Abstract

In this paper, I would like to consider Aristotle’s concept of time by examining his use of the word χρόνος in the biological works. I defend the thesis that for Aristotle, χρόνος is first and foremost a local biological and physical reality and not a universal mathematical structure. That is to say that in the biological works χρόνος refers to the time of specific movements and functions or biological activities: for example the time of mating, the period of gestation, generation, the periods of celestial movements etc. I will argue that this becomes clear as we examine the semantics of the word χρόνος in his biological works, and especially in the more descriptive works such as History of animals. The larger aim of my paper is to provide elements that shed a new light on Aristotle’s “theory of time” in his Physics. I will argue that for Aristotle time is a relative and that, although he states that we can’t attribute velocity to time, his conception is in this respect much more akin to the theory of Einstein than to the conception of Newton. So, I construct and evaluate arguments to sustain the Aristotelian notion of χρόνος as ‘local time’. This important aspect of his theory of time has until now largely been overlooked.