The Way Things Were

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):24-39 (2010)
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David Sanson
Illinois State University

Citations of this work

Ideological parsimony.Sam Cowling - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3889-3908.
Nefarious Presentism.Jonathan Tallant & David Ingram - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):355-371.
Presentism and Truthmaking.Ben Caplan & David Sanson - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (3):196-208.
Defining Existence Presentism.Jonathan Charles Tallant - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S3):479-501.
Presentism and the Myth of Passage.Lisa Leininger - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):724-739.

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References found in this work

Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Theodore Sider - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):642-647.
A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility.David Malet Armstrong - 1989 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
A Defense of Presentism.Ned Markosian - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:47-82.

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