An Inverted Qualia Argument for Direct Realism

Topoi 43 (1):211-219 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This essay extends my “invisible disagreement” argument for Color Realism (2017) to formulate an argument for Direct Realism. It uses a variation of an “inverted qualia” thought experiment to show that successes in intersubjectively validating empirical claims about colors is proof that a nuanced version of Direct Realism is correct.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,227

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Wittgenstein and Qualia.Ned Block - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):73-115.
Against Direct Realism (near final draft).Paul Griffiths - 2021 - Philosophy Now 146 (October/November):12-13.
The Positive Argument Against Scientific Realism.Florian J. Boge - 2023 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 54 (4):535-566.
Absent and inverted qualia revisited.Joseph Levine - 1988 - Mind and Language 3 (4):271-87.
Qualia and materialism: Closing the explanatory gap.Clyde L. Hardin - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (December):281-98.
Qualia Compression.Lieven Decock & Igor Douven - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):129-150.
Inverted qualia.Alex Byrne - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-02-15

Downloads
20 (#771,402)

6 months
20 (#132,777)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Justin Donhauser
Bowling Green State University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Quining qualia.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.
What psychological states are not.Ned Block & Jerry A. Fodor - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (April):159-81.
Physicalism, or Something near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):306-310.
From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Philosophy 79 (309):491-494.

View all 22 references / Add more references