Abstract

We analyze the decisiveness structures associated with acyclical collective choice rules. In particular, we examine the consequences of adding anonymity to weak Pareto, thereby complementing earlier results on acyclical social choice. Both finite and countably infinite populations are considered. As established in contributions by Donald Brown and by Jeffrey Banks, acyclical social choice is closely linked to prefilters in the presence of the weak Pareto principle. We introduce the notion of a conditional prefilter and use it to generalize their results. In the finite-population case, adding anonymity implies that the collection of decisive sets is a special case of a conditional prefilter. We then identify the decisiveness structure that results from adding anonymity to the weak Pareto principle. Moving to infinite populations, we obtain the decisive set that consists of the entire population as a possibility, along with a new class of prefilters that we refer to as symmetric free Fréchet prefilters. The choice of the term Fréchet prefilter is motivated by the observation that they share a defining property with the well-known Fréchet filter—namely, that all sets in the requisite collection are such that their complement is finite.