The Moral Status of the First Principle of Practical Reason in Thomas's Natural-Law Theory

The Thomist 71 (4):609-631 (2007)
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Abstract

A defense of the view that every truly human action (that is, every action that proceeds from reason and will) is a moral action. There is no such thing as a concrete, pre-moral action.

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Giuseppe Butera
Providence College

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