Mental disorder: An ability-based view

Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 4 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

What is it to have a mental disorder? The paper proposes an ability-based view of mental disorder. It argues that such a view is preferable to biological dysfunction views such as Wakefield’s Harmful Dysfunction Analysis and Boorse’s Biostatistical Theory. According to the proposed view, having a mental disorder is basically a matter of having a certain type of inability (or: an ability that is not sufficiently high): the inability to respond adequately to some of one’s available reasons in some of one’s reasons-sensitive attitudes or actions, where the threshold of inability is determined by one’s being harmed. The relevant concepts of inability, reasons, and harm are sketched. The paper argues that the proposed view evades some problems of biological dysfunction views by remaining neutral on questions of causation and the evolution of the mind. Furthermore, it can capture better what is distinctively “mental” about mental disorder. On the proposed view, it is the rational relations among an individual’s attitudes and actions that are “disordered” and the relevant norms in mental disorder are the norms of reasons. As further merits, the view can account for degrees of disorder, incorporate biological as well as social aspects, and elucidate the relations among disorders, symptoms, and their causes.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,197

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

What is mental about mental disorder?Bengt Brülde & Filip Radovic - 2006 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (2):99-116.
What Makes a Disorder 'Mental'? A Practical Treatment of Psychiatric Disorder.Joseph Gough - 2023 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 30 (1):15-35.
Is Non-Suicidal Self-Harm in Youth a Mental Disorder?Snita Ahir-Knight - 2020 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (1):57-71.
Mental disorder and values.Bengt Brülde - 2007 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 93-102.
Why the mental disorder concept matters.Dusan Kecmanovic - 2011 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 4 (1):1-9.
Sex, Immorality, and Mental Disorders.Bernard Gert & Charles M. Culver - 2009 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 34 (5):487-495.
Function, Dysfunction, and the Concept of Mental Disorder.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2021 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 28 (4):371-375.
Naturalist accounts of mental disorder.Elselijn Kingma - 2013 - In K. W. M. Fulford, Martin Davies, Richard Gipps, George Graham, John Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini & Tim Thornton (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy and psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 363.
Defining mental disorder. Exploring the 'natural function' approach.Somogy Varga - 2011 - Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 6:1-.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-04-12

Downloads
55 (#291,844)

6 months
25 (#115,544)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Sanja Dembić
Humboldt University, Berlin

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references