Moral Objectivity: A Kantian Illusion?

Journal of Value Inquiry 49 (1-2):31-45 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Some moral claims strike us as objective. It is often argued that this shows morality to be objective. Moral experience – broadly construed – is invoked as the strongest argument for moral realism, the thesis that there are moral facts or properties.See e.g. Jonathan Dancy, “Two conceptions of Moral Realism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 60 : 167–187. Realists, however, cannot appropriate the argument from moral experience. In fact, constructivists argue that to validate the ways we experience the objectivity of moral claims, realism must be rejected.Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity . There is a general agreement that ethical theory bears the burden of proof of explaining the objective-seeming features of our moral experience.While disputing objectivity, antirealists commit themselves to account for the objectivist pretensions of moral claims. Anti-realists agree with the traditional view that moral experie ..

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,261

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Rawls on the Objectivity of Practical Reason.Carla Bagnoli - 2001 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):307-329.
Two Problems of Moral Objectivity.Steven Ross - 2001 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):49-62.
Kantian value realism.Alison Hills - 2008 - Ratio 21 (2):182–200.
Is Kant a Moral Constructivist or a Moral Realist?Paul Formosa - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):170-196.
Contractualism, moral motivation, and practical reason.Samuel Freeman - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (6):281-303.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-08-12

Downloads
166 (#116,996)

6 months
9 (#317,143)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Carla Bagnoli
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia

Citations of this work

Nietzsche and Moral Psychology.Daniel Telech & Brian Leiter - 2016 - In Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 103-115.
Kantian Constructivism and the Moral Problem.Bagnoli Carla - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):1229-1246.
Neo‐Humean rationality and two types of principles.Caj Strandberg - 2024 - Analytic Philosophy 65 (2):256-273.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Kantian constructivism in moral theory.John Rawls - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (9):515-572.
Constructivism about Practical Knowledge.Carla Bagnoli - 2013 - In Constructivism in Ethics. Cambridge University Press. pp. 153-182.

Add more references