. Not fully considering the sources of personal knowledge and expertise may lead to epistemic injustice within an ethical deliberation logic narrowly relying on a biomedical model of disease. In caring “for” and collaboratively “with” this patient population, we answer the threat of epistemic injustice with epistemic modesty and humility. We will propose ideas about how clinical ethics could contribute to an expansion of the biomedical model of care, so that important aspects of chronic illness experience would flow into clinical-ethical decision-making. (shrink)

How should clinical ethicists be trained? Scholars have stated that clinical ethics fellowships create well-trained, competent ethicists. While this appears intuitive, few features of fellowship programs have been publicly discussed, let alone debated. In this paper, we examine how fellowships can foster effective mentoring relationships. These relationships provide the foundation for the fellow’s transition from novice to competent professional. In this essay, we begin by discussing our pedagogical commitments. Next, we describe the structures our program has created to assist our (...) fellows in becoming competent ethicists. We then outline the kinds of knowledge, skills, and professional attributes mentors should possess. Following this, we focus on the knowledge, skills, and professional attributes that fellows develop as they co-create effective mentoring relationships. We will not prescribe a single approach to fellowship training; instead, our perspective will, we hope, become a catalyst for further conversation on training and mentoring clinical ethics fellows. (shrink)

Numerous ethical issues are raised in cancer treatment and research. Informed consent is challenging due to complex treatment modalities and prognostic uncertainty. Busy oncology clinics limit the ability of oncologists to spend time reinforcing patient understanding and facilitating end-of-life planning. Despite these issues and the ethics consultations they generate, clinical ethicists receive little if any focused education about cancer and its treatment. As the field of clinical ethics develops standards for training, we argue that a basic knowledge of cancer should (...) be included and offer an example of what cancer ethics training components might look like. We further suggest some specific steps to increase collaboration between clinical ethicists and oncology providers in the outpatient setting to facilitate informed consent and proactively identify ethical issues. (shrink)

The controversy over vaccines has recently intensified in the wake of the global COVID-19 pandemic, with calls from politicians, health professionals, journalists, and citizens to take harsh measures against so-called “anti-vaxxers,” while accusing them of spreading “fake news” and as such, of endangering public health. However, the issue of suppression of vaccine dissenters has rarely been studied from the point of view of those who raise concerns about vaccine safety. The purpose of the present study was to examine the subjective (...) perceptions of professionals (physicians, nurses, researchers) involved with vaccines through practice and/or research and who take a critical view on vaccines, about what they perceive as the suppression of dissent in the field of vaccines, their response to it, and its potential implications on science and medicine. Respondents reported being subjected to a variety of censorship and suppression tactics, including the retraction of papers pointing to vaccine safety problems, negative publicity, difficulty in obtaining research funding, calls for dismissal, summonses to official hearings, suspension of medical licenses, and self-censorship. Respondents also reported on what has been termed a “backfire effect” – a counter-reaction that draws more attention to the opponents’ position. Suppression of dissent impairs scientific discourse and research practice while creating the false impression of scientific consensus. (shrink)

Conflict resolution is a core component of healthcare ethics consultation (HEC) and proficiency in this skill set is recognized by the national bioethics organization and its HEC certification process. Difficult interpersonal interactions between the clinical team and patients or their families are often inexorably connected to the normative disputes that are the catalyst for the consult. Ethics consultants are often required to navigate challenging dynamics that have become entrenched and work with patient-provider or family-provider relationships that have already broken down. (...) The first step in conflict resolution is diagnosing the source of the conflict. Because so many interpersonal and normative conflicts rest on misunderstanding and mischaracterization, the diagnosis of the problem requires untangling the actual positions and perspectives of the conflicting parties from the fallacious assumptions made about the parties’ respective positions and views. Developed in management science, the Ladder of Inference (LOI) is a diagnostic tool for assisting stakeholders in re-examining the process they used to form beliefs about others involved in the conflict. The LOI is a device that detects errors in reasoning, including implicit racial bias, that lead to false judgments and counterproductive responses to those judgments. The LOI is an instrument that can be used by ethics consultants to help resolve contentious bedside conflicts, but the LOI can also be employed as a teaching tool used by healthcare ethics consultants in training the clinical staff in how to avoid such conflicts in the first place. (shrink)

This paper is a clinical ethics case study which sheds light on several important dilemmas which arise in providing care to patients from cultures with non-individualistic conceptions of autonomy. Medical professionals face a difficult challenge in determining how to respond when families of patients ask that patients not be informed of bad medical news. These requests are often made for cultural reasons, by families seeking to protect patients. In these cases, the right that patients have to their own medical information (...) in order to make autonomous decisions is in tension with the possibility that patients could hold values that require limiting their autonomy with regard to medical information disclosure, often based on the idea that family should take on difficult decision-making as an act of care. We describe one such case, of an 83-year old Russian woman whose husband requested she not be informed of a new cancer diagnosis. The appropriate response to this request was to ask the patient about her values separately, without disclosing any medical information until her values were clear. This patient indicated she wanted the care team to uphold her husband’s request. This response makes the importance of determining a patient’s values before moving forward with disclosure clear: she would not have wanted to be informed of her cancer. We describe our conversation strategy, which allowed value exploration without disclosure and highlighted that the obligation to respect a patient’s autonomy sometimes includes an obligation to allow a patient to choose to limit their own autonomy. This case also highlights that this kind of conversation prioritizes the patient’s values rather than the family’s or care team’s, centering patients in the way that is ethically appropriate. (shrink)

Cost conversations are essential to informed consent because patients have a right to information that they think is relevant, and patients overwhelmingly report that cost information is relevant to their medical decisions. Providers have an ethical responsibility to provide necessary information for informed consent, and therefore must discuss costs. The Shared Decision Making model is ideal for enabling this exchange of information, and decision aids are also helpful. Although barriers exist, many useful tools can help providers fulfill this obligation, and (...) encouraging progress is being made to improve cost transparency from insurers and facilities. (shrink)

The paper reports results of the very first survey-based study on the prevalence, frequency and nature of ethical or other non-medical difficulties faced by Polish physicians in their everyday clinical practice. The study involved 521 physicians of various medical specialties, practicing mainly in inpatient healthcare. The study showed that the majority of Polish physicians encounter ethical and other non-medical difficulties in making clinical decisions. However, they confront such difficulties less frequently than their foreign peers. Moreover, Polish doctors indicate different circumstances (...) as a source of the experienced problems. The difficulties most often reported relate to (i) patients (or their proxies) requests for medically non-indicated interventions; (ii) problems with communication with patients (or their proxies) due to the patients’ negative attitude, unwillingness to cooperate, or aggression; and (iii) various difficulties with obtaining informed consent. Polish physicians report difficulties associated with disagreements among care givers or scarcity of resources less frequently than doctors from other countries. The study’s findings provide support for the thesis that a significant portion of Polish physicians still follow a traditional, paternalistic, and hierarchical model of healthcare practice. Instead of promoting patient’s empowerment, engagement, and rights, they often consider these ideas as a threat to physicians’ professional authority and autonomy. The study leads to the conclusion that due to insufficient training in medical ethics, communication skills, and medical law, many Polish physicians lack the knowledge and competence necessary to adequately respond to challenges posed by modern healthcare practice. (shrink)

In a recent article (“The current state of the platelet supply in the US and proposed options to decrease the risk of critical shortages”) published in _Transfusion,_ Stubbs et al. have argued that platelet donors should be paid. Dodd et al. have argued against this proposal, supporting their response with survey data that shows that blood donors (and by extension platelet donors) and potential platelet donors are uninterested in receiving incentives to encourage them to donate. Instead, argue Dodd et al., (...) prospective platelet donors are motivated more by the ease of donation than the prospect of payment. This article defends Stubbs et al. from the criticisms of Dodd et al. It first argues that the preferences that persons state they have in response to survey questions might not reflect the preferences that their actions would reveal they have in actual rather than hypothetical situations. This hypothetical bias is especially likely when persons respond to surveys that ask them about the performance of morally commendable actions (such as platelet donation). This article then argues that the survey that Dodd et al. rely on exhibits serious selection bias with respect to the set of persons it considers to be potential platelet donors. (shrink)