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Moods, Colored Lenses, and Emotional Disconnection: a Comment on Gallegos
Philosophia 46 (3):625-632 (2018)
Abstract
In “Moods Are Not Colored Lenses: Perceptualism and the Phenomenology of Moods” Francisco Gallegos presents a challenge to a popular view about the phenomenology of being in a mood that he calls “perceptualism”. In this essay, I offer a partial defense of perceptualism about moods and argue that perceptualism and Gallegos’s preferred Heideggerian alternative need not be viewed as in opposition to one another.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Why moods change: their appropriateness and connection to beliefs.Tatyana A. Kostochka - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11399-11420.
References found in this work
Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value.Bennett W. Helm - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content.Tim Bayne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):385-404.
The nature and plausibility of cognitivism.John Haugeland - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (2):215-26.
Do We Perceive Natural Kind Properties?Berit Brogaard - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):35 - 42.
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