Knowability and Other Onto-theological Paradoxes

Logica Universalis 13 (4):577-586 (2019)
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Abstract

In virtue of Fitch-Church proof, also known as the knowability paradox, we are able to prove that if everything is knowable, then everything is known. I present two ‘onto-theological’ versions of the proof, one concerning collective omniscience and another concerning omnificence. I claim these arguments suggest new ways of exploring the intersection between logical and ontological givens that is a grounding theme of religious thought. What is more, they are good examples of what I call semi-paradoxes: apparently sound arguments whose conclusion is not properly unacceptable, but simply arguable.

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Franca d'Agostini
Università degli Studi di Milano

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On conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.
The taming of the true.Neil Tennant - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Doubt Truth to Be a Liar.Graham Priest - 2007 - Studia Logica 87 (1):129-134.

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