Abstract

This thesis' objective is an understanding of Aristotle's two quite different treatments of pleasure in the Nicomachean Ethics. Both treatments have implications for understanding human action and the role of pleasure in the good life. The thesis shows that differences in the treatments are resolvable if, first, an independent common basis for an Aristotelian notion of pleasure is developed and then the contexts of the passages are considered. ;The De Anima's exposition of locomotion as the characteristic activity of the sensient being is used to orient the discussion. From it the basis for a notion of pleasure is established which includes the actuality-potentiality relationships in a sensient act as well as Aristotle's notion of orexis. Because the frameworks of the De Amina and Nicomachean Ethics differ, a transition is needed. Analyzing Aristotle's use of physis as it relates to the acts characteristic of biological and of ethical behaviors shows that the notion of pleasure in both works is an analogous one. The transition enables the concepts involved to be appropriately applied and, in the Nicomachean Ethics, hexeis are seen to operate in an analogous fashion to the De Anima's concept of animate nature. ;It is through a detailed analysis of each passage that the contexts of the passages become clear. The analyses are organized under four broad themes: Aristotle's criticism of other opinions, his position that pleasure is not a process but an energeia, his descriptions of pleasure both as an unimpeded activity of a natural state and as the supervenient end of perfect activity and his use of the notion of pleasure to resolve some difficult ethical problems. Through a close consideration of the needs of their contexts, a harmonious interpretation of pleasure evolves which respects the differences of the passages and accounts for them