Evidence

&
In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,323

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Internalism Defended.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 2001 - American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):1 - 18.
Evidence of evidence is not (necessarily) evidence.Branden Fitelson - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):85-88.
Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.Earl Brink Conee & Richard Feldman - 2004 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Edited by Richard Feldman.
Heeding misleading evidence.Earl Conee - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 103 (2):99-120.
Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
Replies.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
Review of Earl Conee, Richard Feldman, Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology. [REVIEW]Richard Fumerton - 2005 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (2).
Evidentialism and the problem of stored beliefs.Tommaso Piazza - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):311 - 324.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
24 (#660,844)

6 months
1 (#1,478,456)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Earl Conee
University of Rochester
Richard Feldman
University of Rochester

Citations of this work

Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.
The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):363-387.
Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):364-376.

View all 127 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references