Dualism 301: A Case for Multiple Soul Residency

Open Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):54-70 (2024)
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Abstract

Psychological dualism (or dualism herein) purports that there is a complementary, non-material/physical, mind-active component associated with a living organism. Thus mind would not simply be an expression of brain function as confidently believed by neuroscience (and science in general). As earlier work has suggested that confidence can be brushed aside by considering some accepted unusual behaviors. One simple dualism-consistent example is terminal lucidity in which people return to psychological coherence shortly before death despite having been lost to “dull, unconscious, or mentally ill” conditions, in some cases for years. Arguably framing these challenges to materialism, though, is genetics’ unfolding “missing heritability” crisis in which many expected DNA origins have not been found despite extensive searches. An associated soul-consistent explanation is that instead of DNA origins these innate characteristics reflect continuity associated with the earlier lives of incarnating souls (and of course with this some other particular explanations). Herein arguments for the existence of souls are considered for the very surprising case of multiple soul residency in a single organism. Discussions on this possibility focus on the stunning experiences of some heart transplant patients, and also the very difficult condition of Multiple Personality (or Dissociative Identity) Disorder. These two phenomena pose very difficult challenges for materialism (and brain function), and on the other hand are suggestive of the influences of additional souls. Finally, some of the implications of these extraordinary possibilities are briefly considered.

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