Abstract

The book is a translation of the Sophist with a running commentary. Three main points are argued: the dialogue does not present positive doctrine but has the structure of a reductio ad absurdum, Plato's point is to criticize the metaphysics of Parmenides. By failing to account for resemblance, Eleaticism implies an inadequate theory of relations, which makes impossible any understanding of "essence." Consequently, Eleaticism can be taken as the philosophical underpinning for the antithesis of philosophy, lending legitimacy to sophistry, the criticism constitutes an indirect argument for the theory of forms. ;The method of division employed in the Sophist does not proceed "along natural joints" as called for in the Phaedrus, nor can it, since the Eleatic logic that underlies the method used in the Sophist allows for no intermediate in the strict opposition of 'being' and 'not-being.' The only definitions that can be made on this basis are negative definitions. This leads to an inability to account for images on Eleatic terms, providing a refuge for the sophist--he cannot be a maker of deceptive images if there are no images and no falsity. However, the modification of the Eleatic rejection of not-being is incomplete and insufficient. ;The arguments allow only for relations of identity and difference or whole and part, excluding any account of resemblance, the basis for any theory of participation. On these grounds, not-being is defined in terms of difference, affording an incomplete explanation of false statement, while abandoning the initial problem of images. Moreover, the concluding argument directly implies the reduction of 'being' to the newly introduced definition of 'not-being.' The ending turns back to the beginning: the sophist has an art that is no art, and definitions can only be definitions in terms of difference, negative definitions allowing no adequate account of images and no essences. The dialogue ends in a subtle aporia pointing to the failure to acknowledge that to say images both are and are not indicates an order of ontological dependence