Belief updating in subclinical and clinical delusions

Schizophrenia Bulletin Open (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Current frameworks propose that delusions result from aberrant belief updating due to altered prediction error (PE) signaling and misestimation of environmental volatility. We aimed to investigate whether behavioral and neural signatures of belief updating are specifically related to the presence of delusions or generally associated with manifest schizophrenia.Our cross-sectional design includes human participants (nfemale/male=6625/41), stratified into four groups: healthy participants with minimal (n=22) or strong delusional-like ideation (n=18), and participants with diagnosed schizophrenia with minimal (n=13) or strong delusions (n=13), resulting in a 2x2 design, which allows to test for the effects of delusion and diagnosis. Participants performed a reversal learning task with stable and volatile task contingencies during fMRI scanning. We formalized learning with a hierarchical Gaussian filter model and conducted model-based fMRI analysis regarding beliefs of outcome uncertainty and volatility, precision-weighted PEs of the outcome- and the volatility-belief.Patients with schizophrenia as compared to healthy controls showed lower accuracy and heightened choice switching, while delusional ideation did not affect these measures. Participants with delusions showed increased precision-weighted PE-related neural activation in fronto-striatal regions. People with diagnosed schizophrenia overestimated environmental volatility and showed an attenuated neural representation of volatility in the anterior insula, medial frontal and angular gyrus.Delusional beliefs are associated with altered striatal PE-signals. Juxtaposing, the potentially unsettling belief that the environment is constantly changing and weaker neural encoding of this subjective volatility seems to be associated with manifest schizophrenia, but not with the presence of delusional ideation.

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