Comment défendre l’anti-pragmatisme de Clifford à propos des croyances en général et des croyances religieuses en particulier

ThéoRèmes 13 (13) (2018)
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Abstract

I outline and criticise the received interpretation of the controversy between Clifford and James over the ethics of belief. I defend Clifford’s view by arguing that his maxim ‘that it is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence’ should be understood as stating that any belief that results from the corruption of one’s judgement by one’s desires is wrong. I indicate what follows about religious beliefs in particular.

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Benoit Gaultier
University of Zürich

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References found in this work

Self-Deception Unmasked.Alfred R. Mele - 2001 - Princeton University Press.
Warranted Christian Belief.Alvin Plantinga - 2000 - Philosophia Christi 3 (2):327-328.
Twisted Self Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):117-137.
Finite rational self-deceivers.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):191 - 208.
Emotion and Desire in Self-Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 163-179.

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