Abstract

The aim of the present paper is to show that the fundamental transformation of Russian society that had been realized by the Soviet government since the early twenties included not only the reforms of scientific institutions or the creation of a new educational system but also a radical reevaluation of the social role of the expert knowledge. It proposes a transversal analysis of the institutional history of the Soviet science and its complex relations with the state apparatus in order to show that the research policy of the twenties should be considered not only as an attempt to stimulate a “catch up growth,” but rather as an anticipation of some essential problems discussed in the contemporary social epistemology. The early Soviet government had a very particular vision of “social engineering” that was both utopian and extremely pragmatic. The Soviet Union was considered as the first truly “scientific state,” based on the idea that the historical development could be accelerated due to a party lead popular mobilization. The result of this conviction was the policy of “state-sponsored evolutionism” that created a high demand for the experts in all fields of knowledge. First, it focuses on the dualism of scientific institutions in the twenties when the “old” Academy of Sciences composed of the scientists formed under the Old Regime was disputing the role of the leading research institution with the newly created Communist Academy. This period could be described as the era of “New Scientific Policy” or some kind of “primitive accumulation” of the expert knowledge. Later it explores another dualism that existed since the creation of the Soviet Union: it consisted of the opposition between two rival projects of state building. The first one was promoted by State Planning Committee and made an emphasis on the administrative division based on economical basis, the second one was a project of People’s Commissariat of Nationalities, that proposed a creation of multiple soviet “national states” based on the principle of self-determination. Both projects required a large amount of data in various fields of knowledge and promoted a creation of new research institutions and favored the pioneering study in both central economy planning and social engineering. The aim of this article is to place the soviet experience in the comparative perspective, claiming that the communist modernization should be analyzed in the context of elaboration, in Foucault’s terms, of new “governmental technologies” which are supposed to be the products of new research institutions directly or indirectly influenced by a modern state.