Collective preferences, obligations, and rational choice

Economics and Philosophy 17 (1):109-119 (2001)
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Abstract

Can teams and other collectivities have preferences of their own, preferences that are not in some way reducible to the personal preferences of their members? In short, are collective preferences possible? In everyday life people speak easily of what we prefer, where what is at issue seems to be a collective preference. This is suggested by the acceptability of such remarks as ‘My ideal walk would be . . . along rougher and less well-marked paths than we prefer as a family’. One can imagine, indeed, that each member of a given family prefers something other than what the family prefers. What, then, do the collective preferences of everyday understanding amount to?

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Margaret Gilbert
University of California, Irvine

Citations of this work

Collectives' Duties and Collectivisation Duties.Stephanie Collins - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):231-248.
Group agency and supervenience.Philip Pettit - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):85-105.
Group virtue epistemology.Jesper Kallestrup - 2016 - Synthese 197 (12):5233-5251.
Two kinds of we-reasoning.Raul Hakli, Kaarlo Miller & Raimo Tuomela - 2010 - Economics and Philosophy 26 (3):291-320.
How to Tell if a Group is an Agent.Philip Pettit - 2014 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 97-121.

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