Basic knowledge and the problem of easy knowledge

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329 (2002)
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Abstract

The dominant response to this problem of the criterion focuses on the alleged requirement that we need to know a belief source is reliable in order for us to acquire knowledge by that source. Let us call this requirement, “The KR principle”

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2007

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00318205

DOI

10.1111/j.1933-1592.2002.tb00204.x

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Citations of this work

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References found in this work

Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
A virtue epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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