Theoretical Bias in Evidence: A Historical Sketch

Philosophica 31 (1):7-24 (1983)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The studies of theoretical bias in evidence are these days developed by many clever psychologists, social psychologists, and philosophers. It therefore comes as a surprise to realize that most of the material one can find in the up-to -date literature repeats discoveries which are due to the heroes of the present sketch, namely Galileo Galilei, Sir Francis Bacon, and Robert Boyle; William Whewell, Pierre Duhem, and Karl Popper. We may try to raise scholarly standards by familiarizing ourselves with their ideas and studying them with a little appreciation.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,197

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
55 (#291,844)

6 months
4 (#797,974)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Joseph Agassi
York University

Citations of this work

The Moral Underpinnings of Popper's Philosophy.Noretta Koertge - 2009 - In Zuzana Parusniková & R. S. Cohen (eds.), Rethinking Popper. Springer. pp. 323--338.
Popper on Refutability: Some Philosophical and Historical Questions.Diego L. Rosende - 2009 - In Zuzana Parusniková & R. S. Cohen (eds.), Rethinking Popper. Springer. pp. 135--154.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references