Desire Satisfactionism and Not-So-Satisfying Deserts

Southwest Philosophy Review 35 (1):217-227 (2019)
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Abstract

This paper appeals to certain popular doctrines about human welfare and morality to offer a new response to the problem of hell. In particular, I contend that the combination of desire satisfactionism, a subjective theory about welfare, with an objective theory of morality leads to a surprisingly intuitive and compelling argument for the consistency of the post-mortem punishment of people in hell with the existence of an omniperfect God. In fact, under these conditions, the existence of such a divine being may actually require that there be at least some type of hell/post-mortem punishment. Finally, I suggest that positing the existence of hell can strengthen desire satisfactionism against an objection tied to base or immoral desires.

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