Abstract

The idea of the "original position" is one of the most famous concepts in contemporary political philosophy. Since the first publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971, the device of the original position has become a popular theoretical method in many political theorists' writings. Unfortunately, the true meaning of the original position is far from clear both in Rawls's and Rawlsians' accounts. This has caused a lot of misunderstanding and misuse of this concept in contemporary literature. This study attempts to explore the more profound connotation of the original position by sorting out its relationship with Kant's categorical imperative procedure and argues that it is more appropriate to claim that Rawls's original position device is a development of Kant's categorical imperative procedure rather than the standard version of rational choice theory or social contract tradition. I demonstrate three essential similarities between Rawls's original position and Kant's categorical imperative procedure, which embodies Kantian constructivism: justificatory individualism, the reasonable presupposes and subordinates the rational, and the combination of moral and realistic considerations.