Abstract

In this chapter, I argue that despite Rorty and MacIntyre’s shared historicism, critics are right to claim that Rorty is more of a relativist than MacIntyre because the latter provides a more substantial conception of rational progress. At its most fundamental, MacIntyre’s inter-tradition conception of rational progress recognizes incoherence as a general ill and the pursuit of truth as a general good, whereas the specter of incommensurability precludes Rorty from establishing generalities regarding progress. Thus, after a brief introduction I present the key points of confluence found in Rorty’s and MacIntyre’s respective conceptions of historicism focusing on their conceptions of “justification” and “rationality” as well as their attempts to reject the charge of relativism. Then I show how MacIntyre’s conception of rational progress and the role he envisions for truth as the ideal end of enquiry set him apart from Rorty. Finally, I conclude that these differences make MacIntyre less susceptible to the charge of relativism and that this, in turn, makes his conception of progress more alluring than Rorty’s.