Self‐Assessment and Social Practices

Journal of Social Philosophy 48 (2):144-164 (2017)
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Abstract

This article develops and defends a social practice-based theory of personal ideals. After sketching this theory, I show how it undermines the sharp dichotomy between evaluative self-assessment and assessment of one’s social standing that underlies common objections to accounts of pride and shame (such as Rawls’s account of shame) that explain these emotions in terms of personal ideals.

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Jeremy Fischer
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