It Ain't Necessarily So

Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

While Neo-Aristotelians argue quite plausibly that it is hard to get to eudaemonia if one is wicked, I argue that they fail to show that the seeker of flourishing has a reason to become virtuous (as opposed to morally mediocre).

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Some Problems with Virtue Theory.Everitt Nicholas - 2007 - Philosophy 82 (2):275-299.
Thomistic Eudaimonism, Virtue, and Well-Being.Matthew Shea - 2017 - Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (1):173-185.
Virtue ethics and the charge of egoism.Julia Annas - 2008 - In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest. New York: Oxford University Press.
Virtue and austerity.Peter Allmark - 2013 - Nursing Philosophy 14 (1):45-52.
Virtue and the practice of modern medicine.Daniel A. Putman - 1988 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 13 (4):433-443.
Reflection, Epistemic Value and Human Flourishing.Waldomiro Silva Filho & Felipe Rocha - 2016 - Analytica. Revista de Filosofia 19 (1):129-144.
Are You Truly Flourishing.Dj Young - 2017 - Dissertation, Bridgewater State University
Human Flourishing from the Foot's Viewpoint Regarding to Aristotle's Ideas.Majid Mollayousefi Mollayousefi & Sakine Aflatooni Aflatooni - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations at University of Tabriz 5 (9):161-176.
Animal Flourishing: What Virtue Requires of Human Animals.R. Walker - 2007 - In Rebecca L. Walker & Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Working virtue: virtue ethics and contemporary moral problems. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 173--189.
Environmentalism and Public Virtue.Brian Treanor - 2009 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 23 (1-2):9-28.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-02-01

Downloads
190 (#105,719)

6 months
83 (#59,425)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Nomy Arpaly
Brown University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
On Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1999 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Intelligent Virtue.Julia Annas - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Modern Moral Philosophy.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1958 - Philosophy 33 (124):1 - 19.
Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50 (1):115-152.

View all 18 references / Add more references