Chalmers' principle of organizational invariance makes consciousness fundamental but meaningless spectator of its own drama

Activitas Nervosa Superior 61 (4):159-164 (2019)
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Abstract

The principles of classical physics, including deterministic dynamics and observability of physical states, are incompatible with the existence of unobservable conscious minds that possess free will. Attempts to directly accommodate consciousness in a classical world lead to philosophical paradoxes such as causally ineffective consciousness and possibility of alternate worlds in which functional brain isomorphs behave identically but lack conscious experiences. Here, we show that because Chalmers’ principle of organizational invariance is based on a deficient nineteenth century classical physics, it is inherently flawed and implies evolutionary inexplicable epiphenomenal consciousness. Consequently, if consciousness is a fundamental ingredient of physical reality, no psychophysical laws such as Chalmers’ principle of organizational invariance are needed to establish correspondence between conscious experiences and brain function. Quantum mechanics is the most successful and only modern physical theory capable of naturally accommodating consciousness without violation of physical laws.

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2009-01-28

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Author's Profile

Danko D. Georgiev
Institute For Advanced Study, Varna

References found in this work

Facing up to the problem of consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
The Self and its brain.K. Popper & J. Eccles - 1986 - Revista de filosofía (Chile) 27:167-171.
Absent qualia, fading qualia, dancing qualia.David J. Chalmers - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 309--328.

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