Michael Polanyi on Scientific Authority and his Criticism of Popper and Russell

Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 56 (1):249-268 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article analyzes, Polanyi’s notion of authority in science and his criticism of Popper and Russell. It uses the history of early genetics and neo-Darwinism in order to examine the fruitfulness of Polanyi's concepts for an understanding of the history of biology. It discusses the responsibility of scientists in influential positions and shows that scientific authority is – as is criticism – indispensable for progress.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,227

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Rationality and the tu quoque argument.Joseph Agassi - 1973 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 16 (1-4):395 – 406.
Polanyi's Progress.Phil Rolnick - 1993 - Tradition and Discovery 19 (2):13-31.
A critique of Popper's views on scientific method.Nicholas Maxwell - 1972 - Philosophy of Science 39 (2):131-152.
Science in a democratic republic.I. C. Jarvie - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (4):545-564.
Darwin, Kuhn, and Polanyi.Richard Henry Schmitt - 2006 - Tradition and Discovery 33 (2):49-55.
Michael Polanyi.Paul Craig Roberts - 2005 - Tradition and Discovery 32 (3):15-18.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-01-08

Downloads
41 (#390,435)

6 months
7 (#439,760)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ute Deichmann
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references