Wittgenstein running: Neural mechanisms of collective intentionality and we-mode

Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):123-133 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper we discuss the problem of the neural conditions of shared attitudes and intentions: which neural mechanisms underlie “we-mode” processes or serve as precursors to such processes? Neurophysiological and neuropsychological evidence suggests that in different areas of the brain neural representations are shared by several individuals. This situation, on the one hand, creates a potential problem for correct attribution. On the other hand, it may provide the conditions for shared attitudes and intentions

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,261

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Can brains in vats think as a team?Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):201-218.
Collective intentionality.Deborah Tollefsen - 2004 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Rationality in collective action.Margaret Gilbert - 2006 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):3-17.
Collective guilt and collective guilt feelings.Margaret Gilbert - 2002 - The Journal of Ethics 6 (2):115-143.
Collective and joint intention.Raimo Tuomela - 2000 - Mind and Society 1 (2):39-69.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
110 (#161,675)

6 months
1 (#1,478,781)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Shared emotions.Mikko Salmela - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (1):33-46.
Explicatures are NOT Cancellable.Alessandro Capone - 2013 - In Alessandro Capone, Franco Lo Piparo & Marco Carapezza (eds.), Perspectives on linguistic pragmatics. Springer. pp. 131-151.
Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons.Matteo Bianchin - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5):442-461.
A model-based approach to social ontology.Matti Sarkia - 2021 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 52 (3):175-203.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Collective Intentions and Actions.John Searle - 1990 - In Philip R. Cohen Jerry Morgan & Martha Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication. MIT Press. pp. 401-415.
Shared cooperative activity.Michael E. Bratman - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):327-341.
We-Intentions.Raimo Tuomela & Kaarlo Miller - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (3):367-389.

View all 15 references / Add more references