Statistical evidence and the reliability of medical research

In Miriam Solomon, Jeremy R. Simon & Harold Kincaid (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Medicine. Routledge (2016)
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Abstract

Statistical evidence is pervasive in medicine. In this chapter we will focus on the reliability of randomized clinical trials (RCTs) conducted to test the safety and efficacy of medical treatments. RCTs are scientific experiments and, as such, we expect them to be replicable: if we repeat the same experiment time and again, we should obtain the same outcome (Norton 2015). The statistical design of the test should guarantee that the observed outcome is not a random event, but rather a real effect of the treatments administered. However, for more than a decade now, we have been discussing a replicability crisis across different experimental disciplines including medicine: the outcomes of trials published in very prestigious journals often disappear when the experiment is repeated (see, e.g., Lehrer 2010, Begley and Ellis 2012, Horton 2015). There are different accounts of the reason for this replicability crisis, ranging from scientific fraud to lack of institutional incentives to double-check someone else’s results. In this chapter we will use the replicability crisis as a thread to introduce some central issues in the design of scientific experiments in medicine. First, in section 1, we will see how replicability and statistical significance are connected: we can only make sense of the p-value of a trial outcome within a series of replications of the test. But in order to conduct these replications properly, we need to agree on the proper design of the experiment we are going to repeat. In particular, we need to prevent the preferences of the experimenters from biasing the outcome of the experiment. If there is such a bias, when the experiment is replicated by a third party, the observed outcome will vanish. In section 2, we will argue that trialists need to agree on the debiasing procedures and the statistical quality controls that feature in the trial protocol, if they want the outcome to be replicable. In section 3, we will make two complementary points. On the one hand, replicability per se is not everything: we need trial outcomes that are not only statistically significant but also clinically relevant. On the other hand, trials are not everything: the experts analyzing the evidence can improve the reliability of statistical evidence, although they sometimes fail; we need to further study how they make their decisions. In section 4, we will use a controversy about the overprescription of statins to show how non-replicable effects are obtained in trials and how experts may fail at detecting such flaws, if the commercial interests are big enough.

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David Teira
Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia

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