Apeiron 40 (1):71 - 93 (
2007)
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Abstract
Most readers of ancient Greek psychology will agree that the Philebus is where we find Platos best attempt to theorize about bodily pain.1 But they will probably also agree that the account he develops there has no real chance of being true, and so should not have much appeal to us today at least insofar as we are philosophers rather than historians. Its this second conviction that I want to challenge in what follows. More specifically, I want to argue for two connected claims about the merits of Platos account: first, that despite its flaws which are significant it is stronger and more subtle than most commentators have yet realized; and second, that it anticipates in interesting ways a view that has become both increasingly popular and increasingly controversial in the last couple of decades: the view that pains like beliefs, desires, hopes, and fears are mental states with representational content. I will call this view representationalism.