Belief’s minimal rationality

Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3263-3282 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Many of our beliefs behave irrationally: this is hardly news to anyone. Although beliefs’ irrational tendencies need to be taken into account, this paper argues that beliefs necessarily preserve at least a minimal level of rationality. This view offers a plausible picture of what makes belief unique and will help us to set beliefs apart from other cognitive attitudes.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1007/s11098-019-01369-y

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

A rule of minimal rationality: The logical link between beliefs and values.Jeffrey Foss - 1976 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 19 (1-4):341 – 353.
The relation between degrees of belief and binary beliefs: A general impossibility theorem.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2021 - In Igor Douven (ed.), Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief. Essays on the Lottery Paradox. Cambridge University Press. pp. 223-54.
Gricean Belief Change.James P. Delgrande, Abhaya C. Nayak & Maurice Pagnucco - 2005 - Studia Logica 79 (1):97-113.
Rationality and the First Person.Olley Pearson - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (11-12):132-148.
The moral belief problem.Neil Sinclair - 2006 - Ratio 19 (2):249–260.
Bayle on the (Ir)rationality of Religious Belief.Kristen Irwin - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (6):560-569.
Rationality and higher-order intentionality.Alan Millar - 2001 - Philosophy Supplement 49:179-198.
Holding/Modifying Beliefs: Critical Thinking and the Problem of Minimal Rationality.Robert Mark Frazier - 1993 - Dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo
The Rationality of Religious Belief in a Postmodern Age.Thomas Anthony Provenzola - 2000 - Dissertation, Trinity Evangelical Divinity School
La voluntad de no creer.Manuel Iglesias - 2007 - Análisis Filosófico 27 (1).
Minimal belief change and pareto-optimality.Oliver Schulte - unknown
Primitively rational belief-forming processes.Ralph Wedgwood - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 180--200.
The Dynamic Foundations of Epistemic Rationality.Barry Lam - forthcoming - Philosophy.
Rationality of belief or: why savage’s axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality. [REVIEW]Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):11-31.
Intentionality without Rationality.Lisa Bortolotti - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):369 - 376.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-11-15

Downloads
730 (#22,402)

6 months
179 (#17,029)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Resistant beliefs, responsive believers.Carolina Flores - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
How can belief be akratic?Eugene Chislenko - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13925-13948.
On the Irreducibility of Attitudinal Imagining.Alon Chasid - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy:1-33.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation.Donald Davidson - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

View all 118 references / Add more references