In this paper, my aim is to outline a tripartite systematization of the plurivocal senses of movement in phenomenology. In particular, I follow Eugen Fink’s speculative integration of the phenomenological method as providing a broad map to orient the interpretation of phenomenologically informed studies of movement. My interpretation focuses on the role of Neoplatonic concepts and terms in Fink’s own systematic recasting of phenomenology. As a result of the development of self-critical discussions of method in phenomenology in connection with Neoplatonic (...) metaphysics, three types of movement emerge: the katabantic movement of origination, the ekbantic movement of philosophical refection, and the anabantic movement of concrete living human experience. (shrink)

The aim of this contribution is to establish the role of movement in the reconsideration of ontology proposed by Eugen Fink in his 1951 summer semester course Nachdenkliches zur ontologischen Frühgeschichte von Raum - Zeit - Bewegung. In this lecture, first published in 1957, Fink successively discusses how Parmenides, Zeno of Aeneas, Plato and Aristotle approach the concepts of time, space and movement in the overall economy of ontology, and how they might be overcome in a cosmology. This refection on (...) the notion of. (shrink)

The purpose is to retrace phenomenology's argumentative path towards temporality as the foundation of phenomenality as presentation. The next step is to construct another paradigm based on movement and the processes of differentiation involved in it. The confrontation between these two types of approach, one related to Husserl's genetic phenomenology, and the other which allows us to think of presuppositions for a phenomenology of difference and event based on Merleau-Ponty's lateral writings in the 1950s, serves to question the foundations of (...) this type of philosophy. The final aim is to show how space and time can be described from the point of view of movement. (shrink)

Following a brief presentation of the main results of R. Barbaras’ contemporary essay in phenomenological cosmology, L’appartenance, we propose to examine what appear be two internal tensions: a) the apparent inflation of the importance of the conceptuality of spatiality for describing the type of adjointment that unites subjective life and the life of the world, and b) the competition between two opposing ontological models of mobility in the description of subjective life (or of the living in general): a model of.

This paper enquires into a paradigmatic change concerning the concept of motion: from a phenomenological conception of motion understood as a continuous and finite process of translation, to a physical conception of motion as rectilinear, uniform and continuous, that is, as an inertial state that if unhindered, can extend infinitely – the former held by Aristotle, the latter by Koyré, a shift that is evidenced by their contrasting treatment of Zeno’s paradoxes. I argue that both ontologies of motion can be (...) understood in phenomenological terms: Motion is accomplished by the real itself. However, while Aristotle’s continuous motion as actualization of the form of a given body involves its formal determination and constitution of sense, Koyré’s conceives of motion and rest as kinds of being and motion itself as exemplifcation of the mathematization of nature that Husserl described in the Crisis. Taken together, these changes presuppose a transformation of metaphysical and epistemic frameworks. (shrink)

We experience perception as a holistic phenomenon that can be unfolded in different aspects assigned to different senses. Against this background two interrelated questions can be asked pointing us in opposite directions: If our original experience is a holistic one, how do we ever come to divide the unity of our perception into a multiplicity of sensory objects and experiences? And if different senses can be distinguished, what in turn is the reason for their interaction in a synesthetic unity of (...) experience?—To answer both questions, the role of our experiences of two diferent movements associated with our perception is analyzed: (1) the so-called kinesthetic experiences, and (2) the dynamic movements associated with perceived things, events, atmospheres, etc., and their affective significance for the perceiving subject. The article argues that attention to both movements is crucial both for the possibility of separating different sensory perceptions and for the experience of a sensory unity in our perception. (shrink)

This paper aims to ofer descriptions of the motion of human life and the place it is embedded in by presenting Eugen Fink’s cosmology and Emmanuel Levinas thinking as philosophies of motion. For both, human life is placed inside an impersonal motion and needs to make its home inside it. They differ however in the adequate mode of achieving this. The first part begins by introducing a difference between observable and non-observable types of motion with Fink. Progressing from thing ontological (...) concepts of motion derived from observation on things, the text presents Fink’s conceptions of the non-observable motions of human existence and the cosmic motion of appearing itself. In the second part, human life is thought as a corporeal motion of emancipation from the unpredictable motion of the elements. Taming the elements in economy, human life moves infinitely towards the Other. The conclusion juxtaposes Fink’s and Levinas‘ philosophies of motion. (shrink)

This paper interprets migration as an interplay of external and internal movement, of physical locomotion and becoming. The first part calls for completing Migration Studies with an experience-centred philosophy of migration from the insider’s perspective. A critical examination of phenomenological contributions emphasises how phenomenology has usually prioritised dwelling, emplacement and alterity over moving, displacement and the migrant’s reactions to being considered the “other”. The second part examines migration along its several stages, from the detachment from the home country to “arrival” (...) and integration, including the temporary or definitive return to the former “home”. Finally, the recent phenomenon of trans-migration nourishes the hope in the possibility of a non-traumatic dwelling in-between and on the move. (shrink)

Phenomenological description can be interpreted as an explicitation of experience as it is lived. However, there are at least two ways in which the explicitation of experience can be realised: the first is associated with an epistemic model, the second to an ontological model. The first is based on a principle of manifestation, the second on a principle of disposition. The aim of this paper is to show that only the second model, the ontological one, is able to account for (...) the concept of movement understood not as mere displacement but as change. In order to do this, however, it is necessary to introduce a notion that classical phenomenology – starting from the well-known Brentanian definition – considers to be oxymoronic: the notion of physical intentionality. (shrink)

In this article, we analyze how movement takes part in creating intersubjective meaning. We discuss what Daniel Stern termed ‘affect attunement,’ a primary way of constituting intersubjectivity. Based on an analysis of how movement, meaning-making, vitality affects, and primordial feelings interrelate in affect attunement, we show that primordial feelings and thereby movement play a much greater role in affect attunement than Stern proposed. This makes movement a primary meaning-making modality, indispensable to the development of intersubjectivity. To illustrate the relation between (...) movement and affect attunement in psychological development, we discuss the role of movement in autism. Recent research suggests that differences in movement precede the onset of social-communicative deficits and may be primary to autistic development. Building on the proposed interrelation of movement and primordial feelings in affect attunement, we suggest that autistic movement differences illuminate the vital role played by movement in early intersubjective development. (shrink)