“YOU AND I DO NOT ‘SHARE’ THE SAME CONSCIOUSNESS”: APPLYING A NOMINALIST BUDDHIST SEMANTIC PERSPECTIVE TO THE GENERAL EXPRESSION “CONSCIOUSNESS”

Kínesis - Revista de Estudos Dos Pós-Graduandos Em Filosofia 14 (36) (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is recognized that Buddhadharma schools are markedly ontologically, epistemologically, and semantically nominalist. Regardless of that, when it comes to the use of the term “consciousness”, there is still a tendency in some Western circles to understand Buddhism in a solipsist or monist way. To this purpose, I argue that the general expression “consciousness” from Buddhadharma texts must be understood according to traditional nominalist Buddhist semantics and theory of entities. In the end, I briefly mention some arguments and viewpoints – defending the plurality/diversity of consciousness – of some Buddhist Dzogchen scholars and masters.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Contemporary Philosophy of Mind and Buddhist Thought.John Spackman - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (10):741-751.
Death in Tibetan Buddhism.Alyson Prude - 2019 - In Timothy D. Knepper, Lucy Bregman & Mary Gottschalk (eds.), Death and Dying : An Exercise in Comparative Philosophy of Religion. Springer Verlag. pp. 125-142.
Buddhist Epistemology.Kuang Lo - 1998 - Philosophy and Culture 25 (5):402-405.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-09-11

Downloads
259 (#79,064)

6 months
259 (#9,187)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references