Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for Knowledge

Erkenntnis 80 (1):185-200 (2015)
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Abstract

Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called ‘extended mind’ thesis

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10.1007/s10670-014-9620-2

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Katalin Farkas
Central European University

Citations of this work

Know-wh does not reduce to know that.Katalin Farkas - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2):109-122.
Against epistemic absolutism.Changsheng Lai - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3945-3967.
Beliefless Knowing.Paul Silva - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):723-746.

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References found in this work

The extended mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
On Certainty (ed. Anscombe and von Wright).Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1969 - San Francisco: Harper Torchbooks. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe, G. H. von Wright & Mel Bochner.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.

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