The Domain Constraint on Analogy and Analogical Argument

Informal Logic 17 (1) (1995)
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Abstract

Domain constraint, the requirement that analogues be selected from "the same category," inheres in the popular saying "you can't compare apples and oranges" and the textbook principle "the greater the number of shared properties, the stronger the argument from analogy." I identify roles of domains in biological, linguistic, and legal analogy, supporting the account of law with a computer word search of judicial decisions. I argue that the category treatments within these disciplines cannot be exported to general informal logic, where the relevance of properties, not their number, must be the logically prior criterion for evaluating analogical arguments

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References found in this work

Analogies and Missing Premises.Trudy Govier - 1989 - Informal Logic 11 (3).
By Parity of Reasoning.John Woods & Brent Hudak - 1989 - Informal Logic 11 (3).

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