Why the Brain Knows More than We Do

Brain Sciences 2:1-21 (2011)
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Abstract

Scientific studies have shown that non-conscious stimuli and représentations influence information processing during conscious experience. In the light of such evidence, questions about potential functional links between non-conscious brain representations and conscious experience arise. This article discusses models capable of explaining how statistical learning mechanisms in dedicated resonant circuits could generate specific temporal activity traces of non-conscious representations in the brain. How reentrant signaling, top-down matching, and statistical coincidence of such activity traces may lead to the progressive consolidation of neural signatures of conscious experience in networks extending across large distances beyond functionally specialized brain regions is then explained.

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Birgitta Dresp-Langley
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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