Abstract
A fate similar to Kant’s sometimes befalls Hegel: the importance of their meditation on art is not always given its full due. In Kant’s case the Critique of Judgement becomes an elaborate afterthought, filling some of the gaps left by the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason. Particularly with English-speaking commentators, Kant is read from the First Critique forwards, never also from the Third Critique backwards. Hegel, we add, did not lend himself to such a unilinear reading of Kant; yet his own concern with art is frequently subject to a similar consideration. Despite the fact that Hegel unabashedly ascribes to art a certain absoluteness, his reflections on art tend not to be placed close to the core of his philosophy as a whole. As in commentaries on Kant, so also with Hegel: towards the end of involved exegeses, we get a quick run-through of their aesthetic views, as if both too did write on these matters, yet somehow in a not central way. Art comes after the hard work is done, it does not shape their thought from the beginning. We may marvel at the astonishing breadth of culture displayed by Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics, all the more surprising, given Hegel’s reputation as an unbending rationalist. In them we may find many rich reflections on art’s significance. Yet these tend to be detached from the general principles of Hegel’s philosophy, and praised or criticized in isolation. Even when due weight is given to the general principles of Hegel’s thought, and even when these principles are held to reveal something of art’s significance, the significance of art for philosophy itself tends to remain unexplored. How the art work enters intimately into Hegel’s ideal of philosophical thinking is not always entertained for the central question that it is.