Indeterminate permissibility and choiceworthy options

Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1693-1702 (2018)
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Abstract

Various people have claimed that some cases involve indeterminate permissibility. However, it’s unclear what guidance one can take away from this fact: are indeterminately permissible options choiceworthy and if so when? In this paper, I present a counterexample that undermines two existing responses to this question and I then present two alternative solutions that avoid this counterexample.

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Adam Bales
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

Moral Rightness Comes in Degrees.Martin Peterson - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (4):645-664.
Abortion Is Neither Right Nor Wrong.Martin Peterson - 2022 - Journal of Value Inquiry 56 (2):219-240.

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References found in this work

Vague Value.Tom Dougherty - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):352-372.

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