Disputing an Analytic Construct of Philosophical Conservatism

Abstract

This paper examines and ultimately objects to a version of political Conservatism as described in Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin’s paper “Analytic Conservatism.” Brennan and Hamlin’s argument makes several claims about economic forecasting and societal risk-aversion that ultimately uphold the status quo within society. This paper examines these claims and refutes them, while also considering counter-arguments Brennan and Hamlin could use to defend their theory. In conclusion, this paper supports the analytic dimension of Brennan and Hamlin’s theory while criticizing the trivial and arbitrary nature of valuing the status quo

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,440

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

A Defense of Restricted Phenomenal Conservatism.Harold Langsam - 2013 - Philosophical Papers 42 (3):315 - 340.
Is There an 'I' in Epistemology?Ted Poston - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (4):517-541.
Epistemic conservatism.Rodrigo Laera - 2013 - Filosofia Unisinos 14 (3):176-188.
Józef M. Bocheński and the Cracow Circle.Jan Woleński - 2013 - Studies in East European Thought 65 (1-2):5-15.
Varieties of epistemic conservatism.Hamid Vahid - 2004 - Synthese 141 (1):97 - 122.
PPE: An appraisal.Geoffrey Brennan, Alan Hamlin & Hartmut Kliemt - 2010 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (4):363-365.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-04-17

Downloads
30 (#537,355)

6 months
6 (#531,855)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references