Abstract

In the present paper, I argue that in order to be in a position to understand what the World Soul thinks about, we need first to answer the question of whether the universe perceives and if so, of what it perceives. I shall first (section ) lay out the main reasons for suspecting that the universe has perception and some possible objections against this view. I will then (section ) make a case for my claim that the universe has perception on the basis of my ‘minimalist’ account of perception, which identifies four necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for having an instance of aisthēsis: 1) a body; 2) a soul; 3) affections which cause motion/change in the body and in the soul; 4) the cause of these affections. I will show that the universe composed of a World Body and a World Soul meets all four conditions. On the basis of this, I will claim that one can ascribe (self-) perception to the universe. Finally (section ), I will suggest that the universe perceives the polyhedra of its own body.