Avoiding Risk and Avoiding Evidence

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Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (3):495-515 (2020)
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Abstract

It is natural to think that there is something epistemically objectionable about avoiding evidence, at least in ideal cases. We argue that this thought is inconsistent with a kind of risk-avoidance...

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10.1080/00048402.2019.1697305

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Author Profiles

Catrin Campbell-Moore
University of Bristol
Bernhard Salow
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

Risk aversion and elite‐group ignorance.David Kinney & Liam Kofi Bright - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):35-57.
The Value of Biased Information.Nilanjan Das - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1):25-55.
Credal pragmatism.Jie Gao - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1595-1617.
Rational Aversion to Information.Sven Neth - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

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References found in this work

Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.
Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Laws and Symmetry.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1989 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 182 (3):327-329.

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