Deciding for the Incompetent
Abstract
This chapter discusses the moral framework for surrogate decision-making for
incompetent medical patients. The chapter focuses on the question of how we
can respect the autonomy of those who are no longer competent to make such
decisions. The standard counterfactual account of how to respect the autonomy
of the incompetent is evaluated, along with accounts that ground respect for
autonomy on the patient’s most recent desires and values (regardless of whether
the patient still possesses those desires and values) as well as accounts according
to which only the current desires and values of the patient matter. Other issues
discussed include whether questions of personal identity should affect decision-making
for incompetent patients, whether a patient’s former desires and values
factor in to the patient’s current well-being, and whether an incompetent patient’s
“investment interests” should guide decisions on the patient’s behalf.